


DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I05-TSA-CHI-01544

WASH. D.C.
U.S. OFFICE OF
SPECIAL INSPECTOR
2005 JUN 31 PM 1:03



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<i>Case Number:</i>	I05-TSA-CHI-01544
<i>Case Title:</i>	Transportation Security Administration, Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City, MI
<i>Report Status:</i>	Final
<i>Alleged Violation(s):</i>	Deficiencies in TSA Security Measures Insufficient Emergency Training

SYNOPSIS

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a complaint from the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), Washington, DC, forwarding an allegation received from former Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Supervisory Security Screener Thomas Mair, Traverse City, MI. Mair alleged that TSA officials at Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City, MI, failed to respond to reported security deficiencies at the airport, resulting in a substantial and specific danger to public safety.

The OIG interviewed complainant Thomas Mair regarding his allegations, including four specific concerns enumerated in his complaint to the OSC. Mair's complaint alleged that two access points at the terminal building were insufficiently secured and that emergency lights failed, causing a security vulnerability. Further, he alleged that airport personnel have never received emergency preparedness training. Mair acknowledged being motivated, in part, by a desire to enhance his credibility with respect to an appeal he had filed concerning his termination from TSA.

The OIG interviewed Federal Security Director (FSD) Alan Anderson, Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City, MI, who refuted Mair's allegations. Anderson pointed out that the terminal building, which was the subject of the alleged physical security deficiencies specified by Mair, is no longer in use since the opening of a new terminal on October 27, 2004. Anderson provided documentation of TSA training, and multi-agency exercises, which have been conducted during 2003 and 2004. He also provided maintenance and repair records, which refuted Mair's allegation.

Reporting Agent:		Distribution:	
Name: [Redacted]	Signature: [Redacted]	Chicago Field Office	Original
Title: Special Agent	Date: 12/17/04	Headquarters	1 cc
Approving Official:		Component(s)	1 cc
Name: Thomas M. Frost	Signature: [Signature]	Other	cc
Title: Special Agent in Charge	Date: 12-20-04		

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The OIG conducted interviews of numerous persons from various agencies, which confirmed that: the old airport terminal had been in compliance with all Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and TSA security regulations and guidelines; TSA had participated in numerous joint agency emergency planning meetings and training exercises; and repairs had been made to areas of the old terminal mentioned in response to incidents described in the allegations.

The allegations were not substantiated. OIG analysis of conditions at the old terminal, and management response at the time of alleged security lapses, did not disclose any systemic security management deficiencies that represent a past or present specific danger to public safety.

This matter will be referred to the TSA, Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review for whatever action they deem appropriate.

DETAILS

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a referral from the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC), which forwarded the allegations of Thomas Mair, former Supervisory Security Screener, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City, MI. Mair alleged that TSA officials failed to respond to reported security deficiencies at the airport, resulting in a substantial and specific danger to public safety. Mair's complaint alleged that two access points at the terminal building were insufficiently secured and that emergency lights failed, causing a security vulnerability. Further, he alleged that airport personnel have never received emergency preparedness training. (Exhibit 1)

Allegation 1: A door in a baggage-handling tunnel behind the airline ticket counters is left unlocked and/or unattended resulting in a breach of security. Complaints made by Mair about the door were ignored.

On November 29, 2004, the OIG surveyed the old terminal building at Cherry Capital Airport and observed the door listed in the allegation. The building is no longer used for any aviation traffic and was locked. (Exhibit 2)

On November 29, 2004, the OIG interviewed FSD Alan Anderson, who conceded that the door referred to in this allegation was not locked. Anderson explained that access to the door, through the tunnel, was restricted by locked doors controlling access from the terminal area. Access to the door from the outside was within the secured Air Operations Area (AOA). Anderson said that TSA Aviation Security Inspectors (ASI) had surveyed the area as part of their normal inspection process, and did not cite the door as needing to be locked. (Exhibit 3)

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On November 29, 2004, the OIG interviewed ASI [REDACTED], TSA, Cherry Capital Airport, who stated that the door in question had been within the airport's AOA, and that access to the door from the exterior of the building was controlled by the airport's perimeter fencing, which was permissible under FAA regulation 1542.201 for category 3 airports such as Traverse City, MI. (Exhibit 4)

On December 1, 2004, the OIG interviewed [REDACTED], former Screening Manager, TSA, who recalled Mair notifying [REDACTED] that the door had no locking mechanism. [REDACTED] claimed that [REDACTED] passed the concern to Assistant Federal Security Director (AFSD) [REDACTED] who informed [REDACTED] that the condition of the door was of no consequence because it was in the secured area. (Exhibit 5)

On December 1, 2004, the OIG interviewed ASI [REDACTED] TSA, who was previously assigned to Cherry Capital Airport. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was familiar with the door in question and that it had been within the secured AOA. [REDACTED] stated that access to this door from the exterior of the building was controlled by the airport's perimeter fencing, which was permissible under FAA regulations for category 3 airports such as Cherry Capital Airport and, therefore, the door did not have to be locked. [REDACTED] added that [REDACTED] conducted an Annual Comprehensive inspection of the airport from September 15-19, 2003, which determined that the airport was in compliance with all applicable TSA security regulations, including measures designed to secure the AOA. [REDACTED] denied that Mair had ever expressed a concern to [REDACTED] about the security of the door. (Exhibit 6)

The OIG investigation determined that although the door had been unlocked, it was located within an area protected by a security perimeter. This allegation was not substantiated.

Allegation 2: Emergency back-up lights in the baggage-handling tunnel did not work during a power outage, leaving the entire tunnel in complete darkness.

On November 29, 2004, the OIG surveyed the old terminal building at Cherry Capital Airport and observed the baggage-handling tunnel. The building is no longer used for any aviation traffic and was locked. (Exhibit 2)

The OIG interviewed FSD Alan Anderson who acknowledged being aware that the subject lights malfunctioned on at least one occasion. He explained that repairs were requested by [REDACTED] and completed by airport maintenance personnel. (Exhibit 3)

On November 30, 2004, the OIG interviewed [REDACTED] who recalled that during each of the two or three power outages which have occurred, at least one of the emergency lighting fixtures in the tunnel did not illuminate. The remaining lights continued to work, and the malfunctions were reported to the Northwest Regional Airport Commission (NRAC), Operations Office, which completed repairs. (Exhibit 7)

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On November 30, 2004, the OIG interviewed [REDACTED], NRAC, who recalled being informed about malfunctions of the emergency back-up lights in the tunnel [REDACTED] stated that within two days of being notified, new batteries were installed and thereafter the lights worked properly. [REDACTED] provided three sales invoices for the batteries that were installed. [REDACTED] accompanied the OIG to the tunnel and demonstrated that the subject lights were working by pressing the "test" button on two randomly chosen light fixtures. (Exhibit 8)

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] who recalled that Mair notified [REDACTED] of the lights' malfunction. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] reported the malfunctions to AFSD [REDACTED] who forwarded the information to airport operations. [REDACTED] recalled personally testing the lights after notifying [REDACTED] confirming that they were operational. [REDACTED] added that on at least two other occasions, and possibly more frequently, [REDACTED] performed a successful test of the lights. (Exhibit 5)

OIG investigation determined that on at least two occasions after having lost power, some of the emergency lighting in the baggage tunnel of the now vacant terminal did not function. Evidence was presented that the remaining lights were functional and, thus, a condition of complete darkness would not have resulted. This allegation was not substantiated.

Allegation 3: A revolving exit door that leads from the secured to the unsecured area of the passenger terminal malfunctions, and repairs have been unsuccessful, therefore, presenting a security risk. Further, the door's alarm cannot be heard at the closest TSA security post.

On November 29, 2004, the OIG surveyed the old terminal building at Cherry Capital Airport where the revolving exit door, subject of this allegation, is located. The building is no longer used for any aviation traffic and was locked. (Exhibit 2)

The OIG interviewed FSD Alan Anderson, who confirmed that on February 8, 2004, several teenagers had breached the door. He recalled that after the breach was confirmed, the individuals were re-screened and a contract security guard was placed at the door until design modifications to the door were completed on February 10, 2004.

With regard to the door's alarm, Anderson acknowledged that after receiving a complaint that the alarm was not always audible, he decided to relocate the alarm enunciator to the top of the stairwell located at the main TSA checkpoint. After relocation, the alarm could be heard throughout the passenger screening and gate areas. (Exhibit 3)

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] who recalled that the revolving exit door would jam periodically. [REDACTED] stated that on at least one occasion, the alarm [REDACTED] malfunctioned when a passenger attempted to enter through the door, however, since the door automatically stopped, no security breach occurred. [REDACTED] stated that the February 8, 2004, breach prompted a comprehensive examination of the door's operation. [REDACTED] stated that it took approximately three days to upgrade the door's hardware, during which time a contract security

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officer was stationed at the door. [redacted] stated [redacted] personally monitored the repair process and participated in subsequent testing of the door. [redacted] added that this incident was the only breach of security involving this door. [redacted] added that the relocation of the alarm enunciator closer to the TSA main checkpoint allowed TSA personnel to hear the alarm. (Exhibit 7)

On November 30, 2004, the OIG interviewed [redacted], Cherry Capital Airport, and conducted an on-site inspection of the door. The door was found to be in proper working condition, and the alarm, when activated, was audible from the area where the TSA main checkpoint had been previously located. [redacted] also provided copies of invoices for repairs to the door, which were completed on February 10, 2004, as well as for another repair dated January 28, 2004. (Exhibit 8)

On November 30, 2004, the OIG interviewed [redacted] Corporate Security Solutions (CSS), who provided copies of [redacted] company's daily activity reports indicating that a CSS security officer was posted at the subject revolving door during the period of February 8, 2004 through February 10, 2004. (Exhibit 8)

The OIG interviewed [redacted] who recalled the breach on February 8, 2004. [redacted] stated that [redacted] remembered that a contract security guard was posted at the door after the incident, and that the door was restored to proper operating condition within a couple of days. [redacted] recalled that on another occasion, the door was found to be in a constant revolving condition, which [redacted] felt could have allowed a breach of security. [redacted] stated that as a result of this discovery [redacted] decided to delay the departure of two flights. [redacted] stated a breach was not confirmed, and added that [redacted] believed the door was repaired later that day. (Exhibit 5)

On December 1, 2004, the OIG interviewed [redacted] Screening Manager, TSA, who stated that [redacted] was in the vicinity of the TSA main checkpoint on more than five occasions when the alarm on the revolving door was activated. [redacted] stated [redacted] believed that the alarm could be heard at the TSA main checkpoint with no difficulty. (Exhibit 9)

The OIG investigation revealed evidence that the revolving door had malfunctioned on one occasion, and had been quickly repaired. On a second occasion, the door had been breached, and modifications intended to enhance the effectiveness of the door were completed. There was no evidence to indicate that a malfunction of the door resulted in a breach. This allegation was not substantiated.

Allegation 4: Personnel at Cherry Capital Airport have received no training in emergency response procedures. No drills or exercises have been conducted. The complainant responded to a [redacted] without appropriate training.

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On November 29, 2004, the OIG interviewed complainant Thomas Mair, who acknowledged that he received sufficient training from TSA to qualify him to train newly hired screeners at Cherry Capital and three other airports. Mair stated that he also received training on the maintenance of Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) machines, and thereafter, he was responsible for the maintenance of these machines at Cherry Capital Airport. He stated that in 2003, he personally supervised the re-certification of subordinate screeners. Mair also stated he participated in the development of an Emergency Operations Manual, which was finalized in 2004. Although Mair complained about a lack of training in emergency procedures, during the interview, he produced a copy of a December 9, 2002, memorandum from FSD Alan Anderson entitled, "Security Incident Response Procedures."

SSI Mair described a [REDACTED] incident that occurred on February 8, 2004. He stated that he was unaware of the threat until the arrival of a [REDACTED] team at the airport. Mair stated he never learned who requested the [REDACTED] search; however, he opined that a Northwest Airlines representative may have done so. He claimed he subsequently spoke with the [REDACTED] and learned that [REDACTED]. Mair, therefore, concluded that the response to the threat should have been planned and communicated in advance. (Exhibit 10)

SSI The OIG interviewed FSD Alan Anderson, who disclosed that each screener receives a minimum of three hours of training per week, including normal screening and emergency response procedures. He stated that an Emergency Operations Plan has been developed, [REDACTED]. Anderson asserted that screeners are very familiar with this plan because it is included in their recurring training. Anderson also disclosed that [REDACTED] large-scale emergency response exercises were conducted in cooperation with local, state and federal agencies, as well as airline and airport personnel, during 2003 and 2004.

SSI Regarding Mair's allegation with reference to the [REDACTED] incident, Anderson explained that [REDACTED] Northwest Airlines, contacted the Grand Traverse County Sheriff's Department to request a [REDACTED]. Anderson asserted that [REDACTED] failure to notify TSA was the only procedural problem associated with this incident. He stated that AFSD [REDACTED] had a conversation with [REDACTED] after the incident and told [REDACTED] that TSA should have been notified sooner. [REDACTED] incident report mentioned [REDACTED] admonition. Anderson commented that the incident occurred during the early phases of TSA's coverage of the airport, and that communication between all entities involved at the airport has improved significantly since that time. (Exhibit 3)

SSI On November 29, 2004, the OIG interviewed [REDACTED] who indicated that all screeners receive three hours of TSA-mandated training each week. The training is accomplished via the TSA Online Learning Center, and through scenario-based practical exercises conducted at the screening checkpoint during periods of low passenger flow. [REDACTED] added that a briefing book, containing standard operating procedures, and other required reading, is utilized by managers to communicate policy and procedure updates to screeners. (Exhibit 11)

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On November 29, 2004, the OIG interviewed [REDACTED] Training Officer, TSA, Cherry Capital Airport. [REDACTED] confirmed that screeners receive a minimum of three hours of training per week, including sessions covering standard operating procedures, x-ray machine procedures, intelligence briefings, and customer service. Screener Supervisors are also directed to conduct training scenarios with [REDACTED] the screeners. [REDACTED] provided the OIG with a copy of Mair's training record for the period of December 2003 through April 2004, which reflected that Mair completed approximately 71 training sessions during the period. (Exhibit 12)

SSIT
The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] who confirmed that TSA was not aware of the subject [REDACTED] until the sheriff's [REDACTED] officers responded to the airport, and [REDACTED] Northwest Airlines, later conceded that [REDACTED] should have notified TSA earlier. (Exhibit 7) SSI

SSIT
On November 30, 2004, the OIG interviewed [REDACTED] Grand Traverse County, Emergency Management, who stated [REDACTED] office participated in [REDACTED] and a large-scale disaster drill which included an aircraft-hijacking scenario at Cherry Capital Airport. [REDACTED] recalled that preparation for the latter involved many pre-event planning meetings in which the TSA staff played an integral role. (Exhibit 13) SSI

On November 30, 2004, the OIG interviewed Ed Fisher, Chief, Traverse City Fire Department. Fisher stated that he meets with FSD Anderson, AFSD [REDACTED], and Operations Officer [REDACTED] on a regular basis. He recalled approximately five organizational meetings held in preparation for a "tabletop" exercise conducted in 2004, and also stated that his department participated with TSA and other law enforcement and emergency management agencies [REDACTED] SSI
Fisher stated a review of his personal calendar disclosed that he attended 11 planning meetings or training sessions since 2002 involving aviation security matters in which TSA representatives were actively involved. (Exhibit 14)

SSIT
On November 30, 2004, the OIG interviewed Mike Warren, Chief, Traverse City Police Department (TCPD), who stated his department has participated with TSA in tabletop exercises, [REDACTED] SSI
and the above reported large-scale disaster drill. Chief Warren also stated that since TSA initiated coverage of Cherry Capital Airport, his department has had many meetings with TSA to establish policies and procedures for TCPD response to situations resulting from TSA screening activities. He added that refinement of these policies is continuing. (Exhibit 15)

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] who initially stated that [REDACTED] believed that the amount of training provided by TSA was very poor. [REDACTED] described numerous emergency response procedures that warranted a formal response plan, but later acknowledged that these procedures were, in fact, contained in TSA's Emergency Operations Plan, which [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] also claimed that [REDACTED] recommended that a Safety Action Committee be established, and that it was initiated in January 2004. [REDACTED] also claimed that [REDACTED] played a "big part" in [REDACTED] training exercise. After providing the above information, [REDACTED] acknowledged that TSA training, including [REDACTED] SSI

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emergency preparedness, had steadily improved. When asked if [redacted] initial assessment of TSA training as being "very poor" was accurate, [redacted] said it was not. (Exhibit 5)

The OIG interviewed [redacted], who stated that a Safety Action Committee binder and the Emergency Operations Plan binder are both kept [redacted] so they may be reviewed regularly by screeners. [redacted] stated that in addition to the previously reported exercises, a tabletop exercise was held at the Alpena, Michigan airport, which is under the supervision of FSD Anderson. / SSI

[redacted] provided the OIG with a copy of an email from Mair in which he acknowledged that "Who to call in an emergency is common knowledge." Mair also acknowledged his responsibility for providing training stating, "There hasn't been much spare time for training. Staffing numbers are tight. Last week there were six training items alone from [redacted]." (Exhibit 9)

The OIG investigation determined that both training and drills for emergency response are regularly conducted at Cherry Capital Airport. With respect to Mair's own preparedness, his training included completion of a course "Identification and Reporting of Security Violations, Threat Information, and Criminal Activity." Further, he was required to be familiar with, and had a copy of, a memorandum from FSD Alan Anderson dated December 9, 2002, "Security Incident Response Procedures." Moreover, the investigation determined that Mair's supervisors were notified of the [redacted] incident, promptly responded, and assumed control. This allegation was not substantiated. / SSI

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EXHIBITS

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
1	Letter from the U.S. Office of Special Counsel to Tom Ridge, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, dated October 20, 2004; and a Memorandum from Secretary Ridge to Clark Ervin, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, dated November 16, 2004.
2	Memorandum of Activity, Pre-Investigation Activity, dated December 14, 2004.
3	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of FSD Alan Anderson, dated December 14, 2004.
4	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 9, 2004.
5	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 14, 2004.
6	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated December 9, 2004.
7	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 9, 2004.
8	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of Cherry Capital Airport Employees, dated December 14, 2004.
9	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 14, 2004.
10	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of Thomas Mair, dated December 9, 2004.
11	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated December 9, 2004.
12	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 14, 2004.
13	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of Grand Traverse County Emergency Management employees, dated December 14, 2004.
14	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of Ed Fisher, dated December 9, 2004.
15	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of Traverse City Police, dated December 14, 2004.

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Homeland Security

MEMORANDUM FOR: Clark Kent Ervin
Inspector General

FROM: Tom Ridge 

SUBJECT: Office of Special Counsel Referral in Regard to OSC File No. DI-04-2465

DATE: November 16, 2004

Attached please find the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) referral in regard to OSC File No. DI-04-2465. I hereby refer this matter to you to investigate and prepare the report required by 5 U.S.C. § 1213 for my review and signature. Please note the time limitations for complying with the OSC's referral and ensure that I have the report back from your office with sufficient time to review and transmit.



U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL
1730 M Street, N.W., Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20036-4505

The Special Counsel

October 20, 2004

The Honorable Thomas J. Ridge
Secretary
United States Department of Homeland Security
Washington, D.C. 20528

OCT21 '04 RCVO

Re: OSC File No. DI-04-2465

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The U.S. Office of Special Counsel is authorized by law to receive disclosures of information from federal employees alleging violations of law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a) and (b). As Special Counsel, if I find, on the basis of the information disclosed, that there is a substantial likelihood that one of these conditions exists, I am required to advise the appropriate agency head of my findings, and the agency head is required to conduct an investigation of the allegations and prepare a report. 5 U.S.C. § 1213(c) and (g).

For the reasons set forth below, I have concluded that there is a substantial likelihood that information provided to the Office of Special Counsel by Thomas Mair, former Supervisory Transportation Security Screener, discloses a violation of law, rule or regulation and a substantial and specific danger to public safety arising out of actions by employees at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City, Michigan. Accordingly, I am referring this information to you for an investigation of the allegations described below and a report of your findings within 60 days of your receipt of this letter.

The Information Disclosed

As noted, the relevant information was provided to the Office of Special Counsel by Thomas Mair, former Supervisory Transportation Security Screener,¹ who has consented to the release of his name. Mr. Mair worked at TSA from June 2002 until June 2004. In that position, he investigated and reported threats to safety and security while on duty for Cherry Capital Airport. He advises that the airport personnel are not trained for emergencies and have not practiced emergency procedures. He also alleged that at least two doors to the facility are left unlocked for a portion of the day and night. He

¹Mr. Mair's current address and phone number are: [REDACTED]

The Honorable Thomas J. Ridge
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contends these lapses compromise the airport's security thereby posing a substantial and specific danger to public safety. Mr. Mair's allegations are described in greater detail below.

Mr. Mair states that behind the airline check-in desks is a tunnel for checked baggage. The baggage goes through the tunnel to the screening area. Once the baggage is screened, it is passed to airline personnel for loading onto the aircraft through the ramp at the end of the tunnel. Mr. Mair reports that in approximately the middle of the tunnel there is an unlocked door through which individuals can access the tunnel. Mr. Mair alleges that the door is unattended during working hours and for up to eight hours during the night. As a result, unauthorized individuals can gain access to the tunnel and through that tunnel could gain access to the airplanes or the airport. Thus, he alleges this unchecked access to the tunnel constitutes a breach of security.

Mr. Mair also reported that the emergency back-up lights in the tunnel did not work during a power failure. He alleged that the lack of proper emergency response equipment left the airport personnel in complete darkness in a vulnerable area resulting in a security deficiency.

Mr. Mair alleged that there is a one-way revolving door from the sterile passenger area to another area of the airport that also presents a security risk. Although it is a one-way door, the one-way mechanism has failed on more than one occasion. Mr. Mair states that the reasons for the door malfunction were unclear and that attempts to fix it have been unsuccessful. He also stated that the door is equipped with an alarm. However, he emphasized that the alarm cannot be heard by the personnel at the closest checkpoint which he estimate is approximately 100 yards away. Mr. Mair also alleged that a door in the back of the facility on the west side is always left unlocked. He reports that this door is located between the gates where American and Northwest airlines park their planes.

Finally, Mr. Mair advises that the personnel at Cherry Capital Airport have not ever been trained on how to respond to emergencies. Airport officials have not conducted any drills or exercises on emergency situations. Indeed, Mr. Mair notes that he is the only person who has responded to a [REDACTED] at the facility and that he did so with no training. The only instructions available were listed on a call sheet. Even after the [REDACTED] Mr. Mair described, no emergency training was provided to airport personnel.

If true, Mr. Mair's allegations represent serious disregard of security matters at Cherry Capital Airport. These allegations and the apparent failure of agency officials to respond to the security deficiencies and take appropriate steps to protect the facility are particularly troubling in light of the heightened national concern regarding security at airports and the safety of the flying public.

