June 19, 2007
The Honorable Scott J. Bloch
Special Counsel
U.S. Office of Special Counsel
1730 M Street, NW, Suite300
Washington DC 20036-4505

Re: OSC File No. DI-06-1117

Dear Mr. Bloch:

Thank you for letter of May 15, 2007, which contains the results of an investigation conducted by the Department of Transportation, Inspector General Office, Calvin L. Scovel III. Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the results of that investigation.

In his open remarks he states, "In brief, our investigation did not substantiate, Mr. Dunkin's allegations and therefore, we have no recommendations for regulatory or administrative action".

I am not surprised at the findings of this investigation, quite the contrary. I expected the findings to be in complete alignment with the opinions and statements made by the AVN 300 group. Most of the statements are untrue, but I expected alignment with them nonetheless.

The Department of Transportation Inspector General's Office has a stake in the outcome of this investigation as the parent department for the Federal Aviation Administration. Based on that fact, for all practical purposes, this investigation is better described as a *"pseudo-gation":* a social gathering of self-serving, stake holding parties, for the elimination of accountability, and the exoneration of alleged parties.

I am aware of this bias. I am also aware of the budgetary constraints prohibiting a full, proper, and timely investigation of these allegations. During subsequent conversations with the primary investigator, Erika Vincent, Senior Investigator, Office of Inspector General, Special Investigations and Analysis Unit, U.S. Department of Transportation, I learned due to slow Congressional budget approvals, the OIG's travel budget had been limited to the highest priority travel. As a result, I believe the bulk of the investigation was conducted thru letters and phone requests, asking for pertinent, self incriminating records from the parties under investigation. The record checks performed by the alleged violators of FARs and the General Maintenance Manual failed to find any incriminating evidence. How surprising. I am led to believe that the most critical documents relating to these allegations were not retrieved personally by the Investigator, and that the original records, logbooks, etc., were never viewed by the Investigator, relying solely upon second hand information obtained by the alleged violators, and accepting the constructed "stories" and explanations designed to placate her inquiries.

Offices of Inspector General are positioned too high in the Department architecture and hierarchy to expect the results of an independent investigation, and are too cognizant of political influences to deliver untainted investigations. It is unreasonable to assume that a fair, impartial, objective investigation of issues concerning Accountability, Abuse of Management Powers, Abuses of Personnel, or excessive monetary discrepancies, *can* or *will* be accomplished without political pressure from Departmental, Agency, or other outside political influences, to find in other than the Departments or Agencies favor. Even without pressure being applied, the inherent *desire* to do the politically correct, or agency correct thing, showing loyalty to the agency and its interests, almost always take precedence in a self-investigation and cannot be expected to exhibit objectivity.
Any investigation conducted by an office residing within an Agency or Department, is not an investigation. Investigations conducted by an office that has a stake in the outcome, cannot be considered a trustworthy investigation. Self-examinations are never objective, but subjective. Investigations that rely on the alleged parties submission of self-incriminating information is even less likely to be worth the paper written on.

An investigation worth its weight is based on the following:

1. Honesty
2. Impartiality
3. Objectiveness
4. Accountability
5. Free of political pressure
6. Genuine interest in the truth
7. Determination to find the truth

I do not believe this is the case; it is more about keeping the status quo, and playing interagency politics. Departments or Agencies investigating themselves is a farce.

It is an old cliché but still has merit, "Do not send a boy to do a man's job." Boys do not have the backbone, intestinal fortitude, or stamina to do a man's work. Grit, determination, and commitment are admirable qualities that are required in many professions to accomplish the job at hand. These qualities are fading fast on the American Landscape in general and becoming non-existent in American Government. Such huge efforts have been made to make "political correctness" *THE* most important aspect of everything, nothing else has value. Those efforts to make everything nice, soft, cuddly and palatable to the weakest of constitutions, has voided some of the most important qualities required to fulfill our most basic obligations. This is why accountability is so scarce, and why every effort to bring accountability back, is met with such resistance, there is no backbone in the American Government anymore. The Buck does not stop anywhere, anymore. Responsibility and Accountability are passé by today's gelatinous standards. People want to "play" at the work they have been given, to sugar coat it, to make it a fun, a recreational activity. Work is work, it is not a game or a place to have fun, make friends, and play the day away, although that is *precisely* the way most government activities are conducted. It seems there are many children within the government that have no con-

cept of work, just play. Most are replete with all of the baby-boomer attributes so frequently written about; the me, me, me, I, I, I, give me, give me, give me attitudes that are selfish, self-centered and serve no place in business, *especially* in Government. We are supposed to be focused on the needs of *all* people, and the nation, not just the few, not just the government executive. There are far too many game playing "executives" in the Government. Far too many people do not possess the "right stuff" for the positions they hold. Anyone can attend training for a particular job or career field and fulfill the training requirements, or be selected for a position based on their desire and willingness to play on-the-job games, but that does not mean they are the best person for the job. Many doctors, lawyers, and "business professionals" have no place being in those professions, because they are not dedicated to what they are doing, and are therefore ineffective in those professions. They choose their profession based on the potential income and prestige they are seeking, nothing more. They do a terrible disservice to their clientele and to themselves in the end. That would be the U.S. Government and every citizen in this country, when employed by the government.

The requests made by the DOT OIG were made to people of this caliber, as such, these people, driven by their greed and desire of power, cannot be expected to release self-incriminating evidence or documents that would interfere with their own ambitions.

I believe the public interest would be best served, if an independent, special office of the FBI or another agency whose primary focus is criminal investigations, conduct all investigations of prohibited personnel actions, management abuses or fraud waste & abuse. Completely independent, not in conjunction with. If that sounds radical, so be it, the designated offices within Departments and Agencies have proven repeatedly they are not capable of performing the tasks without bias. A radical departure from "business as usual" is the only means of restoring integrity and ethical conduct in Government. This would not be palatable to Department or Agency Heads, for the sheer fact it *assures* true Accountability, by a non-stake investigator. The seriousness of the investigation would have an all-new meaning to those under investigation, as it should. The interviewees should also be interviewed apart from the comfortable environment that has been the backdrop for their alleged activities. This will never happen; no one in government wants true accountability. Accountability requires toughness, tenacity, and a commitment to high moral and ethical standards which are inconsistent with present governmental standards.

I do not ascribe to political game playing and I believe that the political correctness games played are nothing more than fodder for those bellied up to the trough of abuses and handouts. No one