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The Special Counsel's Findings

As noted above, if I find that there is a substantial likelihood that information disclosed to this office reveals a violation of law, rule, or regulation or a substantial and specific danger to public safety, I am required to send that information to the appropriate agency head for an investigation and report. 5 U.S.C. § 1213. Given Mr. Mair's knowledge of matters he has disclosed, and the detail he has provided, I have concluded that there is a substantial likelihood that he has disclosed a violation of law, rule, or regulation and a substantial and specific danger to public safety arising out of actions by employees at Cherry Capital Airport.

Accordingly, I am referring this information to you for an investigation of the allegations described above and a report of your findings within 60 days of your receipt of this letter. By law, the report must be reviewed and signed by you personally. Should you delegate your authority to review and sign the report to the Inspector General, or any other official, the delegation must be specifically stated and must include the authority to take the actions necessary under 5 U.S.C. § 1213(d)(5). Without this information, I would hasten to add that the report may be found deficient. The requirements of the report are set forth at 5 U.S.C. § 1213(c) and (d). A summary of § 1213(d) is enclosed.

In the event it is not possible to report on the matter within the 60-day time limit under the statute, you may request in writing an extension of time not to exceed 60 days. Please be advised that an extension of time is normally not granted automatically, but only upon a showing of good cause. Accordingly, in the written request for an extension of time, please state specifically the reasons the additional time is needed.

After making the determinations required by 5 U.S.C. § 1213(e)(2), copies of the report, along with any comments on the report from the person making the disclosure and any comments or recommendations by this office will be sent to the President and the appropriate oversight committees in the Senate and House of Representatives owing to the requirements set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 1213(e)(3).


Unless classified or prohibited from release by law, a copy of the report and any comments will be placed in a public file in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 1219(a).

The Special Counsel

The Honorable Thomas J. Ridge
Page 4

Please refer to our file number in any correspondence on this matter. If you need further information, please contact Catherine A. McMullen, Chief, Disclosure Unit, at (202) 254-3604. I am also available for any questions you may have.

Sincerely,



Scott J. Bloch

Enclosure

Requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 1213(d)

Any report required under subsection (c) shall be reviewed and signed by the head of the agency¹ and shall include:

- (1) a summary of the information with respect to which the investigation was initiated;
- (2) a description of the conduct of the investigation;
- (3) a summary of any evidence obtained from the investigation;
- (4) a listing of any violation or apparent violation of law, rule or regulation; and
- (5) a description of any action taken or planned as a result of the investigation, such as:
 - (A) changes in agency rules, regulations or practices;
 - (B) the restoration of any aggrieved employee;
 - (C) disciplinary action against any employee; and
 - (D) referral to the Attorney General of any evidence of criminal violation.

In addition, we are interested in learning of any dollar savings, or projected savings, and any management initiatives that may result from this review.

¹ Should you decide to delegate authority to another official to review and sign the report, your delegation must be specifically stated.

[REDACTED]
From: Knorr, Michael C.
Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 3:23 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Secretary Referral of OSC File No. DI-04-2465

Attached Office of Special Counsel referral involving TSA that was sent out to Frost from Laferty. When Chicago FO contacts you for a case number the memo to TSA, IA, may have to be a little more detailed than usual concerning this matter.

Mike

-----Original Message-----

From: Laferty, John
Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 2:20 PM
To: Frost, Thomas
Cc: Redman, Lisa; Wilson, Mike; Knorr, Michael C.
Subject: FW: Secretary Referral of OSC File No. DI-04-2465

Tom,

This one's for you.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: Redman, Lisa
Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 2:15 PM
To: Laferty, John
Cc: Knorr, Michael C.
Subject: FW: Secretary Referral of OSC File No. DI-04-2465

[REDACTED] - pls assign to either Mike Wilson or Tom Frost. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Ervin, Clark
Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 2:10 PM
To: Redman, Lisa; Reback, Richard
Cc: Skinner, Richard; [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Secretary Referral of OSC File No. DI-04-2465

Please handle.

-----Original Message-----


From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 2:09 PM [mailto:[REDACTED]]
To: Ervin, Clark
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: Secretary Referral of OSC File No. DI-04-2465

Please find a memo transmitting OSC File No. DI-04-2465. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions.
Thank you,

[Redacted]

AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

Department of Homeland Security
Executive Secretariat
Office of the Secretary
[Redacted] (Office)
[Redacted] (cell)





Type of Activity: Telephone Contact

Case Number: I05-TSA-CHI-01544	Case Title: TSA, Cherry Capital Airport
--------------------------------	---

Pre-Investigation:

On November 19, 2004 Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General (DHS/OIG) contacted Alan Anderson, the Federal Security Director (FSD) of the Cherry Capitol Airport located in Traverse City, Michigan to advise Anderson of the allegations contained in the complaint received from the Office of Special Counsel and let him know that agents of the OIG would be arriving in Traverse City on November 29th to conduct an investigation. Anderson advised he would make himself available to the OIG as necessary and also that the terminal where these allegations would have taken place was now closed. A new terminal was dedicated on October 27, 2004.

On November 19, 2004 SA [REDACTED] also attempted to contact the complainant Thomas Mair. Mair and SA [REDACTED] left several messages for each other and were eventually able to talk on November 23rd. During the conversation, an arrangement was made to meet at a local restaurant in Traverse City. Mair also requested that SA [REDACTED] respond to an email confirming the meeting so that he could have a record in writing of the purposed meet. Mair stated that this was at the advice of his attorney.

During this conversation, Mair made several comments to SA [REDACTED] about his current employment status and his attempt to get himself reinstated to his previous position as a Supervisory Transportation Security Screener with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Mair also stated that he did not bring the issues of security up as adamantly while he was employed with TSA because he feared repercussions from both the FSD and his assistant. Mair further stated that he believed an investigation of the security concerns, substantiated by DHS/OIG, would make him more credible in his quest to regain his employment with TSA and help prove, that the information he provided during the appeal of his termination was truthful.

Name, Title, Signature, Date: [REDACTED] - Special Agent 12-14-04	Reviewing Official Name, Title, Signature, Date: Thomas M. Frost - Special Agent in Charge
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MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY

Terminal Visit:

Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] arrived in Traverse City at approximately 11:30AM on November 29, 2004, and went to the old terminal in an attempt to inspect the layout of the building before beginning their investigation.

The old terminal is no longer in use and was locked. Agents were able to locate [REDACTED] an employee of the Northwest Regional Airport Commission, who provided them with a brief tour of the facility. Agents were able to locate and observe the areas subject of the allegations, and obtained a brochure that contained a small diagram of the terminal.

Attached:

Map of Traverse City area. Airport Location.
Quick Facts Sheet for TVC Airport.

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Cherry Capital Airport
TVC

Airport Overview: Located in scenic Traverse City, Michigan, Cherry Capital Airport is a full-service commercial airport offering major airline service. Cherry Capital Airport is also home for the United States Coast Guard Air Station, which provides search and rescue services for the Great Lakes area.

Federal Security Director (FSD): Alan Anderson is a former deputy director and lieutenant colonel with the Michigan State Police, where he served for 30 years. He retired as commanding officer of the state police Investigative Services Bureau, which is comprised of the Fire Marshal Division, the Forensic Science Division, the Field Detective Division, and two Criminal Investigation Divisions. He is a graduate from the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, and holds a Master of Public Administration degree from Western Michigan University.

Quick Facts Listing

Information on Checkpoints

- Number of Checkpoints 1
- Number of Lanes 2
- Number of Screener Shifts [REDACTED]
- Number of Gates 8

- Number Passenger Screeners: 28
- Number Cross-Trained Screeners: All screeners are cross trained.

Information on Baggage Screening

- In-Line CTX 5500 EDS System With two (2) CTX Units.
- Percentage of bags screened electronically: All checked bags are screened with EDS equipment.
- Type and number of equipment in Checked Baggage Area:
 - Four (4) Barringer Ionscan 400B ETDs
 - Two (2) Itemizer ETDs
 - Two CTX 5500 EDS

Airport and Passenger Information

- Number and type of Carriers 3 Commercial Airlines
- Number of destinations, national and international: 3 National 0 Interntl.
- Number of flights per year:
 - ARV: 5431
 - DPT: 5431
- Number of terminals: 1
- Number domestic passengers per year: Enplaning: 194649 Deplaning: 159050
- Number international passengers per year: 0
- Number of checked bags per year: 220897
- Tons of freight shipped per year: 2156
- Percentage of screened baggage alarms: [REDACTED]

Information on Employees

- Total TSA personnel: 40 (includes Admin Staff)
- Total number of screeners authorized (FTEs per week): 27
- Number of screeners on-board: 31
- Percent Fulltime Screeners: 65
- Percent Part-Time Screeners: 35
- Number Baggage Screeners: 0

SSI

SSI

- Average number prohibited items intercepted a month: 240
- Average Deadly or Dangerous items intercepted a month: [REDACTED]

SSI


- Average number of security-related incidents per month [REDACTED]

SSI

Hot Issues: The new Cherry Capital Airport terminal opened in October of 2004, complete with an in-line Invision CTX 5500 EDS baggage system. This automated system is more efficient than the previous system of manually screening and utilizing ETD equipment on 100% of checked baggage. The transition to the new system went very smoothly and all Screeners are now fully trained. The Traverse City Record Eagle has published articles regarding TVC utilizing armed security guards rather than Law Enforcement Officers at the checkpoint. The system has been working well and the issue has fallen to the wayside.

Easy access to Cherry Capital Airport

All airline travelers to Cherry Capital Airport now use the new entrance from South Airport Road to access the new airline terminal. If coming to Traverse City from the northeast, take Three Mile Road from Munson Avenue (US 31 & MI 72) and turn right onto South Airport Road.



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EXHIBIT 3



Type of Activity: Personal Interview Anderson

Case Number: I05-TSA-CHI-01544	Case Title: TSA, Cherry Capital Airport
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On November 29, 2004, at 4:30PM, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General (DHS/OIG) interviewed Alan Anderson, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Federal Security Director (FSD), Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City, Michigan. The interview took place in the FSD's office in Traverse City.

Prior to this position, Anderson was a thirty-year veteran of the Michigan State Police and retired with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In his current position as FSD, he oversees five airports that include Traverse City, Manistee Blacker, Alpena County Regional, Pellston Regional, and Chippewa International. All are Category III and IV airports located in northern Michigan.

SA [redacted] first went over the concerns outlined by the Office of Special Counsel with Anderson. Anderson had, prior to agents arrival, prepared a statement addressing the issues based on his telephone conversation with SA [redacted]. Anderson's statement rebukes the concerns outlined by Thomas Mair in his complaint to the Office of Special Counsel. Anderson listed specific actions he and his staff had taken to correct safety issues or concerns that were brought to their attention, and documents several training exercises that were conducted to insure the safety of the flying public.

Before discussing safety concerns, Anderson explained to agents why Mair was terminated from his position as Supervisory Security Screener with TSA. The reasons were, failure to calibrate or cause to have calibrated an Explosive Trace Detection Machine (ETD), failure to follow instructions, and failure to fulfill supervisory responsibilities. An allegation that Mair made false statements was also investigated but not supported.

The first allegation, from the Office of Special Counsel, is in regard to an unlocked door located in the tunnel, which is part of the sterile area. The tunnel is an area between the unsecured area and the Airport Operations Area (AOA) in which baggage is loaded/unloaded. It is large enough to drive luggage trucks and other equipment through and has garage style lift doors at both ends. These doors are locked when not in use. There was mutual acknowledgment that this area has been abandoned pursuant to the opening of a new terminal building.

Anderson explained that to get into the tunnel from the unsecured area an individual must go through a locked door with either a cipher or key lock. Therefore access to the AOA from the door is

Name, Title, Signature, Date: [redacted] → 12-14-04 [redacted] – Special Agent	Reviewing Official Name, Title, Signature, Date: [Signature] 12-14-04 Thomas M. Frost – Special Agent in Charge
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MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY

restricted. Nevertheless, TSA inspection guidelines do not require the doors to be locked. The current TSA, Aviation Security Inspector (ASI) [REDACTED] and the former ASI, who is now at Dulles Airport [REDACTED] had inspected these doors as part of their normal inspection process. TSA Headquarters also conducted a vulnerability assessment on October 27, 28, & 29, 2003, at this airport, and did not observe this to be a problem.

Agents brought up the concern to the Anderson that from approximately midnight until 5:00AM there are no employees present at the airport. Therefore, if an individual would climb the airport security fence, which is 4-6 feet high depending on the location, they could gain access to the sterile area through these doors. The doors with the locks that prevent individuals from entering this area do not have locks on the backside to prevent someone from leaving. Access could be gained that would lead from the tunnel, past the checkpoint, and up the stairs to the sterile area. Any of a number of situations could be imagined, with the most obvious being the ability to hide a weapon and retrieve it later. Although both TSA employees and airport maintenance employees perform security checks in the morning, these checks could be enhanced if they had knowledge of the sterile area being breeched. Anderson said that the doors had not been examined from this point of view and he fully understood the concern. However, this terminal is not longer in use and the new terminal has locks on all doors.

The second allegation was that emergency lights, located in the same tunnel, did not work during a power outage posing a security deficiency. Anderson acknowledged being aware that the lights malfunctioned on at least one occasion and explained that repairs were requested by [REDACTED] and completed by airport maintenance personnel.

The third allegation was that a one-way revolving door from the sterile area to the unsecured area presents a security risk. The one-way mechanism has been known to malfunction and allow the door to move in both directions. Anderson remembers maintenance issues with the door that were corrected, and recounted an incident that occurred on February 8, 2004. During this incident five teenagers were able to defeat the door and enter the sterile area. This was discovered by a TSA Screener and immediately brought to his supervisor's attention. The incident was quickly solved with the individuals being rescreened and a guard placed on the door until the problem could be corrected. The door was either kept locked or a guard was present until it was repaired on February 10, 2004. (Security logs later obtained from Corporate Security Solutions and a repair invoice from Windemuller Electric Inc. verify these statements.)

Anderson was asked to address the allegation that the alarm attached to the revolving door that notifies security personnel of a breach or attempted breach was not audible because the speaker for this door was located, over the door, which is about 75-100 feet from the open stairwell that leads to the security checkpoint. Anderson said that after the problem was brought to his attention, the alarm was moved to the top of the stairwell located above where the screeners perform their duties. The speaker is very loud and can be heard throughout the airport.

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MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY

The final allegation is that personnel at the airport have not been trained in how to respond to emergencies. According to Anderson, each screener receives a minimum of three hours of training per week. This training includes normal screening procedures as well as responding to emergencies that occur at the checkpoint or elsewhere in the airport. TSA Supervisor Security Screeners are responsible for facilitating this training as well as role-playing emergency or threat situations with screeners.

Anderson said that the airport has adopted an Emergency Operations Plan and [REDACTED] SSI
[REDACTED] The plan is a collaborative effort between TSA Administrators and Screener Supervisors. This book contains information on numerous situations, both emergency and not, that may arise at the airport. The plan discusses how to handle each situation and provides emergency contact information. Screeners are very familiar with this plan and it is a normal part of their training. Also in effect is a plan to account for all employees in the event of an evacuation.

Anderson discussed the following large-scale exercises that were conducted in cooperation with many other local, state and federal agencies as well as airline and airport personnel. Examples were:

April 14, 2003: A table-top exercise was conducted at the airport. The scenario was an approaching aircraft is experiencing difficulties that may or may not be terrorist related. Participants included, Crash Fire Rescue, Traverse City Police and Fire Representatives, Ambulance Staff, Federal Aviation Administration Personnel, TSA Personnel, local Airline and Airport Staff, Etc.

[REDACTED]

September 18, 2004: Grand Traverse County/Full Scale Disaster Drill. The scenario was a terrorist group blows up a local dam and hijacks an aircraft at the airport. More information will be presented in interviews with Grand Traverse County, Office of Emergency Management. [REDACTED] was very involved in the planning of this exercise.

Anderson was asked about the allegation that Mair was forced to respond alone to [REDACTED] SSI which occurred in February of 2003 in the early morning. Anderson explained that Northwest Airlines Manager, [REDACTED] attempted to "downplay" a possible threat that was received, and contacted the [REDACTED] to request [REDACTED] SSI
[REDACTED] TSA screeners and supervisors who [REDACTED] and overheard [REDACTED] SSI conversations with airline personnel demanded to know what was occurring and responded appropriately. Mair was the supervisor on duty and once knowledge of the situation was obtained he immediately called [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED] at that time, [REDACTED]

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MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY

SSI [redacted] Reports show that neither supervisor was on duty, but still responded to the airport
[redacted] According to Anderson, [redacted] took control of the situation.

SSI - According to Anderson, the only negative issue seemed to be that Northwest Airlines never notified
TSA [redacted] but called [redacted] directly. He stated that [redacted]
[redacted], had a conversation with [redacted] after the incident and told [redacted]
that TSA should have been notified sooner. [redacted] documented this conversation in a Northwest
Airlines Incident Report, a copy of which is attached.

FSD Anderson commented that the incident occurred during the early phases of TSA's coverage of
the airport, and that communication between all entities involved at the airport has increased
significantly since that time.

- Attachments: Statement from FSD Alan Anderson
- Documents pertaining to Thomas Mair
- SSI Reports from [redacted] Mair, NW Airlines [redacted] Security
- Aviation Security Directive/Compliance Letter
- Cherry Capital Airport-Table-top info Dated April 2003
- Emergency Operations Plan
- SSI [redacted]
- Full Scale Drill, time line
- Miscellaneous Training Documents

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To: Investigator [REDACTED] Office of Inspector General, DHS

From: Alan K. Anderson, Federal Security Director, TSA

Subject: Allegations from Mr. Tom Mair

Date: November 26, 2004

INFORMATION

[REDACTED] called this office on Friday, November 19, and indicated [REDACTED] and a colleague would be conducting an investigation at Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City, MI, on November 29th and 30th, 2004. The basis for the investigation is a letter of complaint from Mr. Tom Mair. Mr. Mair was formerly employed as a TSA Supervisory Screener at Cherry Capital Airport.

Mr. Tom Mair worked for the Transportation Security Administration as a Supervisory Screener from June 30, 2002 until June 28, 2004. He served initially as a member of the TSA national mobile screening force and was subsequently assigned to Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City, MI, in September of 2002. A Supervisory Screener is tasked with a key role in enforcement of federal guidelines with regard to passenger and baggage screening. His defined responsibility as a Supervisory Screener was to supervise, coach, manage, and ensure the performance and training of personnel that provide frontline security.

Mr. Mair was terminated from employment on June 28, 2004 for: (1) Failure to calibrate or cause to have calibrated an Explosive Trace Detection instrument (as was his responsibility), (2) Failure to follow instructions, and (3) Failure to fulfill supervisory responsibilities. An allegation that he made false statements was not sustained due to insufficient evidence. Attached to this document are: A copy of his SF50 which indicates employment dates, a copy of his position description as Supervisory Screener, and a copy of the letter of decision to remove him from federal service dated June 28th, 2004 (Attachment 1).

CHERRY CAPITAL AIRPORT

Cherry Capital Airport (TVC) is located at 727 Fly Don't Drive, Traverse City, MI, 49686. It is a full-service commercial airport offering major airline service. It is administered by the northwestern Regional Airport Commission which consists of representatives from Grand Traverse and Lelanau Counties. The Airport Director is Stephen R. Cassens. Cherry Capital Airport is also home for the United States Coast Guard Air Station, which provides search and rescue services for the Great Lakes area. TVC is classified as a CATEGORY III airport and approximately 195,000 passengers are boarded each year.

Of recent significance is the construction of a new terminal, located at the above address, which opened on Wednesday, October 27th, 2004. A significant improvement is the introduction of a new in-line baggage handling system, with two (2) explosive detection systems (EDS), instead of the old Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) baggage inspection system. Also new is the capability to have two lanes at the passenger screening checkpoint instead of one.

TSA currently has an allocation of 27 Screener FTEs at Cherry Capital Airport. Screening personnel currently number 31 (including part-time employees), and we have three (3) supervisors. TSA also has a current Law Enforcement Personnel Reimbursement Agreement with the Northwestern Regional Airport Commission. The essence of the Reimbursement Agreement is a requirement that the airport provide an air transportation security program that provides a law enforcement (or armed security) presence and capability at the airport that is adequate to ensure the safety of passengers. Issues beyond the purview of the screening staff are turned over to an armed security representative of Corporate Security Solutions, and the security officer will in turn notify the Traverse City Police Department when necessary. A copy of the reimbursable agreement is available upon request, and a "Quick Fact Listing" regarding the airport is attached (Attachment 2).

ALLEGATIONS

Absent a copy of the letter of complaint, the following response is based upon conversation with Investigator [REDACTED] Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security. This response is not intended to be all inclusive, and request is made to reserve the right to modify this response and to reply to other potential allegations as they become known. It is my understanding that neither [REDACTED] nor [REDACTED] colleague have had the opportunity to interview Mr. Mair.

1. Mr. Mair is alleging that 2 doors at the old terminal were left unlocked day and night, and this was a danger to the public. One of the unlocked doors is believed to be in the middle of the "tunnel" where baggage was searched and loaded on tugs for delivery to the aircraft. Absent specific information as to exactly which doors he is referring, and absent information regarding under what circumstances they were allegedly left unlocked, I will delay response pending more information. It will be helpful to also discuss this with [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] is the person with whom we would work on such issues. [REDACTED] is the first one to bring this allegation to my attention, and I have no knowledge that Mr. Mair, in his capacity as TSA Supervisor, brought it to the attention of anyone else. As already indicated, a move occurred to the new terminal on October 27th. The old terminal is not longer being used, and there is a strong likelihood that the building will be razed.
2. A second allegation involves emergency back-up lights in the tunnel and failure during a power outage. [REDACTED] has information regarding such a failure, and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] will be best able to address what was done regarding

~~this issue.~~ Regarding issues of concern that could involve significant capital outlay, there was some logical reticence to putting a lot of money into the old terminal when a new terminal was under construction and a move was pending. A good example of airport responsiveness, however, was the installation of a plexi-glass shield or window to prevent unscreened passengers on the first floor from tossing items up to screened passengers on the second floor. The airport complied with our direction.

3. A third allegation involves a revolving door in the old terminal which was designed to allow arriving passengers to leave the secure second floor, and to preclude departing passengers from entering the secure area. It is located at the top of a stairway leading to the second floor, secured, passenger waiting room. To my knowledge, problems with this door were first brought to our attention on February 8, 2004. Teenagers were able to defeat the door and enter the secured area. When brought to our attention, we immediately stationed someone at the door to ensure unauthorized personnel could not gain inappropriate access to the secured waiting area, and worked with the airport to repair/modify the door. The door was also designed to alarm when attempts were made to defeat its purpose, and at our direction the bell for the alarm was moved to the checkpoint so LEO and Screening personnel could hear it. A PARIS record detailing this incident is attached (Attachment 3). The door is an approved means of allowing legitimate egress from, and prohibiting unlawful ingress to, the secure area.
4. A fourth allegation involves personnel not being trained on how to react to emergencies. Reference was allegedly made ██████████ in which Mr. Mair *SST* was personally involved, and there are records regarding such an incident on February 8, 2003. The report of the incident is attached (Attachment 4), and I believe it speaks for itself. Regarding personnel not being trained, I am not sure of the exact personnel to whom he is referring, nor to which emergencies, but the following will illustrate some of our activities and preparation to date. This process is ongoing as world events change and as vulnerabilities are identified.

In regard to our Screening staff, training essentially starts with their Introductory Screener Training course in which they are made aware of how to identify safety-related areas and problems in the workplace, how to identify weapons of mass destruction (IED and Chem/Bio agents), and when to immediately notify their supervisor and, in turn, a LEO. Security incidents, which require immediate notification of a supervisor and/or LEO, involve positive identification of a threat item, positive identification of contraband/illegal items, and a breach of a secured (non-public) area. The main focus is on how to effectively and courteously perform the screening function, and when to inform a Supervisor and/or LEO. Once an emergency situation is identified, it is the Screener/Supervisor's primary responsibility to notify the Armed Security/Law Enforcement Officer before taking any further action. The expectation is also for the Supervisor to notify his/her Screening Manager so that the Administration and, if necessary, TSA Headquarters can be notified of any incident.

In response to emergencies such as a fire alarm or other circumstance where there is a need to evacuate the building, we did establish direction and a meeting point outside the facility where all personnel could be accounted for. While we have a vested interest in the well being of our employees as indicated by the development of our own evacuation plan, safety issues such as these come under the responsibility of the Airport and are regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration. A new plan is in the process of development for our new terminal at TVC.

As to recurrent training for our TVC screening staff, each screener currently receives 3 hours of training per week. As a representative example of training received, a Student Learning History for Lead Screener [REDACTED] is attached (Attachment 5). While the focus is primarily upon improving screening capabilities and upon screener awareness of ever-changing threats, emphasis has also been placed on emergency preparedness. For example, in November, 2002 emergency preparedness input was requested from Supervisors. When this input was combined with Administrative concerns and direction, the result was an Emergency Operations Plan which was completed and distributed to Supervisors at all 5 of our airports in April, 2003. Supervisors discussed the Emergency Plan and were asked to train staff on the content.

Included in the Emergency Operations Plan is an emergency contact telephone list and step by step directions on what to do in the event of the following: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], Fire Alarm, Hazardous Leak of Spill, Medical Emergency, Adverse Weather Conditions, Power Outage, and an Undeclared Weapon or Gun. Also included are maps, weapons, and floor plans of the airport. The Emergency Operations Plan books were most recently discussed and updated at a Supervisor's Meeting in May, 2004. A copy of the book is available upon request.

As to specific Emergency Preparedness Training, Supervisors are expected to facilitate training and role playing with Screeners on possible threat/emergency scenarios whenever down time and scheduling permits. Examples of recent role-playing for which we have records include:

07/02/04 [REDACTED]
08/28/04 [REDACTED]
09/08/04 [REDACTED]
09/10/04 [REDACTED]
10/13/04 Power Outage Emergency Training

On an ongoing basis, Screening Quality and Compliance Checklists (Audits) are completed [REDACTED] and three (3) hours of recurrent training (including IED

image detection at the X-ray, Role-Playing, and Standard Operation Procedure review) is completed on a weekly basis.

AIRPORT AND COMMUNITY WIDE EMERGENCY PREPARATION

There are other aspects to security and safety at Cherry Capital Airport which are exemplified by the Airport Security Plan (ASP) and the Cherry Capital Airport Emergency Plan which covers such incidents at the airport. A copy of the Cherry Capital Airport Emergency Plan is available upon request. The issue of emergency preparation and response also extends into the greater Traverse City community. Emergency preparation activities have been conducted with officials from the airport, the Traverse City Police Department, the Grand Traverse County Sheriff's Department, the Grand Traverse County Office of Emergency Management, the Michigan State Police, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the United States Coast Guard, to name a few. Emergency preparation activities to date include, but are not limited to:

April 14, 2003. A table top exercise was conducted at TVC involving an approaching aircraft experiencing difficulty which may or may not have been terrorist related. Participants, to name a few, included representatives from Emergency Crash Fire Rescue located at the airport, the Traverse City Fire and Police Department, Ambulance Staff, the Federal Aviation Administration, Cherry Capital Airport, local Airlines, and the Transportation Security Administration. [REDACTED] facilitated the exercise.

SSI

[REDACTED]

SSI

[REDACTED]

September 18, 2004. A Grand Traverse County Full Scale Disaster Drill was conducted on Saturday, September 18, 2004. The scenario involved local terrorists blowing up a dam and hijacking an aircraft. Participation was extensive. TSA was represented at the Emergency Operations Center. The exercise was

successfully conducted, and further detail is available as needed. In addition, AFSD Screening [REDACTED] was involved in many of the pre-planning meetings.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

If necessary or helpful, further records and/or information can be provided regarding crisis management and role playing. Administrative Staff Meeting Minutes, in which occasional reference is made to some of the above, can also be made available.

CLASSIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ATTACHMENT

1. Name (Last, First, Middle) MAIR, THOMAS A		2. Social Security Number 9882	3. Date of Birth [REDACTED]	4. Effective Date 06-28-04
--	--	--	--------------------------------	--------------------------------------

FIRST ACTION		SECOND ACTION	
5-A. Code 357	5-B. Nature of Action TERMINATION	6-A. Code	6-B. Nature of Action
5-C. Code ZVC	5-D. Legal Authority P.L. 107-71	6-C. Code	6-D. Legal Authority
5-E. Code	5-F. Legal Authority	6-E. Code	6-F. Legal Authority

7. FROM: Position Title and Number SUPERVISORY TRANS. SECURITY SCREENER PD NO=SA-TVCSG BU NO=APTSCR ORG=2B12TVC00 CST CNTR=212TVC	15. TO: Position Title and Number
---	-----------------------------------

8. Pay Plan SV	9. Occ. Code 0019	10. Grade or Level G	11. Step or Rate 00	12. Total Salary \$42,950	13. Pay Basis PA	16. Pay Plan	17. Occ. Code	18. Grade or Level	19. Step or Rate	20. Total Salary/Award	21. Pay Basis
12A. Basic Pay \$38,729	12B. Locality Adj. \$4,221	12C. Adj. Basic Pay \$42,950	12D. Other Pay \$0	20A. Basic Pay	20B. Locality Adj.	20C. Adj. Basic Pay	20D. Other Pay				

14. Name and Location of Position's Organization AUS FOR AVIATION OPERATIONS AVIATION OPERATIONS DIVISION NORTH CENTRAL AREA CHERRY CAPITAL AIRPORT	22. Name and Location of Position's Organization
---	--

EMPLOYEE DATA

23. Veterans Preference 1 - None 2 - 5-Point 3 - 10-Point/Disability 4 - 10-Point/Compensable 5 - 10-Point/Other 6 - 10-Point/Compensable/30%	24. Tenure 0 - None 1 - Permanent 2 - Conditional 3 - Indefinite	25. Agency Use	26. Veterans Pref for Hire YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
27. FEGLI Q2	28. Annuitant Indicator 9	29. Pay Rate Determinant 0	
30. Retirement Plan K	31. Service Comp. Date (Leave) 06-30-02	32. Work Schedule F	33. Part-Time Hours Per Biweekly Pay Period

POSITION DATA

34. Position Occupied 1 - Competitive Service 2 - Excepted Service 3 - SES General 4 - SES Career	35. FLSA Category E - Exempt N - Nonexempt	36. Appropriation Code SEE REMARKS BELOW	37. Bargaining Unit Status 8888
38. Duty Station Code 26-4880-055	39. Duty Station (City - County - State or Overseas Location) TRAVERSE CITY, GRAND TRAVERSE, MI		
40. AGENCY DATA SP PROG=00	41. SUPV CSC=2	42. POS TYPE=1	44. POSITION SENSITIVITY = 5

45. Remarks
 APPROP = 05AV.000/000/APTSCR/2B12TVC00/1111
 SALARY IN BLOCK 12A IS BASED ON PAY BAND G, SPECIALIZED JOB CATEGORY, MANAGER LEVEL 1. SALARY IN BLOCK 12C INCLUDES A LOCALITY-BASED PAYMENT OF 10.90%. FWD ADDRES = 6125TH ST, TRAVERSE CITY, MI, 49684 REASON SEP = TERMINATION. SF-2819 PROVIDED. LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE EXTENDED 31 DAYS DURING WHICH YOU ARE ELIG TO CONVERT TO AN INDIV POLICY (NONGROUP). HEALTH BENEFITS COVERAGE IS EXTENDED FOR 31 DAYS DURING WHICH YOU ARE ELIGIBLE TO CONVERT TO AN INDIVIDUAL POLICY (NONGROUP CONTRACT). YOU ARE ALSO ELIGIBLE FOR TEMPORARY CONTINUATION OF YOUR FEHB COVERAGE FOR UP TO 18 MONTHS. LUMP-SUM PAYMENT TO BE MADE FOR ANY UNUSED ANNUAL LEAVE. NOT ENTITLED TO SEVERANCE PAY.


Employing Department or Agency DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY/TSA			50. Signature/Authentication and Title of Approving Official APPROVING OFFICIAL
47. Agency Code HSBC	48. Personnel Office ID 1598	49. Approval Date 08-09-04	

The statement below is from the official TSA Website:

Supervisory Transportation Security Screener (STSS):

Supervisors play a key role in enforcement of new more stringent federal guidelines with regard to passenger and baggage screening. Responsibilities include:

- Supervise coach manage and ensure the performance and training of personnel that provide frontline security
- Position
 - G Band (Word 347KB)



Job Analysis Tool

Type of Action: (Check one below)	IPPS No:
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> New hire <input type="checkbox"/> Promotion <input type="checkbox"/> Temporary Promotion <input type="checkbox"/> Reassignment <input type="checkbox"/> Demotion <input type="checkbox"/> Detail	

Job title: Supervisory Transportation Security Screener

Series: 019	Category: Specialized	Level: MGR 3	Pay Band: G
--------------------	------------------------------	---------------------	--------------------

Duties and Responsibilities: Functions as a level 1 Supervisory Transportation Security Screener responsible for supervising personnel performing pre-board security screening of persons and their carry-on and checked baggage.

Implement security-screening procedures that are central to Transportation Security Administration (TSA) objectives that will serve to protect the traveling public by preventing any deadly or dangerous objects from being transported onto an aircraft. Conducts screening of passengers and/or baggage, and/or cargo.

Participates in information briefings concerning security-sensitive or classified information.

Assists management with inquiries for information or investigations that may be initiated against a regulated party. Oversees the screening checkpoint on a day-to-day basis to include equipment with personnel. Schedules an adequate number of screener personnel to provide for efficient and effective screening of all persons, their baggage and cargo.

Provides guidance to lower-staff on resolving difficult technical issues. Coaches staff in customer service, technical approaches and other duties related to passenger screening. Resolves all but unique technical problems without the intervention of management or a more experienced technical specialist.

Maintains communication with management regarding issues that might reveal a weakness or vulnerable area of security screening that is discovered in the course of screening duties. Works with a full team of transportation security screeners, supervisors, and law enforcement personnel at checkpoints and airport security staff and management.

Directs the work of subordinate employees. Sets priorities; assigns tasks, monitors and evaluates performance; coaches and develops employee capabilities; approves leave; and takes or recommends corrective/disciplinary action, as appropriate.

Resolves routine problems independently, but consults with higher-level management when existing guidelines are not available or applicable for complex problems. May be called upon to assist in the development of new policies and procedures.

Maintains communication with supervisors regarding any issues that might reveal a weakness or vulnerable area of security screening that is discovered in the course of screening duties.


KSAs: (List each item)

- Knowledge of the theories, dynamics, and factors underlying the aviation screening process to enable authoritative and independent handling of screening functions.
- Skill sufficient to operate all advanced technologies security equipment at screening checkpoints.
- Ability to interpret and apply federal, agency, and TSA personnel policies, processes and procedures.
- Skill in working with the public to include resolving conflicts, communicating process and procedures, and enhancing understanding of the TSA mission, vision and values.
- Ability to manage a diverse workforce and lead others, including planning and assigning work, improving and controlling performance, selecting employees, and promoting EEO, human relations, and employee participation.

Optional: Selective Factor/Quality Ranking Factor(s): (List each item)

Other:

Who signs off



Authorizing Official

HR Review

Chargas



Transportation
Security
Administration

Date: June 28, 2004
To: Thomas A. Mair
Transportation Security Screener
From: Michael Deegan
Assistant Federal Security Director
Traverse City Regional Airport
Subject: Letter of Decision to Remove
REF: #401287/TVC/NC/ME/mc

On April 29, 2004, you received a written Notice of Proposed Removal signed by TSA Screening Manager [REDACTED]. The notice proposed to remove you from your position of Transportation Security Screener (SV-0019-G) for failure to perform required pre-shift operational checks, failure to follow instructions, failure to fulfill supervisory responsibilities and false statement.

You were given ten (10) calendar days from your receipt of the proposed notice to submit a reply orally, in writing or both. At the request of your counsel, you were also given an extension on this time limit and ultimately submitted a written reply from your representative, Mr. Lee Hornberger on or about May 21, 2004.

I have carefully considered all of the evidence of record, including the notice of proposed removal, the documents used to support the specifications and your response to the proposal. As the deciding official, I am responsible for reviewing the allegations and supporting documentation, and rendering a final decision.

In your reply, you state that Lead Security Screener [REDACTED] statement was inaccurate in that Screener [REDACTED] did not report for duty until 1410 and [REDACTED] statement said that [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] to check the ETD log at about 1310. You also said that [REDACTED] did not calibrate the ETD for the afternoon shift. The Checkpoint SOP Chapter 3.4B requires that an ETD machine must undergo a successful calibration/verification test each day [REDACTED]. This means that it was your responsibility to perform a calibration/verification test [REDACTED].

find that while [REDACTED] March 25, 2004 statement about the March 1, 2004 incident may have been inaccurate about the time Screener [REDACTED] checked the ETD log, the fact that you did not accomplish the required calibration/verification checks is accurate. Further, in your March 25, 2004 statement you state that there was no record that the ETD was verified before 1400 hours on March 1, 2004.

Your representative also argues that the calibration/verification of the ETD machine is not an operational test because it does not appear on the Daily Operational Testing of Equipment form. The calibration/verification of the ETD machine is an operational test, [REDACTED]

SST

SST

I find that the evidence supports the fact that on March 1, 2004, you failed to calibrate or caused to have calibrated by a subordinate the ETD, as was your responsibility. Ultimately, the responsibility for the proper operation of the screening machines rests upon the management official on sight. Your failure to accept this responsibility endangers the traveling public and undermines my confidence in you. As such, this Reason 1, specification 1 is sustained.

As to Reason 2, specification 1, Failure to Follow Instructions, your reply argues that it was Lead [REDACTED] responsibility to report the violation of SOP [REDACTED]. Since the first violation of the SOP occurred [REDACTED] it was your responsibility to report the violation. Consequently, I find that specification 1 was sustained.

SST

Concerning specification 2, in your reply, you state that Training Coordinator [REDACTED] did not notify you that you were the main specified POC for Traverse City but rather that you were the alternate. I find that the evidence indicates that you told both the HAZMAT contractor and Lead [REDACTED] that you were unaware that you were responsible for HAZMAT pickup and that you had no information about HAZMAT processing. I find that the evidence supports that on January 13, 2004, you were informed by Training Coordinator, [REDACTED], that you were the alternate POC for HAZMAT pickups at TVC, and you acknowledged the January 13th e-mail in a January 18th response. In a March 18, 2004 e-mail to Screening Manager [REDACTED], you state that you did not open the attachment to the January 13th e-mail as an excuse for not knowing you were responsible for the HAZMAT pickup but your January 18, 2004 response to [REDACTED] indicates that you must have opened the attachment. I find that specification 2 is sustained.

As to Reason 3, failure to fulfill supervisory responsibilities, in your reply, you state that you gave [REDACTED] the forms to cancel [REDACTED] health benefits that you received from HR Specialist [REDACTED] on December 27, 2004 and that [REDACTED] "apparently misplaced the forms". The evidence indicates that in a January 17, 2004 e-mail you asked [REDACTED] for the forms again inferring that [REDACTED] had not replied to your original December 27, 2003 request. You make no mention of [REDACTED] misplacing the forms. Consequently, I conclude that you did not give [REDACTED] the forms resulted in the screener paying additional premiums on unwanted insurance and specification 1 is substantiated.

I find that specification 2 is not substantiated because the Notice of Proposed Removal contains insufficient information. As to specification 3, in your reply you state that you did not know about the supervisor log. The evidence indicates that Screening Manager announced the implementation of the supervisors log at a January 27, 2004 meeting with you, and Supervisors [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Supervisor [REDACTED] made the first entry in the log on the following day. The only entry from you is dated April 4, 2004. Consequently, I find that you were informed about the supervisor log and specification 3 is substantiated.

Lastly, as to Reason 4, Making False Statements, I find this reason and specification although supported by the evidence is not sustained because more evidence was needed.

In reaching my decision, I considered several other factors including your length of service, past performance and your reply to the notice of proposed removal. I find your explanation of the

SS1 - [REDACTED] events surrounding your removal to be incredible and unpersuasive. First and foremost you are responsible for assuring that the equipment you and your subordinates use is operating correctly and within the guidelines of the SOP. Failure to conduct an operational check [REDACTED] SS1 is an offense that requires removal for the first offense. As a Supervisor Transportation Security Screener, you are held to a higher standard of conduct. Your entry in the daily log sheet that the ETD machine went unused is contradicted by reason and your own March 25, 2004 statement. You have violated the trust and confidence I had in you to perform your duties and simply tell the truth. I no longer have confidence in your trustworthiness or your ability to perform the essential functions of a Supervisory Transportation Security Screener in a professional manner.

I find that the decision to remove you from Federal Service is an appropriate penalty, in the best interest of the TSA and is for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service. Accordingly, your removal will become effective on June 28, 2004.

You may appeal this decision to the TSA Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) within thirty (30) days following the effective date of this decision. The address for filing an appeal is:

Assistant Administrator for Human Resources Management
Transportation Security Administration (TSA-21)
Attention: Disciplinary Review Board Coordinator
601 South 12th Street
Arlington, VA 22202-4204


A copy of TSA Management Directive No. 1100.77-1, Disciplinary Review Board, which contains applicable requirements and procedures, is attached to this letter as well as the Disciplinary Review Board Appeal Form to use if you elect to file an appeal. Questions concerning the appeal process may be directed to [REDACTED]

If you believe this removal resulted from discrimination or harassment based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or reprisal, you may make a report to the TSA Office of Civil Rights (1-877-336-4872). If you choose to make a report to the Civil Rights Office you must do so within 45 calendar days of the effective date of this action.

You must return all TSA issued property including ID badge(s), uniforms, equipment and manuals. You will not be allowed to access TSA offices or any other TSA facilities. Therefore, please contact [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] to arrange an appointment for out-processing.

If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]

Please sign the acknowledgement of receipt below. Your signature does not denote agreement with this action; it only represents receipt of this notice on the date signed.



Michael Deegan
AFSD Traverse City Regional Airport

Attachment: TSA Management Directive No. 1100.77-1, Disciplinary Review Board

Acknowledgement of Receipt

Date

Delivery Information:

Hand Delivered By

Date

Mailed By

Date

Name/Signature: I certify that on this date I mailed
via FedEx, regular, and certified mail this notice to the addressee.

Date

ATTACHMENT #4
2/8/03

Anderson, Alan

To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: TSO Watch Contact

Want to inform you about what was initially reported as

[REDACTED]

Finally, regarding the change in

[REDACTED]

Please call if you have questions.

Alan Anderson
F.S.D.
TVC - Cherry Capital Airport
ph [REDACTED] fax [REDACTED]

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S
L



NORTHWEST AIRLINES



Royal Dutch Airlines

Incident Report

February 8, 2003

[REDACTED]

On February 7, 2003 my office was informed in the afternoon of the need to have [REDACTED] searched,

SS I

[REDACTED]

While debriefing with the TSA, they felt if they had been informed earlier that they could have arranged for the searches earlier in the morning, thus preventing any delays or irregularities in operations. Likewise, the airport would have rather had the aircraft removed from the gate to a remote location for the search. Despite some poor communication, the searches went fairly smoothly with minimal disruption to operations and were found uneventful.

[REDACTED]

Customer Service Manager - TVC

INCIDENT REPORT

0530

Saturday, February 8, 2003

RE: [REDACTED] SSI

As reported by Tom Mair, Supervisor

I was the first person to attend to the threat. The first word of the threat came from a conversation between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] relayed to [REDACTED] that the [REDACTED] SSI

[REDACTED] brought [REDACTED] into the office to relay the information to me. They thought I may already know about the situation.

[REDACTED] SSI

I assessed the situation with [REDACTED] and determined that the threat [REDACTED] SSI

I followed the following steps to resolve the threat:

[REDACTED]

SSI

SSA



According to NW and Sheriff's Dept officials, the threat was made to a pilot (one of two pilots), of the aircraft, by a female who knows the pilot. The pilot contacted NW on Friday, February 7, 2003 with information about the threat.

I believe we should have been told about the situation by NW ahead of the opening the checkpoint, since they had the most control over the information regarding the threat.

NW should have shared the information with the TSA and let the TSA decide the height/importance of the threat.

By discussing the matter ahead of time we could have avoided all or most of the trouble at 0530.

Flight info:

NWA #3368 at 0630

NWA #3501 at 0700

UAL #5875 at 0716



October 9, 2001

[REDACTED]
Airport Certification/Safety Inspector
Airports Division
FAA
2300 East Devon Avenue
Des Plaines, IL. 60018

Dear [REDACTED]

I am writing to inform you that we completed our FAA-required tabletop review of the Airport Emergency Plan on Wednesday, October 6, 2001. I have enclosed a sign-in sheet of those who participated. Also, we completed our Airport Emergency Plan exercise on Saturday, October 8th. I have also enclosed a scenario from that exercise for your review.

If you have any questions about the tabletop or the exercise, please contact me at [REDACTED]

Sincerely,
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Operations Manager



Cherry Capital Airport


Airport Emergency Plan

Table-top review

October 3, 2001

Scenario


SSI



(Responses)

TVC
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
INDEX

1. Phone List



SST

- 14. Fire Alarm
- 15. Hazardous Materials Leak or Spill
- 16. Medical Emergency
- 17. Adverse Weather Conditions
- 18. Power Outage



SST

ISS

R-9974-8

TSA TELEPHONE BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST

Time Received _____ Time Ended _____ Date _____

Exact Wording of Threat _____

QUESTIONS TO ASK:

1. When is the bomb going to explode? _____
2. Where is it right now? _____
3. What does it look like? _____
4. What kind of bomb is it? _____
5. What will cause it to explode? _____
6. Did you place the bomb? _____
7. Why? _____
8. Where are you now? _____
9. What is your name? _____
10. What is your address? _____

Sex _____ Race _____ Age _____

Remarks: _____

CALLER'S VOICE:

- | | | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> CALM | <input type="checkbox"/> CRYING | <input type="checkbox"/> RASPY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ANGRY | <input type="checkbox"/> NORMAL | <input type="checkbox"/> DEEP |
| <input type="checkbox"/> EXCITED | <input type="checkbox"/> DISTINCT | <input type="checkbox"/> RAGGED |
| <input type="checkbox"/> SLOW | <input type="checkbox"/> BLURRED | <input type="checkbox"/> CLEARING THROAT |
| <input type="checkbox"/> RAPID | <input type="checkbox"/> WHISPERED | <input type="checkbox"/> CRACKING VOICE |
| <input type="checkbox"/> SOFT | <input type="checkbox"/> NASAL | <input type="checkbox"/> DISGUISED |
| <input type="checkbox"/> LOUD | <input type="checkbox"/> STUTTER | <input type="checkbox"/> ACCENT |
| <input type="checkbox"/> LAUGHTER | <input type="checkbox"/> LISP | <input type="checkbox"/> FAMILIAR |

BACKGROUND SOUNDS:

- | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> STREET | <input type="checkbox"/> HOUSE NOISES | <input type="checkbox"/> CLEAR |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CROCKERY | <input type="checkbox"/> MOTOR | <input type="checkbox"/> STATIC |
| <input type="checkbox"/> OFFICE MACH. | <input type="checkbox"/> VOICES | <input type="checkbox"/> LOCAL |
| <input type="checkbox"/> PA SYSTEM | <input type="checkbox"/> FACTORY MACH. | <input type="checkbox"/> LONG DISTANCE |
| <input type="checkbox"/> MUSIC | <input type="checkbox"/> ANIMAL NOISES | <input type="checkbox"/> BOOTH |
| <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER _____ | | |

THREAT LANGUAGE:

- | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> WELL SPOKEN (educated) | <input type="checkbox"/> FOUL |
| <input type="checkbox"/> TAPED | <input type="checkbox"/> IRRATIONAL |
| <input type="checkbox"/> MESSAGE READ BY THREAT MAKER | <input type="checkbox"/> INCOHERENT |

**REPORT CALL IMMEDIATELY TO TSA HEADQUARTERS CONTROL CENTER AT
(571) 227-2600**


Name: _____

Telephone: _____

Fire Alarm in the Airport

1. The following security plan has been established to give direction to the TSA Supervisors and staff in the event a fire occurs or fire alarm sounds in the airport.
2. If you observe a fire or if smoke is detected, pull the closest fire alarm and call 911 immediately. Exit the building, go to parking lot "A", and report the fires location to a Supervisor.
3. If the fire alarm sounds, with no sign of fire or smoke, all passenger processing will stop.


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Medical Emergency


A medical emergency is defined as any instance of illness, injury, or incapacitation at a TSA screening checkpoint. In the event of a medical emergency, the following procedures shall be followed.

Actions to be taken for sick or injured TSA employees:



Actions to be taken for sick or injured passengers:

1. Immediately assess the needs of the injured or sick passenger.
2. If necessary, contact an ambulance or first responders.
3. Notify Airport Operations.
4. If necessary, close the checkpoint. Move the passenger to reopen the checkpoint only if it can be safely done without adding to the injury or illness.

- 
7. If a medical emergency is declared on a flight, either inbound or while boarding, the Supervisor will coordinate and assist airline and airport personnel. Medical first responders shall be escorted. Immediately contact a Screening Manager.
 8. The On Duty Supervisor, or designee, shall note all action taken in the daily shift summary, inform the Screening Manager, and complete all necessary paperwork.

This policy is not intended to be all inclusive not to preclude the use of good judgment as conditions vary.

MEDICAL EMERGENCY CHECKLIST

1. [REDACTED] _____ TIME: _____
2. Evaluate injured/sick and assist employee/passenger at checkpoint. _____ TIME: _____
3. Contact 911 if necessary _____ TIME: _____
4. Contact Airport Operations _____ TIME: _____
5. Contact Screening Managers _____ TIME: _____
6. Remove employee/passenger from checkpoint if appropriate. _____ TIME: _____
Cell: [REDACTED]
Cell: [REDACTED]
7. [REDACTED] _____ TIME: _____
8. [REDACTED] _____ TIME: _____
9. [REDACTED] _____ TIME: _____

SST
Gump
70
(NAME)

SST

Supervisors are responsible for completing appropriate documents involving injury or sickness.

This policy is not intended to be all inclusive or to preclude the use of good judgment as conditions warrant.

SEVERE WEATHER

The following security plan has been established to give direction to the on-duty TSA Supervisor in the event a severe weather condition is issued for the airport and surrounding area.

1. When severe weather is imminent, notify a Screening Manager. If the airport ceases operations, close the Checkpoint and Check Baggage areas and move to the terminal boiler room. This is located across from the National Car Rental office and the Women's rest room on the 1st floor.
2. If the airport is closed, notify TSOC [REDACTED] *Exemption Z*
3. Resume normal operations when the "All Clear" is given.

The policy is not intended to be all inclusive not to preclude the use of good judgment as conditions warrant.

LOCAL WEATHER CONDITIONS CHECKLIST

1. Nature of weather condition: _____ TIME: _____

2. Contact the Screening Managers *Exemption 2* _____ TIME: _____

Exemption
7C

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Cell: [Redacted]

Cell: [Redacted]

Exemption
2
(phone numbers)


- 3. Assist airport staff if needed.
- 4. Direct passengers & staff to safe areas.
- 5. Account for all screening staff at safe area.

(NAME)

Power Failure

In the event of a power failure, the following procedures will be followed:

- SSI
- 
- Contact Supervisor.
 - Contact Airport Operations.
 - Contact Screening Manager for change of status.




Checkpoint Procedures:

Immediately notify all carriers of the power failure.
All passengers will be hand wanded and all bags will be dumped and hand searched.

SSI

These procedures will continue until power has been restored.



This policy is not intended to be all inclusive not to preclude the use of good judgment as conditions warrant.

Firearms

Firearms Found at the Checkpoint

Actions to be taken by Screeners:

SSI



2.




3.

SSI

Undeclared Firearms, or Loaded Declared Firearms in Checked Baggage

Actions to be taken by Screeners:

1.



2.

3.

SSI

This policy is not intended to be all inclusive not to preclude the use of good judgment as conditions warrant.

PHONE LIST TVC

EMERGENCY - Police, Fire, Ambulance

GST 911

Last Name	First Name	Office #	Cellular #	Home
Anderson	Alan			

*Exemption
7C
CRAMA*



TSCC (Transportation Security Coordination Center)

*Exemption
7C*

Traverse City Police Department	Chief Mike Warren
Grand Traverse Sheriff's Department	Sheriff Scott Fewins
Traverse City Fire Department	Chief Ed Fisher
FBI Traverse City Office	[Redacted]
FBI Dispatch - Detroit	[Redacted]
ICE	[Redacted]
Local Emergency Planning Coordinator	[Redacted]
Grand Traverse Central Dispatch - Non Emergency	[Redacted]
FAA Control Tower	[Redacted]
TVC Airport Administration Office	[Redacted]
Airport Manager	[Redacted]
Deputy Airport Manager	[Redacted]
Operations Manager	[Redacted]
Airport Fire Department	[Redacted]
Operations Supervisor	[Redacted]
Airport Maintenance	[Redacted] or [Redacted]
Airport Security (Corporate Security solutions)	[Redacted]

	Emergency #
Northwest	[Redacted]
American	[Redacted]
United	[Redacted] or [Redacted]

11/22/2004

GST


Exemption 7C



Transportation Security
Administration

NOV - 7 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN E. SHKOR, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER
GALE ROSSIDES, CHIEF SUPPORT SYSTEMS OFFICER
CAROL DIBATTISTE, CHIEF OF STAFF
ALL ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATORS AND DIRECTORS

FROM: STEPHEN J. MCHUGH 
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR

SUBJECT: Identification and Reporting of Potential Security Violations,
Threat Information, and Criminal Activity

PURPOSE

This memorandum establishes a protocol for immediate use by all TSA employees and contractors to identify and report potential security violations, threat information, and criminal activity.

All TSA employees and contractors must be alert to the possibility they may receive telephone calls, emails, or other communications about such potential violations, threats, and activities. Information from all such communications must get into the proper channels immediately for prompt analysis and appropriate action. TSA's quick response to such communications will allow us to effectively accomplish our mission and maintain the public's confidence.

The procedures detailed below and illustrated in Figure 1 (attached) rely on each of you to make an initial assessment then immediately report those threatening communications to staff in one of two TSA organizations:

- Report potential security violations, threat information, and criminal activity involving the nation's transportation system to the Transportation Security Coordinating Center (TSCC); and
- Report potential security violations, threat information, and criminal activity against TSA, its facilities, or its employees and contractors to TSA's Office of Security.

Please use a new Threat Assessment Worksheet to documenting these communications (copy attached). Additional information and a downloadable version of the Worksheet will be available on TSAWeb at <http://tsaweb.tsa.dot.gov/>. Please treat these communications as evidence of a crime. Do not discard, delete, alter, take notes on, tear, or fold them.

THREATS DEFINED

Threats include any language expressing a present determination or intent to injure or kill a person, breach security, or damage property now or in the immediate future. This includes an already completed act that poses a current threat. Examples include:

- Any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other prohibited item that was, is currently, or will imminently be placed aboard an aircraft or in a sterile area;
- Any security breach creating a current or imminent threat, including unauthorized access to a sterile area or breach of perimeter security;
Any imminent use of a Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) or other missile threat; and
- Any imminent hijacking.

PROCEDURES

Assess the Threat

Review and become familiar with the definitions and examples listed above. Remember, these are just a few examples and are not the exclusive universe of potential threats.

2. Document the Threat

If you receive a telephone call, voicemail message, email message, fax, letter, or package that you believe presents a threat – document it on the Threat Assessment Worksheet. This form is attached to this memorandum and is also available on the TSAWeb at: <http://tsaweb.tsa.dot.gov/>.

Be prepared. Print and store a few copies of the Worksheet at your desk area now in the event your computer is not on or you are not able to access the TSA network at the time you receive a threat. The Worksheet is a writable .PDF file – you can type the threat information directly into the form, save it, and then attach the file to an email message.

3. Report

- Voicemail Messages –

SSI

SSI

SI

SSI

[REDACTED]

• Email Messages -

[REDACTED]

• Faxes or Letters -

[REDACTED]

4.

Report Threats Against TSA, Its Facilities, or Its Employees and Contractors to TSA's Office of Security.

Telephone Calls -

[REDACTED]

• Voicemail Messages -

[REDACTED]

Email Messages -

[REDACTED]

• Faxes or Letters -

[REDACTED]

• Package -

[REDACTED]

5.

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

NON-THREATENING COMMUNICATIONS

Finally, non-threatening communications can be referred to the TSA Contact Center (TCC). This organization, located in the Office of the Ombudsman, is responsible for preparing timely responses to inquiries and concerns from a variety of sources, including the traveling public. They can be reached at (866) 289-9673 or via email at TellTSA@dhs.gov or TSA-ContactCenter@dhs.gov.

Attachments (2)

FIGURE 1 - Internal TSA Protocol for Responding to Threatening Communications





REPORT ALL THREATS

All threats must be taken seriously, reported immediately to the appropriate authority, and evaluated by trained personnel. Threats can be directed at the transportation system, facilities, employees, individuals, and/or the general public. A threat can be criminal or related to terrorism.

- Report Threats Against the Nation's Transportation System to the TSCC - [Redacted]
- Report Threats Against TSA, Its Facilities, or Its Employees and Contractors to TSA's Office of Security - [Redacted]

EXAMPLES OF THREATS

any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other prohibited item that was, is currently, or will imminently be placed aboard an aircraft or in a sterile area; any notification of imminent assault on a Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) or other missile threat; any threat of imminent hijacking; any expression of an intention to imminently inflict significant pain, injury, or property damage.

SSI

Your Name: _____ Date: _____ Time Received: _____
 Your Office: _____ Your Email: _____ Phone #: _____

Threat Delivery: Telephone Voice Mail Email Facsimile Mail/Letter

Attachments to this Worksheet: Email Message Facsimile Mail

Describe the Threat (Use Exact Wording if Possible):

For Telephonic Threats:

Name of Caller: _____ Phone Number of Caller: _____

Sex of the caller: Male Female

Caller's Voice:

<input type="checkbox"/> Calm	<input type="checkbox"/> Angry	<input type="checkbox"/> Excited	<input type="checkbox"/> Slow	<input type="checkbox"/> Rapid	<input type="checkbox"/> Soft
<input type="checkbox"/> Loud	<input type="checkbox"/> Laughing	<input type="checkbox"/> Crying	<input type="checkbox"/> Normal	<input type="checkbox"/> Unusual	<input type="checkbox"/> Distinct
<input type="checkbox"/> Stuttered	<input type="checkbox"/> Nasal	<input type="checkbox"/> Stutter	<input type="checkbox"/> Lisp	<input type="checkbox"/> Raspy	<input type="checkbox"/> Deep
<input type="checkbox"/> Disguised	<input type="checkbox"/> Familiar	<input type="checkbox"/> Whispered	<input type="checkbox"/> Accent	<input type="checkbox"/> Ragged	
<input type="checkbox"/> Clearing Throat	<input type="checkbox"/> Deep Breathing				

Background Noises:

<input type="checkbox"/> Street Noises	<input type="checkbox"/> Factory Machinery	<input type="checkbox"/> Telephone Booth	<input type="checkbox"/> PA System	<input type="checkbox"/> Long Distance
<input type="checkbox"/> House Noises	<input type="checkbox"/> Static	<input type="checkbox"/> Motor	<input type="checkbox"/> Car Phone	<input type="checkbox"/> Music
<input type="checkbox"/> Local	<input type="checkbox"/> Other			

Record of Confirmation

Contact Name: _____ Date: _____ Time: _____ Phone #: _____

SSI [redacted]
TVC

Anderson, Alan

11/03

To: [redacted]

Subject: RE: [redacted] SSI

[redacted]

Thanks for the opportunity to review. You have asked for feedback on any potentially contentious issues, and I don't think there really are any.

SSI

[redacted] My understanding is that this is going to [redacted] and [redacted] at the airport).

I do have some feedback, however, that I hope is helpful and constructive. For example, regarding the first paragraph in the Executive Summary: I would recommend you state that TVC serves "Northwestern Michigan" instead of just Traverse City and Grand Traverse County. Also, while the airport may be about 2 miles from the center of Traverse City, it is still within the city limits and not "2 miles from Traverse City".

Paragraph 2: The Cherry Capital Festival in July is known as "The National Cherry Festival".

Paragraph 3: The new terminal will open in the Fall of 2004, not 2005.

Page 3. First paragraph. The assessment took place October 27-30, not November 3-6.

Page 12. Date of Assessment: Change from November 2003 to October 2003.

Page 15. For Scenario 2. [redacted]

SSI

Hope this helps. Thanks. See you here some time in warmer weather.

Alan

Alan Anderson, FSD
Transportation Security Administration
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
1769 Forest Ridge Dr, Suite B
Traverse City, MI 49686
ph [redacted] fax [redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2003 4:01 PM
To: Anderson, Alan
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] SSI

Gentlemen,

Please review for content and give us feedback on any potentially contentious issues.

[REDACTED] - [REDACTED] indicated I could send this to you as well and that I could expect feedback on Friday... Please do not release to anyone else until [REDACTED] sends you [REDACTED] SSI

Password for Zip file in next email.

Regards,

[REDACTED] (Operations)
Aviation Security Measures
Office of Aviation Operations
Transportation Security Administration
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
[REDACTED]
Office - [REDACTED]
Cell - [REDACTED]

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October 15, 2003

Mr. Alan Anderson
Transportation Security Administration
1760 Forest Ridge Dr., Suite B
Traverse City, MI 49686

Dear Mr. Anderson,

The Cherry Capital Airport with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is partnering up [REDACTED]. This [REDACTED] and will be led by Federal Security Director Alan Anderson and a team of TSA officials from Washington, D.C.

I ask your attendance for table top exercises on both Tuesday, October 28, 2003 and Wednesday, October 29, 2003 from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. The exercises will be held at the airport administration offices on the second floor of the main terminal. Please meet in the lobby and you will be escorted upstairs.

Please advise me if you have any questions or concerns at [REDACTED]. Please also invite any person that can assist or will participate in the Airport's Emergency Plan.

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Operations Manager
[REDACTED]

mutual aid

Merge.doc

7/03

Title	FirstName	LastName	Company	Address1	City	State	PostalCode
Chief	Ed	Fisher	Traversc City Fire Departmen t	510 W. Front Street	Trave rse City	MI	49684
Chief	Wayne	Hanna	GT Metro Fire Departmen t	879 Parsons	Trave rse City	MI	49685
			GT County Emergency Managem ent	400 Boardman Avenue	Trave rse City	MI	49684
			GT County Emergency Managem ent	400 Boardman Avenue	Trave rse City	MI	49684
Chief	Mike	Warren	Traverse City Police Departmen t	320 Washingto n	Trave rse City	MI	49684
			Grand Traverse County Sheriff	320 Washingto n	Trave rse City	MI	49684
			Michigan State Police	218 W. 14th Street	Trave rse City	MI	49684
			Federal Bureau of Investigati on	P.O. Box 924	Trave rse City	MI	49685
			NW Reg. Med. Auth. c/o MMC	1105 6th Street	Trave rse City	MI	49684
			North Flight, Inc.	1840 Stults Drive	Trave rse City	MI	49686
			North Flight, Inc.	1840 Stults Drive	Trave rse City	MI	49686
Mr.	Alan	Anderson	Transporati on Security Administra tion	1760 Forest Ridge Dr., Suite B	Trave rse City	MI	49686
			Pro-Tec Fire Services	Cherry Capital Airport	Trave rse City	MI	49686
			United Express	Cherry Capital Airport	Trave rse City	MI	49686
			American Eagle	Cherry Capital Airport	Trave rse City	MI	49686
			Northwest Airlines	Cherry Capital	Trave rse City	MI	49686

Exemption

*2
phone
number(s)*

*Exemption
TC
change*

Title	FirstName	LastName	Company	Address1	City	State	PostalCode
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Harbour Air	1150 Airport Access Road	Traverse City	MI	49686
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Cherry Capital Aviation	1190 Airport Access Road	Traverse City	MI	49686
Commander	Steve	Truhlar	U.S. Coast Guard Air Station	1175 Airport Access Road	Traverse City	MI	49686
Commanding Officer	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	U.S. Coast Guard Air Station	1175 Airport Access Road	Traverse City	MI	49686
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	FAA/ATC	Cherry Capital Airport	Traverse City	MI	49686
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Federal Aviation Administration	2300 East Devon Avenue	Des Plaines	IL	60018

*Exemption
2
phone numbers)*

*Exemption
7C
changes)*

ALAN ANDERSON

Transportation Security Administration



Airport: Cherry Capital Airport (TVC)

AVA Team Sign-in Sheet

[Please PRINT. Write LEGIBLY

Signature	Position	Agency
[Redacted]	Airport Director	Cherry Capital Airport
[Redacted]	Home Land Security	Coast Guard Air Station
EDWARD FISHER	FIRE CHIEF	TRAVERSE CITY
[Redacted]	AIR TRAFFIC MANAGER	TRAVERSE CITY TOWER
ALAN ANDERSON	FEDERAL SECURITY DIR	TSA / DHS
[Redacted]	Airport Ops Mgr.	Cherry Cap. A/P
[Redacted]	Operations Manager	Alcona
[Redacted]	Communication Supervisor	North Flight
[Redacted]	MANAGEMENT	CORPORATE SECURITY
[Redacted]	MANAGER	CORPORATE SECURITY
[Redacted]	LT. / TRAINING OFFICER	TRAVERSE CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT
[Redacted]	BATTAL ASST CHIEF / INSPECTOR	GRAND TRAVERSE METED FIRE DEPT
[Redacted]	CAPTAIN	Pro-Tech Fire Svcs.
[Redacted]	AVIATION Security Inspector	TSA / DHS
[Redacted]	AFSD SCREENING	TSA / DHS
[Redacted]	AV OPS - TSA	TSA
[Redacted]	TSA Stakeholder Liaison	TSA / DHS
[Redacted]	SERGEANT	TRAVERSE CITY POLICE 281

Grand Traverse County Full Scale Drill Time line
Saturday, September 18, 2004

- 0700
All airport player/actors arrive at the airport maintenance building for moulage
- 0730
Airport evaluators, observers, and facilitator arrive at the airport maintenance building
- 0730
All Brown Bridge Dam player/actors arrive at [REDACTED] house for moulage
- 0730
Brown Bridge dam evaluator and facilitator arrive at [REDACTED] house
- 0800
Brown Bridge Dam portion of the full scale narrative begins
- 0800
The Grand Traverse County EOC is opened and activated
- 0830
[REDACTED] Grand Traverse Metro Fire, meets the Coast Guard for site survey by Air
- 0830
Cherry Capital Airport full scale narrative begins
- 0915
[REDACTED]
- 1130
Drill Narrative begins to end
- 1130
Lunch provided by the American Red Cross and Salvation Army at the airport maintenance building

Post Exercise Evaluation and Debrief will be Tuesday, September 21, 2004. It will be at Northwestern Michigan College, Great Lakes Maritime Campus, conference room A in the Hagerty Center.
Time: 1000-12 noon, lunch is provided.

SSI
GRAND TRAVERSE COUNTY
EMERGENCY

Grand Traverse County Emergency Management
Full Scale Drill Narrative
September 18, 2004

0800

A previously planted explosive device is detonated by two members of "Citizens For Liberty" (CFL) at the Brown Bridge Dam. Several pipe bombs were placed under the nature trail walkway steps.

The explosion and movement of the water causes a "V" shaped breach in the dam, opening the earthen embankment. As the water rushes out, the breach widens.

0800

[REDACTED] calls in a report to Central Dispatch of a loud explosion in the area of Brown Bridge dam and reports the water level is going down, and the dam has been breached.

Central activates the warning sirens and the tones are set for a County wide disaster.

0805

[REDACTED] a resident on the river, calls 911 to report that he's fallen off of his roof. He's on his cell phone and unable to move. He hears the siren and cannot get to his car.

There is a 20 minute window of opportunity to extricate [REDACTED] and notify residents before the flood waters inundate the Boardman river up to the first bridge on River Road west of Garfield Avenue.

0810

[REDACTED] reports to Central that after the explosion there was a heavy smell of cordite and lots of debris in the air. He could see someone across the lake running up to the hill to Hobbs Highway.


0815

An unidentified courier drops off a videotape at the Traverse City Law Enforcement Center front desk.


The videotape reveals four men, masked, holding weapons and what appear to be numerous pipe bombs. One of the men says, on tape, "When you receive this then you'll know that we blew this dam. It's not going to end here. This is just the beginning of the revolution. We won't stand for federal spies from the USDA to tell us how to raise our dairy cows! Our brothers and sisters will rise up across the nation when they hear our call to arms!"

Two of the men are then seen planting the pipe bomb looking objects around and in the dam.

0815



0825



5907

Anderson, Alan

From:

Sent:

Tuesday, April 08, 2003 1:29 PM

To:

Cc:

Anderson, Alan;

Mair, Tom;

Subject:

Training Lesson Plans

[REDACTED]

Here is a preliminary list of what the training classes (along with the facilitators and location of training) we will be covering over the next few weeks. As it states, this is a preliminary listing. Should any other training issues arise that need to be immediately addressed, the training schedule could be amended to meet those needs.

April 9th, HHMD and Pat down Procedures. [REDACTED] (training room)

April 16th, TSA ETD Maintenance Procedures "Shift Maintenance." Tom Mair and [REDACTED] (airport)

April 23rd, TSA Dangerous Goods and Hazardous Materials "HAZMAT." [REDACTED] (training room)

April 30th, Benefits Seminar. [REDACTED] (training room)

[REDACTED]

TSA Training Coordinator

Cherry Capital Airport

1760 Forest Ridge Drive

Traverse City, MI 49686

[REDACTED] office

[REDACTED] fax

[REDACTED]
From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, June 17, 2004 11:52 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Couple misc. duties

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] I brought the audit cards in. I will work with them this weekend.

Scenario training, as per [REDACTED], lets get some more suggestions for topics from screeners to see what they are interested in practicing or reviewing. Does flexibility count?

[REDACTED]
TVC - Screening Supervisor
Cherry Capital Airport
Ph ([REDACTED])
Fax [REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, June 13, 2004 5:13 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Couple misc. duties

Scenario training could be pat down of PWD. ????
Audits? Do you mean just update the cards that we have?
Also, would you like to assign some overtime from pay period 16 through 17? That will show that we are working together on it. We don't need to assign it until about a month in advance.
Thanks!

[REDACTED]
TSA Supervisor
Cherry Capital Airport (TVC)
1330 Airport Access Rd.
Traverse City, MI. 49686
Office: [REDACTED] / Fax: [REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, June 13, 2004 12:41 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Couple misc. duties

- [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
1. [REDACTED] from PLN will be sending down the guns for us to get our required WTMD test done on time;
 2. We need to do scenario training - we were supposed to have something scheduled by 6/15, and to invite [REDACTED]
 3. Audits - This is something we need to do within the next two weeks to accomplish our directive of once per month.

It would probably be good for us to get #2, and #3 done before the Supervisor's meeting. Do you have any ideas for subjects for the scenarios? The Audits shouldn't be too difficult because we have the forms. I have already practiced doing it, but wanted to wait to talk to you so we are on the same wavelength as to accomplishing our goals.

Weekly Headcount is done. [REDACTED] can we talk later about supply ordering? I'll work on the T&L's for the rest of shift.

See you later and thank you.

P.S. I moved my Briefings to earlier (1300) because we had too many people getting heartburn waiting for us because they get to the airport too late for that 1340(?) flight.

[REDACTED]
TVC - Screening Supervisor
Cherry Capital Airport.
Ph [REDACTED]
Fax [REDACTED]

Tracking:

Recipient
[REDACTED]

Read

Read: 6/18/2004 4:38 PM

[REDACTED]
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

Friday, July 02, 2004 8:19 PM

[REDACTED]
misc. info for weekend, etc.

All:

1. [REDACTED] is ok'd to have extra time for lunch to take [REDACTED] son to sailing lessons for short period of time. [REDACTED] will come in at 0500 and leave at 1400, with an hour run to Kingsley and back to Boardman Lake. Any questions, please feel free to ask.
2. Don't forget to have TDY employees take an hour lunch. They also need to sign in and out correctly. They are getting paid for 11 hours spread out over a 12 hour period, with that hour lunch. For example: 0930 (in) 2130 (out), 11 hours.
3. I didn't get down to storage to see if we have an extra printer cartridge. If this one says toner low, take it out and shake it and you can get some more time out it.
4. Review "channel" messages with staff. They are forgetting to clear out that messages according to directions taped to garage door lid. I cleared out three today.
5. Do role playing! The forms are on top, or under the supervisor task log. Have the screeners come up with some scenarios.
6. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] the audit forms are under the supervisor task log too. [REDACTED] did one for the x-ray operator to work against our July quota.
7. Certain people are tasked [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to question staff about improving checkpoint configuration and screening procedures. They will be talking about this to get feedback, suggestions to return to Mr. Anderson. That may be a good discussion during downtime to help them out.
8. Don't forget to use the task log. It has the daily tasks.
9. If in doubt, use the checklists at the front of the book in the sleeves to figure out what needs to be done.
10. Briefing book - when taking sheets out - destroy the reading material, date the top of the entry log and acknowledgement log for the day it was removed from and put those two sheets in the folder in the back of the supervisor task book.
11. Any questions, feel free to call.
12. This is fun, right?

Thank you.

[REDACTED]
TVC - Screening Supervisor
Cherry Capital Airport
Ph [REDACTED]
Fax [REDACTED]

Tracking:

Recipient

Read

Read: 7/2/2004 8:40 PM

Read: 7/2/2004 9:12 PM



Type of Activity: Personal Interview [redacted] Intv. 11/29/2004

Case Number: I05-TSA-CHI-01544	Case Title: TSA, Cherry Capital Airport
--------------------------------	---

On November 29, 2004, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), and SA [redacted] DHS, OIG, interviewed [redacted] Aviation Security Inspector, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), at the office of the Federal Security Director (FSD), 1760 Forest Ridge, Traverse City, MI. Also present was FSD Alan Anderson. This interview was predicated upon an allegation of Thomas Mair regarding security arrangements at the terminal previously used by commercial aircraft at the Traverse City, MI airport. Mair had stated that a door leading from a tunnel used to transport baggage to the aircraft ramp area had no locking mechanism and, therefore, could be used to gain entry to the terminal by unauthorized individuals.

[redacted] stated [redacted] was familiar with the door in question and stated that the door was within the Air Operations Area (AOA) that had been established while the terminal was utilized by commercial aircraft. [redacted] explained that the AOA, which was mandated by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulation 1542.201, "Security of the Secured Area", included the secured area of the terminal building, the adjacent ramp areas used to park aircraft, all taxiways, and all runways. [redacted] stated that access to the door in question from the exterior of the building was controlled by the airport's perimeter fencing, which was permissible under FAA 1542.201 for category 3 airports such as Traverse City.

[redacted] provided a copy of FAA 1542.201 and a diagram of the AOA for the terminal building in question.

Attachments: Copy of FAA 1542.021
Copy of AOA diagram.

Name, Title, Signature, and Date: [redacted], Special Agent [redacted] 12/10/04	Reviewing Official Name, Title, Signature, and Date: Thomas M. Frost, Special Agent in Charge 12-13-04
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security program. This agreement must contain the following:

(1) A description, a map, and, where appropriate, a diagram of the boundaries and pertinent features of each area, including individual access points, over which the aircraft operator or foreign air carrier will exercise exclusive security responsibility.

(2) A description of the measures used by the aircraft operator or foreign air carrier to comply with § 1542.201, § 1542.203, or § 1542.205, as appropriate.

(3) Procedures by which the aircraft operator or foreign air carrier will immediately notify the airport operator and provide for alternative security measures when there are changed conditions as described in § 1542.103(a).

(c) Any exclusive area agreements in effect on November 14, 2001, must meet the requirements of this section and § 1544.227 no later than November 14, 2002.

§ 1542.113 Airport tenant security programs.

(a) TSA may approve an airport tenant security program as follows:

(1) The tenant must assume responsibility for specified security measures of the secured area, AOA, or SIDA as provided in §§ 1542.201, 1542.203, and 1542.205.

(2) The tenant may not assume responsibility for law enforcement support under § 1542.215.

(3) The tenant must assume the responsibility within the tenant's leased areas or areas designated for the tenant's exclusive use. A tenant may not assume responsibility under a tenant security program for the airport passenger terminal.

(4) Responsibility must be exclusive to one tenant, and shared responsibility among tenants is not permitted.

(5) TSA must find that the tenant is able and willing to carry out the airport tenant security program.

(b) An airport tenant security program must be in writing, signed by the airport operator and the airport tenant, and maintained in the airport security program. The airport tenant security program must include the following:

(1) A description and a map of the boundaries and pertinent features of each area over which the airport tenant will exercise security responsibilities.

(2) A description of the measures the airport tenant has assumed.

(3) Measures by which the airport operator will monitor and audit the tenant's compliance with the security program.

(4) Monetary and other penalties to which the tenant may be subject if it

fails to carry out the airport tenant security program.

(5) Circumstances under which the airport operator will terminate the airport tenant security program for cause.

(6) A provision acknowledging that the tenant is subject to inspection by TSA in accordance with § 1542.5.

(7) A provision acknowledging that individuals who carry out the tenant security program are contracted to or acting for the airport operator and are required to protect sensitive information in accordance with part 1520 of this chapter, and may be subject to civil penalties for failing to protect sensitive security information.

(8) Procedures by which the tenant will immediately notify the airport operator of and provide for alternative security measures for changed conditions as described in § 1542.103(a).

(c) If TSA has approved an airport tenant security program, the airport operator may not be found to be in violation of a requirement of this part in any case in which the airport operator demonstrates that:

(1) The tenant or an employee, permittee, or invitee of the tenant, is responsible for such violation; and

(2) The airport operator has complied with all measures in its security program to ensure the tenant has complied with the airport tenant security program.

(d) TSA may amend or terminate an airport tenant security program in accordance with § 1542.105.

Subpart C—Operations

§ 1542.201 Security of the secured area.

(a) Each airport operator required to have a security program under § 1542.103(a) must establish at least one secured area.

(b) Each airport operator required to establish a secured area must prevent and detect the unauthorized entry, presence, and movement of individuals and ground vehicles into and within the secured area by doing the following:

(1) Establish and carry out measures for controlling entry to secured areas of the airport in accordance with § 1542.207.

(2) Provide for detection of, and response to, each unauthorized presence or movement in, or attempted entry to, the secured area by an individual whose access is not authorized in accordance with its security program.

(3) Establish and carry out a personnel identification system described under § 1542.211.

(4) Subject each individual to employment history verification as

described in § 1542.209 before authorizing unescorted access to a secured area.

(5) Train each individual before granting unescorted access to the secured area, as required in § 1542.213(b).

(6) Post signs at secured area access points and on the perimeter that provide warning of the prohibition against unauthorized entry. Signs must be posted by each airport operator in accordance with its security program not later than November 14, 2003.

§ 1542.203 Security of the air operations area (AOA).

(a) Each airport operator required to have a security program under § 1542.103(a) must establish an AOA, unless the entire area is designated as a secured area.

(b) Each airport operator required to establish an AOA must prevent and detect the unauthorized entry, presence, and movement of individuals and ground vehicles into or within the AOA by doing the following:

(1) Establish and carry out measures for controlling entry to the AOA of the airport in accordance with § 1542.207.

(2) Provide for detection of, and response to, each unauthorized presence or movement in, or attempted entry to, the AOA by an individual whose access is not authorized in accordance with its security program.

(3) Provide security information as described in § 1542.213(c) to each individual with unescorted access to the AOA.

(4) Post signs on AOA access points and perimeters that provide warning of the prohibition against unauthorized entry to the AOA. Signs must be posted by each airport operator in accordance with its security program not later than November 14, 2003.

(5) If approved by TSA, the airport operator may designate all or portions of its AOA as a SIDA, or may use another personnel identification system, as part of its means of meeting the requirements of this section. If it uses another personnel identification system, the media must be clearly distinguishable from those used in the secured area and SIDA.

§ 1542.205 Security of the security identification display area (SIDA).

(a) Each airport operator required to have a security program under § 1542.103(a) must establish at least one SIDA. Each secured area must be a SIDA. Other areas of the airport may be SIDA's.

(b) Each airport operator required to establish a SIDA must establish and



Type of Activity: Personal Interview [REDACTED]

Case Number: I05-TSA-CHI-01544	Case Title: TSA, Cherry Capital Airport
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On December 1, 2004 Special Agent (S/A) [REDACTED] and S/A [REDACTED] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General (DHS/OIG) interviewed [REDACTED] a former Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Security Screener Manager. The interview took place in the cafeteria of Courtyard by Marriot motel in Traverse City, Michigan.

Prior to becoming a Security Screener, [REDACTED] was employed by [REDACTED]. Before that, [REDACTED] was [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] started [REDACTED] employment with TSA as a Security Screener on [REDACTED] career began with training in Baltimore, Maryland; and then [REDACTED] worked as part of a mobile screening force setting up security at several airports throughout the country. These included airports in Baltimore, MD; JFK in NY; Providence, RI; Nashville, TN; and Alpena, MI.

[REDACTED] was promoted to the position of Security Screener Manager [REDACTED], and assigned to the Cherry Capital Airport in Traverse City. [REDACTED] the last shift [REDACTED] worked actually being on May 9, 2004.

At the beginning of the interview, [REDACTED] spoke at length regarding [REDACTED] personal employment issues. [REDACTED] had been talking with another Special Agent from DHS/OIG [REDACTED], and wanted agents to be aware of this. Agents listened to [REDACTED] for quite some time before explaining to [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] should continue arguing [REDACTED] employment issues through the channels [REDACTED] was already pursuing.

SA [REDACTED] explained to [REDACTED] the basis of the investigation were allegations concerning security issues at the old terminal that is no longer in use. [REDACTED] has never worked in the new terminal so there was no confusion. [REDACTED], and said [REDACTED] was willing to discuss the safety concerns, adding that Mair was very security conscience.

[REDACTED] was questioned about the allegation of the unlocked doors in the tunnel. [REDACTED] remembered Mair bringing up the fact that the door had no locking mechanism. [REDACTED] passed the concern to the Assistant Federal Security Director (AFSD) [REDACTED] who said [REDACTED] would try and correct the problem. Some time later, when there was no response from [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] about [REDACTED]

Name, Title, Signature, Date: [REDACTED] - Special Agent 12-14-04	Reviewing Official Name, Title, Signature, Date: Thomas M. Frost - Special Agent in Charge 12-14-04
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the doors again. [redacted] told [redacted] checked into the issue and it was of "no consequence" because the doors were in the secure area.

[redacted] was asked about the allegation that emergency lighting in the tunnel did not work during a power outage. [redacted] remembers at least four power outages while [redacted] was employed with TSA. One outage lasted for 1-2 hours and was caused by a traffic accident near the airport; and the other times the outages were intermittent and only lasted minutes, usually due to weather conditions. Mair and another screener [redacted], brought the issue to [redacted] attention. [redacted] reported this issue to [redacted] who forwarded the information to airport operations. [redacted] remembers checking the emergency lights at a later date by pushing the test button, and confirmed that they were working. [redacted] believes [redacted] performed the test on the lights at least twice and possibly more frequently.

[redacted] was questioned as to [redacted] knowledge of any security problems associated with the one-way revolving door leading from the sterile area, down the stairs, to the unsecured area. [redacted] remembers at least two incidents with this door. The first was when the door was breached by some teenagers. [redacted] remembers a guard being placed on the door after the incident and the door being restored to operating condition a couple of days later. [redacted] feels that even though the door was fixed, it could still be breached; and remembers [redacted] from Corporate Security Solutions showing [redacted] how to defeat the door. [redacted] brought this to [redacted] attention and was told the airport felt it was not cost effective to do anything else with the door. [redacted] felt that this was probably because the airport was within a few months of moving into the new terminal.

On another occasion with the revolving door [redacted] remembers someone finding it in a constant revolving motion. [redacted] said [redacted] held two aircraft from leaving the jetway because of this, but was told by [redacted] to let them go. [redacted] believes the door was fixed the same day by maintenance. Special Agent [redacted] looked at the receipts [redacted] had from the door being repaired, which had previously been provided, and asked [redacted] if this incident could have been on January 6, 2004, approximately one month before the teenagers breached the door, and [redacted] said yes.

[redacted] was asked for [redacted] opinion regarding the type and amount of training provided. [redacted] offered an opinion that training was very poor, and [redacted] wrote a list of things that [redacted] felt TSA needed a response plan. When asked if those were the issues currently contained in the Emergency Operations Plan [redacted] said yes. [redacted] helped work on the plan. [redacted] also recommended that a Safety Action Committee be established, something which was implemented in January of 2004. [redacted] helped set up the configuration of screening equipment for both travelers and baggage, and played a "big part" in the [redacted] training.

SSI

After hearing [redacted] involvement with several training issues, Special Agent [redacted] asked [redacted] to look back at what things were like when [redacted] first got to Traverse City as a manager and compare that to now. [redacted] agreed that Screener training has gradually improved, emergency plans were formulated, relationships have been established with Police, Fire, Ambulance, and Security personnel, table top exercises and even recently a full emergency scenario have been conducted. When asked if [redacted] saw an improvement that got better as time went on [redacted] said yes. [redacted] also stated

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MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY

that employees know who to contact for an emergency and what evacuation procedures are. Finally, when asked if [redacted] assessment of "very poor" was accurate, [redacted] said no.

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Type of Activity: Telephone Contact [REDACTED]

Case Number: I05-TSA-CHI-01544	Case Title: TSA, Cherry Capital Airport
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On December 1, 2004, Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), and SA [REDACTED] DHS, OIG, interviewed [REDACTED] Aviation Security Inspector (ASI), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Dulles International Airport, Dulles, VA, via telephone. [REDACTED] was informed that the interview was being conducted as part of an investigation of an allegation regarding security arrangements at the terminal previously used by commercial aircraft at the Traverse City, MI airport, specifically, that a door leading from a tunnel used to transport baggage to the aircraft ramp area had no locking mechanism and, therefore, could be used to gain entry to the terminal by unauthorized individuals.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was the ASI assigned to Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City, MI. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was familiar with the door in question and stated that the door was within the Air Operations Area (AOA) that had been established while the terminal was utilized by commercial aircraft. [REDACTED] stated that access to this door from the exterior of the building was controlled by the airport's perimeter fencing, which was permissible under FAA regulations for category 3 airports such as Traverse City, MI, and therefore, the door did not have to be locked.

[REDACTED] was informed that Thomas Mair claimed to have informed [REDACTED] via email on January 5, 2004 that leaving the door unsecured posed a potential security problem. [REDACTED] replied that [REDACTED] did not recall ever receiving a communication from Mair regarding the door.

[REDACTED] stated that part of [REDACTED] duties as an ASI is to conduct an Annual Comprehensive inspection of the airport to which [REDACTED] is assigned, and that from September 15-19, 2003 [REDACTED] conducted this inspection at the Traverse City Airport. [REDACTED] stated that this inspection determined that the airport was in compliance with all applicable TSA security regulations, including measures designed to secure the AOA.

Name, Title, Signature, and Date [REDACTED] Special Agent [REDACTED] 12/9/04	Reviewing Official Name, Title, Signature, and Date: Thomas M. Frost, Special Agent in Charge 12-10-04
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Type of Activity: Telephone Contact [REDACTED]

Case Number: I05-TSA-CHI-01544	Case Title: TSA, Cherry Capital Airport
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On November 30, 2004, Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED], Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), and SA [REDACTED], DHS, OIG, interviewed [REDACTED], Assistant Federal Security Director for Screening (AFSD), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Cherry Capital Airport, at the office of the Federal Security Director (FSD), 1760 Forest Ridge, Traverse City, MI. The interview was conducted via telephone due to the fact that [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] on annual leave. FSD Alan Anderson was present with SAs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] during this interview.

[REDACTED] was informed that the purpose of the interview was to discuss allegations made by Thomas Mair regarding security procedures at the now-vacated terminal at Cherry Capital Airport. With regard to Mair's allegation that a baggage tunnel door in the old terminal was not properly secured, [REDACTED] stated that the door has never been considered to be a security vulnerability. [REDACTED] indicated that during the time Mair worked for TSA, Mair never communicated a concern regarding the door to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] added that Mair had been supervised by Screening Managers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], therefore, any such communication would have been forwarded to [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] or [REDACTED].

Regarding the emergency lights installed in the tunnel, [REDACTED] stated that during the past two years [REDACTED] recalled approximately five power outages at the old terminal. [REDACTED] estimated that four of these outages were 10 minutes or less in duration. [REDACTED] continued that during two or three of these outages, at least one of the emergency lighting fixtures in the tunnel did not illuminate. [REDACTED] stated that the malfunctions were reported to [REDACTED] Northwest Regional Airport Commission, Operations Office, who coordinated repairs.

Regarding the revolving exit-only door in the old terminal, [REDACTED] recalled that the door would jam on occasion, causing passengers to utilize an adjacent emergency exit door. [REDACTED] stated that on at least one occasion, the alarm [REDACTED] of the door malfunctioned when a passenger attempted to enter through the door, however, since the door automatically stopped, no security breach occurred. [REDACTED] added that the relocation of the alarm enunciator closer to the TSA main checkpoint improved the ability of TSA personnel to hear the alarm. [REDACTED] stated that the February 8, 2004 incident during which several members of a youth ski team entered the secured area through this exit-only door prompted a comprehensive examination of the door's operation. (Details of this incident were documented in the Memorandum of Activity of SA [REDACTED] which reported the OIG interview of FSD Anderson on November 29, 2004.) [REDACTED] stated it took approximately three days to upgrade the door's hardware, during which time a contract security

SSI →

Name, Title, Signature, and Date [REDACTED] Special Agent, December 9, 2004	Reviewing Official Name, Title, Signature, and Date: [Signature] 12-13-04 Thomas M. Frost, Special Agent in Charge
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MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY

guard was stationed at the door to prevent unauthorized entry [redacted] stated [redacted] observed the repairs and participated in the subsequent testing of the door [redacted] added that this incident was the only breach of security involving this door that had occurred. SSI

With regard to the February 8, 2003 [redacted] incident in which Mair participated [redacted] recalled that [redacted] responded to the airport to assist with [redacted] and learned that [redacted] the Northwest Airlines station manager, contacted the local sheriff's office to request [redacted] the airport. [redacted] stated that TSA was not aware of the threat information until the [redacted] officers responded to the airport, and [redacted] later conceded that [redacted] should have notified TSA earlier. SSI

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Type of Activity: Personal Interview TVC Employees

Case Number: I05-TSA-CHI-01544	Case Title: TSA, Cherry Capital Airport
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On November 30, 2004 Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] from the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General interviewed [redacted] Assistant Airport Director [redacted] Senior Operations Officer, and [redacted] Corporate Security Solutions, all of whom are currently working at Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City, Michigan, as employees of the Northwest Regional Airport Commission.

The interview of these individuals started with a tour of the old terminal where the alleged safety concerns took place. SAs [redacted] and [redacted] inspected the two tunnel doors on the outside of the terminal leading to the Airport Operations Area. (AOA). It was observed these two doors now were secured with hinged locks so access could not be gained from outside. These locks were new and had been added after the terminal closed.

SAs [redacted] and [redacted] walked through the tunnel to inspect the emergency lighting. [redacted] showed agents a test button on the back of the emergency lights. [redacted] pushed the test button on two different lights while walking through the area and they appeared to be operating properly. [redacted] later provided the OIG with receipts for batteries that were replaced in the emergency lights.

Agents next conducted an inspection of the second floor of the terminal where the revolving door is located. The door was found to be in working condition, and the alarm was turned on. Special Agent [redacted] had the employees test the alarm while [redacted] went and stood where the TSA checkpoint had been located. The alarm is very loud and could be easily heard from the checkpoint.

[redacted] showed agents how the revolving door worked and what modifications had been completed as problems arose. [redacted] later was able to provide the date of the power outage in question and maintenance receipts from Windemuller Electric Inc. for repairs on the door. One of the receipts reflected repairs associated with the incident in which the teenagers breeched the door on February 8, 2004. This repair was completed on February 10, 2004.

[redacted] also provided agents with a copy of the Cherry Capital Airport Emergency Plan. This plan is similar to the Transportation Security Administration's Emergency Operations Plan, however it was formulated by airport personnel and approved by the Federal Aviation Administration.

[redacted] stated his company; Corporate Security Solutions, provides armed security to the airport in lieu of a certified law enforcement officer. [redacted] provided agents with a copy of daily

Name, Title, Signature, Date: [redacted] - Special Agent 12-14-04	Reviewing Official Name, Title, Signature, Date: Thomas M. Frost - Special Agent in Charge
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activity reports showing his employees providing security for the revolving door from the time the teenagers breeched the door until it was repaired.

Attached:

Cherry Capital Airport-Emergency Plan
Receipts for Emergency Light Batteries
Receipts for Repair on Revolving Door
Corporate Security Solutions-Officer Daily Activity Reports

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April 9, 2003

Mr. Alan Anderson
Federal Security Director
Transportation Security Administration
1760 Forest Ridge Dr., Suite B
Traverse City, MI 49686

Dear Mr. Anderson,

Please review the enclosed emergency plan. I look forward to you attending the Table Top Exercise on April 14, 2003 at 2:00 p.m. This meeting will be held at the ARFF/Maintenance Building.

Please call me if you have any questions or concerns at [REDACTED]. Please also invite any person that can assist or will participate in the Airport's plan.

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED], A.A.E.
Operations Manager

[REDACTED]
Encl.

Cherry Capital Airport
Airport Certification Manual

Exhibit #9

Airport Emergency Plan

Cherry Capital Airport

Emergency Plan

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EMERGENCY PLAN

GENERAL

Purpose:

This plan has been approved by the FAA and coordination has been accomplished with those persons and agencies tasked in the plan. It is recognized that all emergency conditions cannot be anticipated; and if an emergency situation arises that is not covered by this plan, the Airport Director has authority to direct such actions as he may deem necessary.

At least every 12 months, a representative from each of the parties with whom the plan is coordinated, shall review the plan to ensure that all parties know their responsibilities and that all of the information in the plan is current.

A full scale emergency exercise will be held at least every three years.

Participating Agencies:

INCIDENT COMMANDER

The Incident Commander shall be the highest ranking representative from Traverse City Fire Department, who shall exercise control during emergency or disaster conditions and shall assure implementation of these procedures during any emergency or disaster condition.

Or

In the case of a bomb threat or hijacking the Incident Commander shall be the highest ranking Law Enforcement Official (i.e. TSA, FBI, Police) who shall exercise control during emergency or disaster conditions and shall assure implementation of these procedures during any emergency or disaster condition.

AIRPORT COMMANDER

The Airport Commander shall be the Airport Director or his designated representative who shall exercise control over all facets of airport operations. The Airport Commander shall work closely with the Incident Commander.

EMERGENCY ALARM SYSTEMS

Primary Crash Net is activated by the Cherry Capital Airport Control Tower. The Net is a direct drop telephone line to notify the following agencies:

Original Date: 01/14/03

Revised Date: _____

1. Central Dispatch
2. U.S. Coast Guard Air Station
3. Airport Director
4. ARFF

Secondary Crash Net activated by Central Dispatch. Agencies notified:

1. Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting Unit
2. Traverse City Fire Department
3. Traverse City Police Department
4. Grand Traverse Sheriff Department
5. NorthFlight
6. Grand Traverse Metro Fire Fighting Unit

The ARFF unit will be activated by Central Dispatch. The ARFF representative will carry a small beeper on his person that when activated by Central Dispatch will alert him to respond to his vehicle. Once inside the truck he will coordinate with the FAA tower personnel as to the extent of the emergency; tower will then relay information relating to emergency. Depending on the type of emergency other emergency services will respond.

The Airport Director (airport commander) is alerted by the Primary Crash Net during normal duty hours. Home phone numbers for the Airport Director, Airport Operations Manager and Airport Senior Operations Supervisor are located in the Traverse City Fire Department Knox Box as well on page 22 of this manual.

During hours when the Air Traffic Control Tower is closed, anyone witnessing an aircraft accident, incident or other emergency situation that would require the assistance of emergency personnel (fire or law enforcement) should contact Central Dispatch by dialing 9-1-1. Central Dispatch will be able to page the ARFF representative and dispatch any other appropriate emergency vehicles to the scene.

FIRE SERVICES

The Traverse City Fire Department will respond as required under this plan to provide assistance to the Cherry Capital Airport's ARFF unit.

The Grand Traverse County Fire Departments will respond as required under this plan to provide assistance in the area of extrication of victims, and provide additional water supply.

The ARFF unit will respond as required under this plan to provide primary fire suppression response to aircraft and incidents. Structural fire response shall be by Traverse City, and supporting fire departments.

AMBULANCE SERVICE

Responding ambulances would be provided by the following agencies that are equipped with Advanced Life Support:

NorthFlight/Grand Traverse
1840 Stultz Drive
Traverse City, MI 49686
9-1-1 or (935-9500)

Various Townships
Ambulance Service

CROWD CONTROL

The following agencies will be responsible for crowd control and safe passage for emergency vehicles. Areas of responsibility will be handled by each agency as pertains to their respective jurisdictions.

Traverse City Police Dept, Grand Traverse Sheriff's Office, and the Michigan State Police.

MEDICAL COORDINATOR

The medical officer in charge of injuries and all medical decisions shall be on the scene. This individual will be the Medical Coordinator and remain in charge during the disaster.

TEMPORARY MORGUE

In the event of a disaster involving injuries and/or fatalities; which requires a sheltered area, the ARFF/Maintenance building will be utilized. The maintenance building has separate bays that can be separated from each other and has direct access to airside of the airport.

UNINJURED PASSENGERS

Uninjured passengers will be transported to the ARFF/Maintenance building where they will be detained until released by National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) or other competent authority. It is desirable to have medically trained personnel available to screen apparently uninjured people to insure they are not injured.

BOMB DISPOSAL

The following agency will be contacted for Bomb Disposal:
Michigan State Police 946-4646

MISCELLANEOUS

The County office of Emergency Management will be notified and will be responsible for coordinating all emergency services which the agencies listed above are unable to supply, including personnel, transportation and materials.

NEWS MEDIA

The news media will have their command center in the training room of the airport maintenance building. All information given to the news media will be by the Incident Commander or the Airport Director or designee. If the need arises news media personnel will be escorted to the site, but at no time will they be allowed to go to any area on the Airport Operations Area unescorted.


MEDICAL ASSISTANCE

The following medical facility is located within 5 miles of the airport, and has these normal capacities:

<u>HOSPITAL</u>	<u># OF BEDS</u>	<u>EMERGENCY ROOM CAPACITY</u>
Munson Medical Center	350	21

The above is listed as normal capacity, although Munson Medical Center does have a disaster plan by which they are able to handle emergencies with injuries in excess of the total number which the Cherry Capital Airport would have, should a situation arise.

ALERT DESIGNATIONS



Original Date: 01/14/03

Revised Date:

991



- A. Small aircraft
- B. Medium size. Twin engine or business jets. 6-14 seats.
- C. Large aircraft over 14 seats.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT

TOWER

1. Notify Central Dispatch, U.S. Coast Guard, Airport Director and ARFF of alert designation and provide information relating to type of emergency or incident if time permits. Include type of aircraft, landing runway or location, estimated time of arrival, number of passengers on board (POB), fuel on board and hazardous materials on board.
2. Assist the airport with closing runways or airport as required by alert designation.
3. Control (or notify) taxiing aircraft so as to insure non-interference with emergency equipment.

AIRPORT RESCUE AND FIRE FIGHTING UNIT

1. Proceed to accident or incident and commence fire-fighting procedures. On "Standby" alerts ARFF will remain at ARFF facility until needed.
2. Establish and maintain communication with Central Dispatch as soon as possible via city fire radio frequency.

INCIDENT COMMANDER

1. Proceed to Command Post located in the front portion of the ARFF building.
2. Notify FAA Air Traffic Control Tower (FAA ATCT) that you are on ground frequency 121.8.
3. If needed, make arrangement for Airport Director, or his designated representative to come to airport.
4. Be prepared to call in available resources such as additional fire, ambulance or law enforcement.
5. Designate Operations commander.

AIRPORT COMMANDER

1. Proceed to Command Post located in the communications room of the ARFF building.
2. Assure that the airport and/or runways are closed.

3. Be prepared to call upon available resources on the airport.
4. Call in additional airport employees as required.
5. Ensure the notification of the NTSB or Flight Standards District Office - FAA.
6. Prepare and make statement to press.
7. Provide access for press as manpower becomes available.
8. Arrange for removal of wreckage (after NTSB or FAA approval).
9. Open runways/airport as soon as safely possible.

Original Date: 01/14/03

Revised Date: _____

OFF AIRPORT RESPONSE

Aircraft crashes not on airport property or in the airport clear zones are considered to be off-airport and response of emergency personnel, equipment, and resources will come from the jurisdiction in which the accident occurred.

TOWER

1. Notify Central Dispatch, U.S. Coast Guard, Airport Director and ARFF and provide information relating to type of emergency or incident if time permits. Include type of aircraft, landing location, number of passengers on board (POB), fuel on board and hazardous materials on board.

AIRPORT RESCUE AND FIRE FIGHTING UNIT

1. Establish and maintain communication with Central Dispatch as soon as possible via city fire radio frequency.


INCIDENT COMMANDER

1. If needed, make arrangement for Airport Director, or his designated representative to come to the scene.


AIRPORT COMMANDER

1. Proceed to Command Post located in the communications room of the ARFF building.
2. If applicable assure that the airport surfaces the aircraft used are inspected. Open runways as soon as safely possible.
2. Be prepared to call upon available resources from the airport.
3. Call in additional airport employees as required.
4. Ensure the notification of Flight Standards District Office and/or the NTSB. If search for aircraft is needed contact U.S. Air Force 1 800 851 3051.
5. Prepare and make statement to press.

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
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Original Date: 01/14/03

Revised Date: _____


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
Original Date: 01/14/03

Revised Date:

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AIRPORT STRUCTURAL FIRE

TOWER

1. Notify the Airport Rescue Fire Fighting unit, Airport Director, U.S. Coast Guard and Central Dispatch through the use of the red phone, that a fire has been observed or reported and give location.
2. Control (or notify) taxiing aircraft so as to insure non-interference with emergency equipment proceeding to or fighting the fire.

TRAVERSE CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT

1. The Traverse City Fire Department shall be the agency to respond to, and be in charge of, all structural fires on airport property. Grand Traverse County Metro and Rural Fire units shall be utilized as necessary to assist the Traverse City Fire Department.


AIRPORT DIRECTOR

1. The Airport Director shall assist the Traverse City Fire Department in terms of airport operations.

AIRPORT RESCUE AND FIRE FIGHTING

1. If ARFF notices a structural fire on airport property they should immediately contact Central Dispatch so that the Traverse City Fire Department can respond to the situation. The ARFF representative shall also page airport administration personnel so that they can respond to the airport and assist with airport operations.
2. ARFF should then report to the scene and report any information back to Central Dispatch relating to the fire.


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Original Date: 01/14/03

Revised Date:

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Original Date: 01/14/03

Revised Date: _____

NATURAL DISASTERS

Natural disasters in the form of tornadoes, thunderstorms, high winds, heavy rain and flooding may occur in the Michigan area. Airport personnel will be expected to participate in exercising protective measures in the interests of saving lives and minimizing damage by observing the following procedures:

1. Alerting airport personnel when possible once the weather bureau identifies and declares a potentially dangerous meteorological situation in the area.
2. Airport personnel will direct all persons that may be exposed to the danger to take cover in a protected area.
3. Airport personnel will take action to secure as many tiedown aircraft as possible within the time allowed; however it is understood that securing aircraft is the responsibility of the owners concerned.
4. Airport personnel will secure wherever possible and practicable loose articles that are a potential threat to lives and property.
5. If time allows, airport personnel will attempt to insure that all on-site buildings and tee hangar doors are secured. Once again, it is the basic responsibility of the tenants to take action to protect their properties.

In the event that the airport has been exposed to one of the aforementioned conditions and the area is then cleared:

1. Airport personnel will act promptly in the interest of insuring public safety. This may require an airport area inspection for downed electrical or telephone lines, broken glass, flood areas and other dangers manifested by the station.
2. Airport personnel will exert every effort to return the airport to normal operations which may include removal of debris, repairs to broken window, arrangement to restore possible power and other utility loss within the staff capabilities.

Original Date: 01/14/03

Revised Date: _____

RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS

In case of damage to radioactive materials shipping containers and accidents involving aircraft carrying nuclear weapons the following procedures shall be followed:

TOWER

1. Notify Central Dispatch, U.S. Coast Guard, Airport Director and ARFF and provide information relating to type of emergency or incident if time permits. Include type of aircraft, landing location, number of passengers on board (POB), fuel on board and hazardous materials on board.

AIRPORT COMMAND

1. Ensure Central Dispatch has been notified if call did not come from Tower.
2. Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighters
3. Airport Manager/Commander or designee
4. TSA/Federal Security Director
5. All other affected tenants
6. Coordinate with FAA ATCT to keep other aircraft away from threat aircraft until it is relocated.

INCIDENT COMMANDER

1. Proceed to Command Post located in the communication room of the ARFF building or other designated location if ARFF building is under threat.
2. Be prepared to call in available resources such as additional fire, ambulance or law enforcement.
3. Designate Operations Commander

Original Date: 01/14/03

Revised Date: _____

POWER FAILURE

A primary power failure for the movement area will require Airport Operations to contact Traverse City Light and Power 24 hour emergency number (922-4940 or 922-4942).

FAA AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

1. Advise Airport Operations immediately upon unplanned loss of movement area lighting.

AIRPORT OPERATIONS

1. Issue appropriate NOTAM's
2. Contact Traverse Light and Power
3. Notify Airport Director or designee
4. Provide assistance to airfield users as appropriate

Original Date: 01/14/03

Revised Date: _____

WATER RESCUE RESPONSE

There are no significant bodies of water on the airport. Any bodies of water adjacent to the airport will fall within the jurisdiction of the Grand Traverse County Sheriff Department. Lake Michigan and the East and West Grand Traverse Bays fall under the jurisdiction of the United States Coast Guard. Northwestern Regional Airport Commission response will occur under "Off Airport Responses".

The Grand Traverse County Sheriff has the necessary personnel and equipment to handle water rescue response. This includes the following:

A. Personnel:

Eleven (11) certified scuba divers
Twenty (20) person reserve unit

B. Vehicles:

Fifty (50) marked police cars
One (1) step van mobile command unit
One (1) SWAT command unit
Three (3) full size 4x4 vehicles
One (1) motorcycle

C. Radios:

One (1) portable radio for each certified police officer
Ten (10) portable radios assigned to the reserve unit

D. Boats:

Two (2) 21 foot Chris Craft boats
Four (4) 16 foot Blue fin boats
One (1) 14 foot aluminum boat

The United States Coast Guard has the necessary personnel and equipment to handle water rescue response. This includes the following:

A. Four Dolphin H-65 helicopters

B. 20 person mass casualty raft

Original Date: 01/14/03

Revised Date: _____

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

Northwestern Regional Airport Commission

*Exemption
to
names*

*Exemption 2
(phone numbers)*

Airport Director

[Redacted]
[Redacted]-pager
[Redacted]-cell phone

[Redacted]

Airport Operations
Manager

[Redacted]
[Redacted]-pager
[Redacted]-cell phone

[Redacted]

Senior Operations
Supervisor

[Redacted]
[Redacted]-pager
[Redacted]-cell phone

[Redacted]

Operations
Supervisor
Operations
Supervisor
Operations
Supervisor

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Account Specialist
Clerical
Adm. Assistant

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Airport Maintainer
Airport Maintainer
Airport Maintainer
Airport Maintainer
Airport Maintainer
Airport Maintainer
Airport Maintainer

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

ARFF pager
Ops-1/Maintenance-
Crew Leader Cell Phone

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Airport Tenants

American Eagle
Northwest
United Express

[Redacted]

Original Date: 01/14/03


Revised Date: _____

Passageways
Cherry Capital Aviation
Harbour Air
NMC Flight
North Flight



U.S. Coast Guard


Central non-emergency
FAA-Tower
FAA-Facilities
FSS-Lansing
Lansing-NOTAM
FAA-Minn/Center
FSDO-GRR
FAA Ops Center
FBI Traverse City



Transportation Security Administration

Alan Anderson

Office
Home
Weekend
Pager



Exempt 14
2
(phone numbers)

ORTHERN

Fire & Safety

SALES AND SERVICE
 FIRE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT & HYDROSTATIC TESTING
 FIRE ALARM & INDUSTRIAL SAFETY EQUIPMENT
 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS, KITCHENS & INDUSTRIAL

INVOICE 45104

24 HR. PHONE 231-947-6035 • FAX 231-947-6153
 522 E. 8TH • TRAVERSE CITY, MICH. 49686

PLEASE PAY FROM THIS COPY.

CHASE CAPITAL MARKET Date 8-1-03

Address _____ Customer _____
 Order No. _____

QUAN	ARTICLE	PRICE	AMOUNT
2	PLR610 60-120H	26.06	52.12
1	4V-80H DIODOLIC		23.36
8	PLR64 6V 40H	23.46	187.68

EMERG. DEFECTS
A.V.

PLR610

SUBTOTAL		255.16
TAX		
TOTAL		255.16

SIGNATURE

[Redacted Signature]

NET	255.16
TAX	0.00
TOTAL	255.16

016523

PRINTED IN TRAVERSE CITY

PORTHERRIN

Fire & Safety

SALES AND SERVICE
 FIRE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT & HYDROSTATIC TESTING
 FIRE ALARM & INDUSTRIAL SAFETY EQUIPMENT
 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS, KITCHENS & INDUSTRIAL

24 HR. PHONE 231-947-6035 • FAX 231-947-6153
 522 E. 8TH • TRAVERSE CITY, MICH. 49686

INVOICE 45905

PLEASE PAY FROM THIS COPY.

CHEERY CAPITAL MARKET

Date

8-14-03

Customer

Order No.

CASH

CHARGE

ON ACCT

SOLD BY

Address

City

QUAN

ARTICLE

PRICE

AMOUNT

1

6V 55AH AGUORLOCK BATTERY

158.00

152.00 5720

NO SMOKE IN VEHICLE STEER

2.00

4.00 5713

ITEM IN ALL

NEW IN ALL



Payment Terms: Net 30 days, post-dated checks, subject to 5% financing charge plus 1% per month interest per month with an annual rate of 6%. (Customer's credit rating, payment history, and financial condition will be considered in determining the terms of sale.)
 This invoice and contract file. Store, shop, camp, or other facilities, and other related customer shall reimburse Northern Fire & Safety for the cost of materials, installation, testing, and other related expenses. When a customer's equipment is damaged or destroyed, the customer shall be responsible for the cost of replacement. Reverse Chain by and customer's values and condition of the equipment and related equipment.

SIGNATURE

TOTAL

156.00

\$162.50

PRINTED IN TRAVERSE CITY

WINDEMULLER 
ELECTRIC inc.

Electrical  Automation  Communications  Outdoor Utilities

1714 NORTHERN STAR DRIVE
 TRAVERSE CITY, MI 49686
 TEL: (231) 935-4800
 FAX (231) 935-4801
 WATS (800) 891-5319
 www.windemullerelectric.com

INVOICE

No. 022254	DATE OF WORK	CUST ORDER NO.
INVOICE DATE 02/26/04	JWO	DATE DUE 03/06/04

SOLD TO

2/10/04
TIM CRESS

JOB#040137 JOB NAME & LOCATION

CHERRY CAPITAL AIRPORT
 ATTENTION: ACCOUNTS PAYABLE
 AIRPORT ACCESS ROAD
 TRAVERSE CITY, MI 49686

CHERRY CAPITAL AIRPORT
 AIRPORT ACCESS ROAD
 TRAVERSE CITY, MI 49686

QUANTITY	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT
	LABOR AND MATERIAL FOR ELECTRICAL WORK TO RELOCATE KEY SWITCHES INTO DOOR FRAME OF REVOLVING DOOR AND INSTALL ONE CEILING SPEAKER ABOVE WEST STAIR FROM REVOLVING DOOR. ATTN: BOB CLOUTHIER	
	MATERIAL	49.50
3.00	LABOR REG. ELECTRICIAN HRS. @50.00	150.00
	Sub total	199.50
	Amount Due	199.50
	Total amount due	199.50

#5714

continued

RECEIVED
 FEB 27 2004
 N.W. REGIONAL
 AIRPORT COMMISSION

WINDMULLER ELECTRIC Inc.



Electrical

Automation

Communications

Outdoor Utilities

1714 NORTHERN STAR DRIVE
 TRAVERSE CITY, MI 49686
 TEL: (231) 935-4800
 FAX (231) 935-4801
 WATS (800) 891-5319
 www.windmullerelectric.com

INVOICE

No.	022040	DATE OF WORK		CUST ORDER NO.	
INVOICE DATE	01/28/04	JWO		DATE DUE	02/08/04

SOLD TO

JAN 6 1PM

JOB #040007 JOB NAME & LOCATION

CHERRY CAPITAL AIRPORT
 ATTENTION: ACCOUNTS PAYABLE
 AIRPORT ACCESS ROAD
 TRAVERSE CITY, MI 49686


CHERRY CAPITAL AIRPORT
 AIRPORT ACCESS ROAD
 TRAVERSE CITY, MI 49686

QUANTITY	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT
1.00	LABOR FOR ELECTRICAL WORK TO TROUBLE-SHOOT REVOLVING DOOR ON SECOND FLOOR. RESET LIMIT. ATTN: [REDACTED] LABOR REG. SERVICEMAN HR. @50.00	50.00
	Sub total	50.00
	Amount Due	50.00
	Total amount due	50.00

RECEIVED

JAN 29 2004

N.W. REGIONAL AIRPORT COMMISSION



#5720

TO PAY BY MASTERCARD OR VISA, CALL (231) 935-4800

50.00

CORPORATE SECURITY SOLUTIONS, INC.

OFFICER'S DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT

ACCOUNT NAME: CC AIRPORT

GUARD NAME: [REDACTED]

DATE: 2/8/04

PAGE 1 OF 1

USE THIS LOG FORM TO EXPLAIN ACTIVITIES AND OBSERVATIONS WHICH TAKE PLACE DURING YOUR SCHEDULED SHIFT. USE SPECIFIC TIMES. ENTRIES MUST BE MADE EVERY 15 TO 30 MINUTES. INCLUDE DESCRIPTIONS ABOUT SAFETY HAZARDS, UNLOCKED AREAS, PROPERTY DAMAGE, EQUIPMENT FAILURES, BLOCKED AISLES, DOORS, STAIRWAYS, ROADWAYS, LIGHTS OUT, COMPLAINTS, UNUSUAL PERSONS OR VEHICLES, AND OTHER RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION. THE ITEMS LISTED BELOW MUST BE CHECKED YES OR NO. IF MARKED YES (Y), EXPLAIN.

Y	N	TIMES	DESCRIPTION
		1300	ON DUTY
		1320	CHECKED TERMINAL, SIDA & 2nd LEVEL
		1350	CHECKED TERMINAL & SIDA
		1415	CHECKED TERMINAL & 2nd LEVEL
		1445	CHECKED TERMINAL & SIDA -
		1520	CHECKED TERMINAL & 2nd LEVEL
		1540	CHECKED TERMINAL & SIDA
		1550	CHECKED PARKING - 1 NO PARKING TICKETS
		1605	CHECKED TERMINAL & 2nd LEVEL
		1640	CHECKED TERMINAL & SIDA
		1715	CHECKED TERMINAL & 2nd LEVEL
		1745	CHECKED TERMINAL & SIDA
		1810	CHECKED TERMINAL & 2nd LEVEL
		1840	CHECKED TERMINAL & SIDA - OK
		1845	5 5 TEENAGERS FROM A SKI GROUP

CAME DOWN FROM THE 2nd LEVEL TO CHECK ON ~~THE~~ FLIGHT SCHEDULES, FORGOT THEIR IDs AND RETURNED TO THE 2nd LEVEL VIA THE REVOLVING DOOR. ALL WERE LOCATED & RE-SCREENED. NOTIFIED OPS 1 TO CHECK OUT DOOR.

1915 CHECK POINT CLOSED - LOCKED UP & OUT - CHECKED 2nd LEVEL

1945 CHECKED TERMINAL, SIDA & 2nd LEVEL

2020 CHECKED TERMINAL, SIDA & 2nd LEVEL

2050 CHECKED TERMINAL, SIDA & 2nd LEVEL

2100 OFF DUTY

[Signature]

[REDACTED]

CORPORATE SECURITY SOLUTIONS, INC.

INCIDENT REPORT

Client: CC HURPORT

Date of Incident: 2/8/04

Client Address or Post: T.C.

Time of Incident: 6:45 am pm

Name(s) or Description(s) of Persons Involved:

5 TEENAGERS FROM A SKI TEAM
FLIGHT 2722 TO MINN (MSP)

Police Department Investigating: _____

Time: _____

Police Officer's Name: NA

Police Report No.: _____

Client Notified: OPS 1

Time: 7 PM

Supervisor Notified: _____

Time: _____

Description of Incident: (Explain in detail - who, what, when, where and why. Use additional paper if needed.)

AT APPROX. 6:45 PM [REDACTED] (TSA) NOTICED A TEEN
PASSENGER IN THE 2ND LEVEL WHO HAD NOT COME
THROUGH THE CHECK POINT AFTER TRYING TO REBOOK
HER FLIGHT ON THE LOWER LEVEL. [REDACTED] & I
WENT TO THE 2ND LEVEL FOUND THE TEEN AND
SHE ADMITTED GOING BACKWARD THROUGH THE REVOLVING
DOOR. SHE ALSO SAID OTHERS HAD DONE THE
SAME THING. SHE IDENTIFIED 4 OTHERS & THEY
WERE RESCREENED BY TSA AT THE CHECK POINT.

Action Taken: (Describe. Was situation corrected?)

RESCREENED 5 PASSENGERS AND NOTIFIED OPS 1.
OPS 1 [REDACTED] WERE ABLE TO GO THROUGH THE DOOR
BACKWARDS WITH & WITHOUT SETTING OFF THE ALARM.

Comments / Information:

Signature: _____

Date: 2/8/04

Page 1 of 1

2/10/04

We have to check the revolving door a couple times per hour. The reset button will be relocated in the very near future. This means that "checked 2ND level" ~~to~~ must be entered in your log at least twice per hour

2/1

2-1

2/10/04

All employees (including Airline Employees) are to properly display their SIDA Batches while in the SIDA Area. If they refuse or claim that "it's in their bag", they are to be escorted out of the SIDA Area and not allowed back in until they have their badge. If they refuse to comply, call OPS 1 immediately.

2/1

2/1

2/1

2/10/04

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ MB KEY #6 TO BE USED TO RESET REVOLVING DOOR. PUT ON RING W/ ELEVATOR KEY. (2/17 Key changed to #7)

2-14

2-14



Type of Activity: Personal Interview [REDACTED]

Case Number: I05-TSA-CHI-01544	Case Title: TSA, Cherry Capital Airport
--------------------------------	---

On December 1, 2004 Special Agent (S/A) [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General (DHS/OIG), interviewed Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Screening Manager, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was interviewed in [REDACTED] office located in the new terminal of the Cherry Capital Airport in Traverse City, Michigan.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] other position currently being vacant [REDACTED] oversees nine Security Screener Supervisors and approximately fifty Screeners at five different airports.

[REDACTED] was first asked if [REDACTED] remembered Thomas Mair bringing any safety issues or concerns to [REDACTED] attention. [REDACTED] remembered two issues. First, Mair brought to [REDACTED] attention the issue of having an evacuation plan in effect in case of a fire or other type of incident. A plan was devised and is currently in operation. Employees are trained on the process and where to meet should an incident occur. [REDACTED] even told Mair to conduct a "fire drill" for the Screeners during their training time, indicating that it was a Screener Supervisor's responsibility to train their people. [REDACTED] also explained that there was plenty of time each week to do the necessary training, and that training aides were provided. To [REDACTED] knowledge, Mair never performed the drills.

Secondly, [REDACTED] remembers Mair making an issue about fire extinguishers in regard to their location and condition. [REDACTED] contacted fire personnel stationed at the airport, who performed an inspection, and was told that all fire extinguishers were operable and in the proper location.

In regard to the allegations received from the Office of Special Counsel [REDACTED] does not remember Mair ever mentioning the doors in the tunnel or a problem with the emergency lights. [REDACTED] further stated that if Mair felt the items were an issue, he would have contacted former Screening Manager [REDACTED] instead of [REDACTED] feels that Mair resents [REDACTED] being a manager because he was passed over for the position.

[REDACTED] does remember issues with the revolving door that was located in the old terminal. [REDACTED] said the alarm would sometimes sound twice a day. When this occurred a Screener would respond to the door upstairs in the sterile area and the armed guard would respond to the bottom of the stairs. The area would then be secured and a sweep of the area conducted. If no security breach was discovered employees would resume their duties.

Name, Title, Signature, Date: [REDACTED] - Special Agent 12-14-04	Reviewing Official Name, Title, Signature, Date: [Signature] - Special Agent in Charge 12-14-04 Thomas M. Frost
--	---

IMPORTANT NOTICE

This report is intended solely for the official use of the Department of Homeland Security, or any entity receiving a copy directly from the Office of Inspector General. This report remains the property of the Office of Inspector General, and no secondary distribution may be made, in whole or in part, outside the Department of Homeland Security, without prior authorization by the Office of Inspector General. Public availability of the report will be determined by the Office of Inspector General under 5 U.S.C. 552. Unauthorized disclosure of this report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.

MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY

█████ stated █████ was familiar with one confirmed security breach involving a group of teenagers, however, █████ stated █████ was not personally involved in the incident.

█████ was in the screening area more than five times when the alarm on the revolving door was activated. █████ felt that everyone at the checkpoint could hear the alarm without difficulty.

█████ is the head of the Safety Action Committee for the five airports. This committee was formed in January of 2004, and other than the issues represented above, █████ does not remember Mair voicing any safety concerns for committee review. The Safety Action Team Binder and the █████
SSI █████ are both █████ so they may be reviewed regularly.

█████ has been part of two large training exercises that involved participants from many different agencies. The first was a tabletop exercise at the airport in Alpena, Michigan and the second was a crisis management hijack drill in June of 2004.

█████ agreed to review █████ files regarding any communications received from Mair with regard to emergency preparedness or training. █████ subsequently provided the OIG with a copy of an email dated February 29, 2004 from Mair. In the email, Mair acknowledged that "Who to call in an emergency is common knowledge." Mair also acknowledged his responsibility for providing training stating, "There hasn't been much spare time for training. Staffing numbers are tight. Last week there were six training items alone from █████." A copy of this email is attached.

Attachment: Email from Mair to █████ regarding training and emergency notifications.

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[REDACTED]

From: Mair, Tom
Sent: Sunday, February 29, 2004 11:11 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: OK RE: Directives

[REDACTED]

I apologize for my part.

Although, I'm a little surprised by your remarks "very disappointed." After all, all the Supervisors are not gone, I'm here to Supervise Feb 29 - Mar 4.

I agree, the ETD training is behind. Your request may go back to Feb 6.

Feb 7 I was ETD training at MBL. Feb 8-13 I was at training. Feb 14 & 15 RDO's. I'm not sure how Feb 16 & 17, 20-23 slipped by, but Feb 24-26 it was all about meetings at the Guard Base.

There hasn't been much spare time for training. Staffing numbers are tight. Last week there were six training items alone from [REDACTED]

The T&L information was e-mailed to Leads by [REDACTED] on Thursday.

Who to call in an emergency is common knowledge. They could start by calling me.

Part of the problem here is that on a regular week, no one is really sure which Screening Manager is on duty. We don't have your schedule. The Scr. Mgr. schedule has not been posted here since when [REDACTED] was a Scr. Mgr.

[REDACTED] you wrote that you gave them instructions on most of the items you wrote me about, but you didn't tell me which ones you did.

I'll answer in regard to all of your remarks before you return.

Best,

Tom

Tom Mair

TVC - Screening Supervisor
Cherry Capital Airport
Ph [REDACTED]
Fax [REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Saturday, February 28, 2004 4:27 PM
To: Mair, Tom; [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: Directives

[REDACTED] and Tom,

I wanted to cover a few items to all of you in general and if they do not pertain to you at the least I want to keep you informed. I spent most of my afternoon at the checkpoint going over some things with our acting supervisors (leads) and making sure our ETD machines get put in the proper places. Here are some issues that need to be addressed.

- I would like to state that I was very disappointed about the lack of information given to our

acting supervisors while two of you are absent. At no time did any of you tell them about how to turn in training material (that has a deadline), how to keep up with screeners T&L's, who to call about overtime or in a emergency, (I will be gone) and what to do about implementing training and rotating screeners with the gate closure beginning March 1st. I gave them directions on most of these issues today.

- We have moved the Barringer ETD machine up to the checkpoint so that we have a reliable machine to do ETD checks. I appreciate the work you did to make this happen, we are moving the shell of the Barringer into the checkpoint today so that all machines are in there proper casing. I also authorized [REDACTED] to move ETD machine #5 (I believe it is the number) and put the Itemizer at that position. Siemens was very adamant that the [REDACTED]

- The ETD team formation. I put out a memo and asked for your input on having [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in charge of this team. You all gave me positive feedback. Yet for the last two weeks [REDACTED] is the only one doing the maintenance? Why is that? I thought we all had a clear picture that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are the ETD team so that supervisors can utilize their time for other duties and responsibilities. When I come back on the 9th of March I would like to see that both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are fully trained and in charge of this. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have some very good ideas we can implement and give them positive feedback on.

- The gate closing beginning March 1st is a great time for so many things to be worked on and completed. I leave it up to you as the Supervisors and Leads to rotate people fairly and effectively. We are still working on a time we can have a gate closure for afternoons. I would like to show that we can handle this morning closure successfully as a team. This time can also be used for supervisors to implement the PDP for Leads. This was brought up at our first supervisor/lead meeting and needs to be address before our next meeting in March.

*I write this not just as a Screening Manager but as a part of your team. All of the above mentioned issues cannot be completed with out us all working together and communicating. Please follow through on these items and if there are questions call me [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] I will see you next week. Thank You

[REDACTED]
TSA Screening Manager

APN, CIU, MBL, PLN, TVC

PH# [REDACTED]

FX# [REDACTED]



Type of Activity: Personal Interview Thomas Mair

Case Number: I05-TSA-CHI-01544	Case Title: TSA, Cherry Capital Airport
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On November 29, 2004, Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), and SA [REDACTED] DHS, OIG, interviewed Thomas Mair. At Mair's request, the interview was conducted at Minerva's restaurant, 300 E. State St., Traverse City, MI. Also present was [REDACTED] whom Mair stated was [REDACTED]. This interview was predicated upon information provided by Mair, a former employee of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), to the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, Washington, D.C., alleging that security measures at Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City, MI, were deficient, thereby causing a substantial danger to public safety.

Mair stated he entered on duty with the TSA on April 12, 2002 and was sworn in on that date, however, due to processing delays, his first duty date was June 30, 2002. He stated he was hired as a Screener Supervisor, and continued in that position until he was served with a Notice of Proposed Removal on April 29, 2004, which was his final day on duty.

Mair stated that upon entering on duty, he received one week of basic training at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) facility in Oklahoma City, OK, followed by seven or eight weeks of on-the-job training at JFK Airport, New York, NY. He then was assigned to the Raleigh-Durham Airport in North Carolina for one or two weeks, where he trained newly hired screeners during the start-up of TSA coverage of that airport. Mair stated he then participated in the initial training of screeners at the Grand Rapids, MI airport. He stated he reported for duty at Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City, MI on September 4, 2002, and, with the exception of training newly hired screeners during the start-up of the Pellston, MI airport, remained there until his termination. Mair stated he also provided screener training during the start-up of the Traverse City Airport.

Mair stated that in April 2003, he received training from TSA on the maintenance of Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) machines, and thereafter, he was responsible for the maintenance of these machines at the Traverse City Airport

Mair stated he developed an interest in law enforcement because of the 1968 murder of a friend and the friend's family in Goodheart, MI. He claimed that in 1991, he became involved with the Silent Observer organization, which he stated is similar to CrimesStoppers. He stated he used his affiliation with this organization to attempt to develop information regarding the murders, which Mair stated are still unsolved. Mair claimed that he has provided information to local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies through his involvement with Silent Observer, and used some of these law enforcement contacts as references when he applied to the TSA.

Name, Title, Signature, and Date [REDACTED] Special Agent, December 9, 2004	Reviewing Official Name, Title, Signature, and Date: [Signature] Thomas M. Frost, Special Agent in Charge 12-13-04
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Mair indicated that prior to serving with the TSA, he managed the Harmony House record store, Traverse City, MI, from 1999 through 2001. Prior to that position, he worked at the North Peak Brewpub, Traverse City, MI, from 1997 through 1999, and worked on the Grand Traverse Dinner Train from 1995 through 1997.

Mair admitted that in January 2004 he received a verbal warning for failing to complete on-the-job training paperwork for screeners he had trained, and for failing to complete his Professional Development Plan. He produced a copy of a memo documenting the warning.

Mair produced a copy of a June 28, 2004 Letter of Decision to Remove which documented an incident involving Mair's failure to calibrate an ETD machine at Traverse City Airport. Mair acknowledged that such a failure is specifically listed in the TSA Human Resources Manual as grounds for termination of employment.

With regard to the allegations he communicated to the Office of Special Counsel, Mair produced a hand-drawn sketch of the now-closed Traverse City Airport terminal. The sketch depicts a "door without lock" leading from a tunnel used to transport baggage to the aircraft ramp area. Mair stated a contract security officer from Corporate Security Solutions assigned to the airport had informed him that this door had no locking mechanism, and was allegedly unsecured during the overnight hours when the airport was closed. Mair claimed that on January 3, 2004, he notified his supervisor, [REDACTED] via email of this purported security vulnerability; and on January 5, 2004, he notified [REDACTED] Aviation Security Inspector, TSA, Traverse City Airport, also via email. Mair stated he had copies of these emails and could provide them to the OIG. He claimed that this door continued to have no locking mechanism as of his last day on duty, April 29, 2004, and that he never received a response to his messages.

Mair stated that his second allegation was in regard to the emergency lights which were installed in the above-described tunnel. Mair claimed that during a power failure cause by a storm, the tunnel was "pitch black", creating a hazardous environment for employees and providing cover for possible theft activity. Mair claimed that on October 7, 2003, he notified [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] via email regarding this situation, however, he never received a response to his messages.

Mair stated his third allegation was in regard to a revolving "exit only" door that separated the secured and unsecured areas of the now-unused passenger terminal. Mair claimed that this door malfunctioned "a few times a week" and that security breeches occurred because of these malfunctions. Mair admitted that his knowledge of these alleged malfunctions and breeches came via hearsay from employees of non-TSA entities at the airport. He claimed that these malfunctions occurred throughout his last year on duty at the airport, but also maintained that an aircraft was never "dumped" (all passengers off-loaded and re-screened) due to such a malfunction.

Mair stated that [REDACTED] which would cause an alarm to sound if an individual attempted to enter the secured area; activation of this pad would

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MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY

also cause the door to stop revolving. He indicated that the alarm enunciator was relocated from the vicinity of the door to the opposite end of the gate area at the top of the stairwell leading to the TSA main screening checkpoint. Because the main checkpoint was the only full-time TSA fixed post, this was done to insure that TSA personnel would hear the alarm. Mair claimed that the alarm was not always audible, particularly during peak passenger occupancy periods. He also claimed that the door area was never covered by a fixed security post during times when it had malfunctioned and could, therefore, be breeched.

Mair stated that his fourth allegation related to the amount of training provided to TSA personnel assigned to the Traverse City airport. He claimed that that personnel have never been trained on how to respond to emergencies, and that drills or practical exercises have never been conducted.

SSI → Mair described a [redacted] incident as an example of this lack of preparedness. He stated that on February 8, 2004, [redacted] arrived at the airport. Mair stated he was unaware of the threat, until he was asked by [redacted] for guidance regarding a search of the airport. He stated he was unable to provide any direction, so the [redacted] began a search of areas thought to be related to the threat. Mair stated he notified his direct supervisor, [redacted] regarding the [redacted] arrival, and [redacted] and [redacted], Assistant Federal Security for Screening responded to the airport within [redacted] minutes. He stated that [redacted] and [redacted] assumed supervision of the situation and the search was conducted without incident. Mair stated he never learned who requested the K-9 search, however, he opined that a Northwest Airlines representative may have done so. He claimed he subsequently spoke with [redacted] and learned that the threat had been received [redacted]. Mair therefore concluded that the response to the threat should have been planned and communicated [redacted] a more orderly fashion. Mair stated he prepared an incident report regarding this event, which was submitted to [redacted].

Mair claimed he communicated to his direct supervisors his belief that training procedures were insufficient, however, no drills, "tabletop" exercises, or scenario-based training were ever conducted. He stated he did receive training regarding human resource management policies and procedures, and also personally conducted screener re-certifications during 2003. Mair also stated he participated in the development of an Emergency Operations Manual, which was finalized in 2004, and produced a copy of a December 9, 2002 memorandum from Federal Security Director (FSD) Alan Anderson entitled, "Security Incident Response Procedures."

Mair agreed to meet with the OIG on December 1, 2004 at 9:00 a.m. at Minerva's restaurant to provide copies of documents he asserted were relevant to his allegations. These documents included the Notice of Proposed Removal; the Letter of Decision to Remove; the verbal warning memo; the emails he claimed to have sent regarding the tunnel door; the email he claimed to have sent regarding the tunnel lights; and, a copy of FSD Anderson's memo entitled, "Security Incident Response Procedures."

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MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY

On December 1, 2004 at 9:00 a.m., SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], DHS, OIG, entered Minerva's restaurant and advised the hostess that they were there to meet another individual. The hostess inquired if they were there to meet Tom Mair. They responded that they were, and were told by the hostess that Mair had called the restaurant earlier that morning and left a message with the hostess requesting that she inform the OIG that he would not be coming to the restaurant to meet the OIG.

Continuing on December 1, 2004, at approximately 9:05 a.m., SA [REDACTED] called Mair at [REDACTED] which was the only contact number previously provided by Mair. A message was left requesting a return call.

On December 3, 2004, SA [REDACTED] retrieved a message sent to his OIG email account from Mair [REDACTED]. This message, dated Tuesday, November 30, 2004 at 3:31 p.m., stated in its entirety, "[REDACTED]"; Please be advised that I won't be meeting with you Wednesday morning. Best, Tom Mair".

As of the date of this report, Mair has failed to contact SA [REDACTED] or SA [REDACTED]

Attachment: Hand drawn sketch of the now-closed Traverse City Airport terminal provided by Mair.

Email from Mair to SA [REDACTED] dated November 30, 2004.

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UNTER RAMP

AMERICAN RAMP

EMERGENCY EXIT + 3 DOOR w/o LOCK

GARAGE DOOR

TUNNEL

TSA ETP BAG SWABS + SEARCH


STAIRS

TSA CHECKPOINT

RESTROOM DOOR STAIRS

CHECK-IN COUNTERS

MAIN ENTRANCE



NW RAMP

EMERGENCY EXIT DOOR

NOTE: TA BOX ON WALL DOOR w/o LOCK MARKED "FUEL BIKES"

-----Original Message-----

From: tom mair [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, November 30, 2004 3:31 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Meeting

[REDACTED]

Please be advised that I won't be meeting with you
Wednesday morning.

Best,

Tom Mair



Type of Activity: Personal Interview [REDACTED]

Case Number: I05-TSA-CHI-01544	Case Title: TSA, Cherry Capital Airport
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On November 29, 2004, Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), and SA [REDACTED], DHS, OIG, interviewed [REDACTED], Scheduling and Operations Manager, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), at the office of the Federal Security Director (FSD), 1760 Forest Ridge, Traverse City, MI. Also present was FSD Alan Anderson.

[REDACTED] was questioned regarding [REDACTED] involvement with the February 8, 2003 [REDACTED] - SSI incident described by Thomas Mair during the interview of Mair by the OIG on November 29, 2004. [REDACTED] stated that on the day of the incident [REDACTED] was Screening Manager and was Mair's direct supervisor. [REDACTED] recalled that Mair called [REDACTED] at home and advised that a sweep of the airport [REDACTED] was in progress. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] immediately responded to the airport and participated in the remainder of the sweep. [REDACTED] added that during the sweep [REDACTED] learned that [REDACTED] the Northwest Airlines station manager, had called the sheriff's office and requested a sweep [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] believed the threat [REDACTED] and that Mair was the first TSA employee to learn of the threat because [REDACTED] had called the sheriff's office directly and not made any other notifications.

With regard to Mair's allegation that a baggage tunnel door in the old terminal was not properly secured, [REDACTED] stated that while [REDACTED] served as Screening Manager the door was never considered to be a security vulnerability. [REDACTED] indicated that during the time [REDACTED] supervised Mair, Mair never communicated a concern regarding the door to [REDACTED]

Regarding the revolving exit door in the old terminal, [REDACTED] stated that there were several instances where the door malfunctioned, however [REDACTED] was not aware of any unauthorized entries through the door.

[REDACTED] stated that all screeners receive three hours of TSA-mandated training each week, which is accomplished via the TSA Online Learning Center, and through scenario-based practical exercises conducted at the screening checkpoint during periods of low passenger flow. [REDACTED] added that a briefing book, containing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and other required reading, is utilized by managers to communicate policy and procedure updates to screeners.

SSI - With regard to the [REDACTED] incident, FSD Anderson commented that the incident occurred during the early phases of TSA's coverage of the airport, and that the level of communication between all entities involved at the airport has increased significantly since that time.

Name, Title, Signature, and Date: [REDACTED] Special Agent, December 9, 2004	Reviewing Official Name, Title, Signature, and Date: [Signature] Thomas M. Frost, Special Agent in Charge 12-13-04
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General – Investigations

MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY

Type of Activity: Personal Interview [redacted]

Case Number: I05-TSA-CHI-01544	Case Title: TSA, Cherry Capital Airport
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On November 29, 2004, at 5:40PM, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General interviewed Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Training Coordinator, [redacted]. The interview was held in the office of the Federal Security Director in Traverse City, Michigan.

Prior to becoming the TSA Training Coordinator, [redacted] current job is to document, facilitate and monitor the training of Security Screeners at the Cherry Capital Airport. [redacted]

[redacted] was asked what training the Security Screeners receive. [redacted] said that Screeners are given a minimum of 3 training hours per week. Depending on the number of travelers at the airport and other duties, it is not uncommon for Screeners to get more than 3 hours of training per week. The training is usually broken into 3 separate 1-hour blocks. [redacted]

[redacted] Some examples of training in the open category would be briefings on current threats and intelligence, customer service, and bulletins received from TSA Headquarters.

Screener Supervisors are also instructed to conduct roll-play scenarios with the Screeners. The airport has training aids, which includes [redacted]. According to [redacted] Mair's position as a Screener Supervisor would have required him to conduct this type of training.

Screener Supervisors also perform [redacted] audits on the Screeners in which they stand back away from the checkpoint and watch them perform their specific duties. [redacted] said that [redacted] TSA, Aviation Security Inspector, also does another audit of the checkpoints. [redacted] utilizes outside individuals, from other government agencies, to help [redacted] test the screeners by having them try and hide weapons and go through the checkpoint. This audit is done on a repetitive basis.

[redacted] provided OIG with a copy of complainant, Thomas Mair's, training record from the last five months of his employment. (December 2003 – April 2004). These records reflect that Mair

Name, Title, Signature, Date: [redacted] - Special Agent 12-14-04	Reviewing Official Name, Title, Signature, Date: Thomas M. Frost - Special Agent in Charge 12/14/04
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MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY

completed approximately 71 training courses during that time period. These courses included presentations that ranged from standard operating procedures to the response to the discovery of weapons or explosives at the TSA security checkpoint.

. Attachment: Mair training records.

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Learning History

- MAIR -



> View Learning History

Learning History

The following details your completed learning.

Sort by:

Show records/page (74 total records)

SSI

SSI

SSI

SSI

Component	Completion Date	Status	Completion	Online Certificate
[REDACTED]	4/24/2004 00:00:00			
[REDACTED]	4/24/2004 00:00:00			
<u>X-Ray Image Review</u>	4/24/2004 00:00:00			
<u>X-Ray Image Review</u>	4/19/2004 10:12:36			
[REDACTED]	4/19/2004 10:07:26	Briefing Completed	Print	Yes
<u>Identification and Reporting of Security Violations, Threat Information, and Criminal Activity</u> BRIEFING TSA-SEC-IDVIOLS-0001 (Rev 11/12/2003 08:30:44)	4/18/2004 07:14:58	Briefing Completed	Print	Yes
[REDACTED]	4/18/2004 07:09:47	Briefing Completed	Print	Yes
[REDACTED]	4/18/2004 07:03:10	Briefing Completed	Print	Yes
[REDACTED]	4/17/2004 00:00:00			
[REDACTED]	4/15/2004 08:18:08	Course Pass	Print	Yes
[REDACTED]	4/4/2004 19:55:16	Briefing Completed	Print	Yes
<u>Proper Lifting Techniques for Screeners</u> COURSE SCR-ALL-SAFELIFT-0001 (Rev 10/8/2003 09:32:53)	4/4/2004 19:53:50	Course Completed	Print	Yes
<u>Respecting Privacy, Preserving Freedom</u> READING TSA-PRIVACY-RESPECTPRIV-0001 (Rev 3/8/2004 16:34:30)	4/4/2004 19:52:02	Reading Complete	Print	Yes
<u>OPSEC Awareness</u> BRIEFING SCR-OPSEC-AWARE-0001 (Rev 4/21/2004 14:04:28)	4/2/2004 20:28:04	Briefing Completed	Print	
<u>OPSEC Fundamentals</u> COURSE ALL-OPSEC-FNDMTLS-0001 (Rev 1/30/2004 08:33:31)	4/2/2004 20:28:04	Course Pass	Print	Yes
<u>Excellence in Screener Performance Series: X-RAY OPERATOR</u> TUTORIAL SCR-ALL-XRAYOP-[REDACTED] (Rev 2/11/2004 14:19:30)	3/27/2004 00:00:00	Tutorial Completed	Print	
[REDACTED]	3/27/2004 00:00:00			
<u>X-Ray Image Review</u>	3/27/2004 00:00:00			
<u>IT Security Awareness</u> COURSE ALL-ITSEC-AWARE-0001 (Rev 1/13/2004 11:15:12)	3/14/2004 00:00:00	Course Pass	Print	Yes
[REDACTED]	3/14/2004 00:00:00			

X-Ray Image Review	3/14/2004 00:00:00		
IT Security Awareness COURSE ALL-ITSEC-AWARE-0001 (Rev 1/13/2004 11:15:12)	3/9/2004 19:26:28	Course Pass	Print Yes
Interim Policy on Employee Responsibilities and Conduct READING TSA-GEN-EMPCONDUCT-0001 (Rev 1/15/2004 10:43:54)	3/9/2004 19:10:34	Reading Complete	Print Yes
Interim Policy on Employee Responsibilities and Conduct READING TSA-GEN-EMPCONDUCT-0001 (Rev 1/15/2004 10:43:54)	3/7/2004 00:00:00	Reading Complete	Print Yes
Checkpoint SOP (new) Chpts 12-14	3/7/2004 00:00:00		
X-Ray Image Review	3/7/2004 00:00:00		
Chkd Bag SOP Chapter 8-end	2/29/2004 00:00:00		
Checkpoint SOP (new) Chpts 10-11	2/29/2004 00:00:00		
X-Ray Image Review	2/29/2004 00:00:00		
Modular Bomb Set Assembly/ID	2/29/2004 00:00:00		
Chkd Bab SOP Chapter 6	2/22/2004 00:00:00		
Weapons Kit Assembly/ID	2/22/2004 00:00:00		
X-Ray Image Review	2/22/2004 00:00:00		
Checkpoint SOP (new) Chapters 5,6,8,9	2/22/2004 00:00:00		
	2/21/2004 00:00:00	Tutorial Completed	Print
Checkpoint SOP (New) Chpts 1-3	2/21/2004 00:00:00		
Chkd Bag SOP Chapter 4	2/21/2004 00:00:00		
Travel Sentry Lock/Passkey Training	2/21/2004 00:00:00		
X-Ray Image Review	2/21/2004 00:00:00		
TIP AVO 400.32.2-7	2/21/2004 00:00:00		
Introduction to Supervision Training for TSA Employees - Rev 3 (2/2/04) CLASS SCR-SUPV-INTRO-0001 (Rev 11/7/2003 12:18:42)	2/13/2004 16:00:00	Class Completed	Print
Excellence in Service: Communicating with Your Customers COURSE TSA-HRBUS-44008-0001 (Rev 10/24/2003 14:04:34)	2/11/2004 13:49:24	Course Pass	Print
Terminology/Abbreviations Chkd Bag SOP Chpt 1	2/7/2004 00:00:00		
X-Ray Image Review	2/7/2004 00:00:00		
Excellence in Service: Working with Upset Customers COURSE TSA-CS-UPSETCUST-0001 (Rev 10/24/2003 13:50:05)	1/31/2004 00:00:00	Course Pass	Print
Excellence in Service: Working with Upset Customers COURSE TSA-HRBUS-44007-0001 (Rev 10/24/2003 13:49:14)	1/31/2004 00:00:00	Course Pass	Print
Use of ETD SOP Chapter 5	1/31/2004 00:00:00		
X-Ray Image Review	1/31/2004 00:00:00		
Excellence in Service: Providing Superior Customer Service COURSE TSA-CS-PROVSUP-0001 (Rev 10/24/2003 14:15:14)	1/24/2004 00:00:00	Course Pass	Print
Excellence in Service: Providing Superior Customer Service COURSE TSA-HRBUS-44006-0001 (Rev 10/24/2003 14:04:46)	1/24/2004 00:00:00	Course Completed	Print

Screening Procedure SOP Chpt 4.4.4-4.7	1/24/2004 00:00:00			
X-Ray Image Review	1/24/2004 00:00:00			
Proc For Scrng Ind SOP Chpt 4.4.1-4.1.9	1/17/2004 00:00:00			
Travel Sentry Passkey System AVO	1/17/2004 00:00:00			
X-Ray Image Review	1/17/2004 00:00:00			
Stress Management: Fundamentals for Employees COURSE TSA-GEN-EMPSTRESS-0001 (Rev 10/24/2003 13:29:47)	1/12/2004 15:50:50	Course Pass		Print
Stress Management: Fundamentals for Employees COURSE TSA-HRBUS-43006-0001 (Rev 10/24/2003 13:27:18)	1/12/2004 15:50:50	Course Pass		Print
Screening Accessable Property SOP Chpt. 4.4.3-4.3.5	1/10/2004 00:00:00			
Sterile Area SOP Chpt. 4 Sec 4.5-4.5.2	1/10/2004 00:00:00			
Sensitive Security Information (SSI) Awareness COURSE ALL-SSI-AWARE-0001 (Rev 12/24/2003 09:11:10)	1/6/2004 14:53:52	Course Pass		Print
Screening of Persons w/Disabilities SOP Chpt. 4.4.2-4.2.8	1/5/2004 13:51:57			
Customer Claims Procedure	1/5/2004 13:48:03			
HAZMAT Training	1/5/2004 13:43:31			
[REDACTED]	12/31/2003 06:48:52			
FBI Concealed Weapons Study Guide	12/31/2003 06:45:08			
[REDACTED]	12/31/2003 06:40:16			
[REDACTED]	12/31/2003 06:33:23			
Identification and Reporting of Security Violations, Threat Information, and Criminal Activity BRIEFING TSA-SEC-IDVIOLS-0001 (Rev 11/12/2003 08:30:44)	12/31/2003 06:03:24	Briefing Completed		Print
HHMD / Patdown Procedures Video DEMO SCR-ALL-PATDOWN-VIDEO-0001 (Rev 12/1/2003 15:22:40)	12/20/2003 00:00:00	Demonstration Complete		Print
AVO WTMD 2ND PASS PROCEDURE	12/11/2003 14:47:58			
TIP Job Aids for Screeners READING SCR-ALL-TIPAIID-0001 (Rev 12/5/2003 11:35:59)	12/11/2003 14:00:26	Reading Complete		Print
TSA Online Learning Center Student Training COURSE ALL-TRN-OLCSTUD-0001 (Rev 10/31/2003 08:04:36)	12/10/2003 11:19:56	Course Completed		Print Yes
ETD Maintenance Training - Itemiser CLASS SCR-ETD-MAINT-ITEM-0001 (Rev 5/28/2004 00:00:00)	4/4/2003 00:00:00	Class Completed		Print
ETD Maintenance Training - Barringer CLASS SCR-ETD-MAINT-BARR-0001 (Rev 5/28/2004 08:19:05)	4/3/2003 00:00:00	Class Completed		Print

4/2/04



Type of Activity: Personal Interview [redacted] and [redacted]

Case Number: I05-TSA-CHI-01544	Case Title: TSA, Cherry Capital Airport
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On November 30, 2004, at approximately 11:40AM, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General interviewed Grand Traverse County, Emergency Management Coordinator, [redacted] and Deputy Coordinator, [redacted]. The interview was held in their office in Traverse City, Michigan.

[redacted] and [redacted] were informed of the basis for this investigation in regard to the letter from the Office of Special Counsel and the allegation that employees of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) are not properly trained to respond to an emergency situation. Both [redacted] and [redacted] were very cooperative with agents and stated that they had an outstanding relationship with all of the TSA staff that they have worked with. Two incidents came to mind in which they worked with TSA on training related issues. Those two issues were the [redacted] training put on by TSA, and, more recently, the full-scale disaster drill that was conducted on September 18, 2004. This drill included an aircraft-hijacking scenario at Cherry Capital Airport, and required TSA response to the situation. While preparing for the full-scale drill there were also many pre-event planning meetings that TSA staff attended and participated as an integral part.

[redacted] and [redacted] agreed to review their files regarding the September 18, 2004 drill, and provide the OIG with any documents related to the drill.

On December 7, 2004, [redacted] faxed copies of the Full Scale Drill Narrative and sign-in sheet to SA [redacted]. These documents reflect the participation of Federal Security Director Alan Anderson, and the fact that Cherry Capital Airport was part of the scenario. Copies of these documents are attached.

Attachments: Full Scale Drill Narrative
Sign in sheet

Name, Title, Signature, Date: [redacted] → 12-14-04 [redacted] - Special Agent	Reviewing Official Name, Title, Signature, Date: Thomas M. Frost → 12-14-04 Thomas M. Frost - Special Agent in Charge
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Grand Traverse County Emergency Management
Full Scale Drill Narrative
September 18, 2004

0800

A previously planted explosive device is detonated by a member of "Citizens for Liberty" (CFL) at the Brown Bridge Dam. A pipe bomb is placed under the nature trail walkway steps.

The explosion and movement of water causes a "V" shaped breach in the dam opening the earthen embankment. As the water rushes out, the breach widens.

██████████ calls in a report to Grand Traverse County Central Dispatch of a loud explosion in the area of the Brown Bridge Dam. He reports the water level is going down and the dam has been breached.

0805

██████████, a resident on the river, calls 911 to report that he has fallen off of his roof. He is on his cell phone, but he is unable to move. He hears the sirens, but he cannot get to his car.

There will only be a 20 minute window of opportunity to extricate ██████████ and notify residents before flood waters inundate Boardman River up to the first bridge on River Road west of Garfield Avenue.

0810

██████████ reports to Central that after the explosion there was heavy smell cordite and lots of debris in the air, and he could see someone across the lake running up to the hills to Hobbs Highway.

The Grand Traverse Central Dispatch advises all incoming units of possible bad guy in the area, and that the scene may not be secure.

Fire units from East Bay and Kingsley report in service and reroute to the scene. The first units on scene establish command and confirm the following:

1. The water level is rising at a rapid rate.
2. Heavy debris is flowing downstream, trees are uprooted, there is heavy mud flow, and propane pigs are floating downstream.
3. Light poles are snapping and there are transformers in the water.

0815

An unidentified courier drops off at the Traverse City Law Enforcement Enter front desk.

The videotape reveals a man holding weapons and what appear to be numerous pipe bombs looking objects under the nature trail walkway steps. The man says, on tape, "When you receive this then you'll know that we blew this dam. It's not going to end here. This is just the beginning of the revolution. We won't stand for those federal spies who are flying in to day from the USDA to tell us how to raise our dairy cows! Our brothers and sisters will rise up across the nation when they hear our call to arms!"

The man is then seen planting the pipe bomb looking objects around the nature trail walkway steps.

0820

East Bay and Kingsley request additional ambulance/fire/law enforcement. They notify the city hazardous materials team that a hazardous situation exists and request response.

SSI

[REDACTED]

0830

SSI

[REDACTED]

Command at the Brown Bridge and City fire/hazmat decides to split up the crews and send only a small contingency to evaluate the hazardous materials moving down the Boardman.

0845

[REDACTED]

SI

the Road Commission of the need for roadblocks and emergency repairs. They notify the Salvation Army and American Red Cross for disaster relief.

The Cherry Capital Airport Command continues to monitor situation and advise.

Citizens For Liberty

Citizen's for Liberty (CFL) formed in 1987 in response to the farm crisis. Most of the members were members of the Michigan Militia who splintered to form CFL. They felt that the Michigan Militia did not adequately represent the needs of the farmer.

Most of the founding members were dairy farmers. Although they have splintered from the Michigan Militia, they still are loyal and assert they would respond to a Militia call to arms.

Recently they have been vocal regarding the USDA quarantine of dairy cows due to bovine TB concerns. They have especially been upset with the government's slaughter of entire herds to protect Michigan.

The CFL is known to hold regular exercises at its compound north of Kingsley. They are suspected to be well organized. Historically they have only taken violent action on two occasions.

In the summer of 1988 two members were arrested for assaulting a U.S. Soil Conservation employee who was measuring the amount of till in a low-till field. Low till fields qualify for farming subsidies.

In the spring of 1995 a member was arrested and successfully prosecuted for fire-bombing a Michigan State Extension office in Wexford County.

September 18th

September 18th

September 18th,
Full Scale Exercise

EOC Sign In

Name	Agency	Time
[REDACTED]	GTSO	0710
[REDACTED]	GTSO	0710
[REDACTED]	GTSO	0720
[REDACTED]	Clinton County	0730
[REDACTED]	Clinton CO	0730
[REDACTED]	GTSO	0730
[REDACTED]	EMU	0730
[REDACTED]	EMU	0730
[REDACTED]	AT METROFD	0740
[REDACTED]	GTEM	0745
[REDACTED]	GTSO	0700
[REDACTED]	FIA	7:50
[REDACTED]	GTC 1710	7:50
[REDACTED]	GTC Hall CB	7:51
[REDACTED]	Munson	7:55
ALAN ANDERSON	TSA	7:55
[REDACTED]	MUNSON	7:55
EDWARD FISTOL	TCFD	0800
[REDACTED]	MSP EMP	8:00
[REDACTED]	PFO	8:00
[REDACTED]	GTC RC	8:02
[REDACTED]	NMC	8:02

000

EOC Sign In

North
Comm East

Name	Agency	Time
[REDACTED]	Metro Fire	0741
[REDACTED]	EMU student	0742
[REDACTED]	EMU student	0742
[REDACTED] 239	TCPD	0750
[REDACTED]	FIA	0754
[REDACTED]	Lee. Co.	0756
[REDACTED]	TCPD	0757
[REDACTED]	MMC	0758
[REDACTED]	TCPD	0759
Ed Fristen	Fire	0759
[REDACTED]	EM	0806
[REDACTED]	EMO	0807
[REDACTED]	Comm.	0808
[REDACTED]	TCPD	0815
[REDACTED]	Light + Power	0818
[REDACTED]	FERL	0819
[REDACTED]	NMC Security	0819
[REDACTED]	TCPD	0844
[REDACTED]	TCPD	0857
[REDACTED]	Records	0900
[REDACTED]	EMU	0944
[REDACTED]	EMU	



Type of Activity: Personal Interview Chief Fisher

Case Number: I05-TSA-CHI-01544	Case Title: TSA, Cherry Capital Airport
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On November 30, 2004, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), and SA [redacted], DHS, OIG, interviewed Ed Fisher, Chief, Traverse City Fire Department, at the office of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Federal Security Director (FSD), 1760 Forest Ridge, Traverse City, MI.

Chief Fisher was advised that the OIG was investigating an allegation that TSA management assigned to the Traverse City Airport have not conducted emergency contingency drills or exercises, leaving TSA personnel unprepared for emergencies.

Fisher stated that his department began providing fire protection to the airport on November 15, 2003. Prior to this date, coverage was provided by a proprietary crash, fire, rescue unit supervised by the Northwest Regional Airport Commission. Fisher stated that since initiating coverage, he has met with FSD Alan Anderson, Assistant FSD for Screening [redacted], and Operations Officer [redacted] on a regular basis. He recalled approximately five organizational meeting held in preparation for a "tabletop" exercise conducted in 2004, and also stated that on September 18, 2004, he participated with TSA and other law enforcement and emergency management agencies [redacted] *ISS*

Fisher stated he has had a "fantastic" working relationship with TSA, and that all of his interactions with the FSD's staff have been positive.

Fisher agreed to review his personal and department files to obtain information on the number and types of drills or planning sessions held in conjunction with local TSA management and provide the results to the OIG.

On December 1, 2004, Chief Fisher provided the following summary of TSA interactions documented in his personal calendar:

- May 7, 2002 Tabletop Exercise
- June 3, 2002 Tabletop Exercise
- April 3, 2003 Tabletop Planning Meeting
- April 14, 2003 Tabletop Exercise at Airport
- April 30 -
- May 2, 2003 Homeland Security Conference
- June 25, 2003 Air Show Planning Meeting

Name, Title, Signature, and Date: [redacted] Special Agent [redacted] 12/9/04	Reviewing Official Name, Title, Signature, and Date: Thomas M. Frost, Special Agent in Charge 12-10-04
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December 22, 2003 Airport Communications Meeting
January 6, 2004 Air Show Planning Meeting
May 12, 2004 [REDACTED]
May 12, 2004 Air Show Planning Meeting
June 30, 2004 Air Show Planning Meeting

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Type of Activity: Personal Interview TVC Police

Case Number: I05-TSA-CHI-01544	Case Title: TSA, Cherry Capital Airport
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On November 30, 2004 Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General interviewed Chief Mike Warren and Captain [redacted] Traverse City Police Department.

SA [redacted] first asked Chief Warren about his department's working relationship with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) at the Cherry Capital Airport. Chief Warren said that they have an excellent working relationship with TSA. He explained that, Federal Security Director, Alan Anderson and Assistant Federal Security Director, [redacted], were state certified law enforcement officers before retiring and accepting their current positions. He was acquainted with Anderson, and [redacted] he has known for some time because he worked in neighboring Benzie County.

Chief Warren said that he has been to table-top exercises with TSA personnel [redacted] and also the full scale disaster drill that was conducted on September 18, 2004. He further stated there were several meetings prior to both of these events that either he or Captain [redacted] attended in regard to preparation.

Chief Warren also stated that when TSA first took over security at the airport, and several times since, there have been many informal meetings of the two departments. These meetings were to form agreements to outline circumstances under which the police would respond to the airport. This included such things as what constituted a weapon, emergencies, etc. This is an ongoing process that continues today.

Name, Title, Signature, Date: [redacted] → 12-14-04 - Special Agent	Reviewing Official Name, Title, Signature, Date: [Signature] Thomas M. Frost – Special Agent in Charge
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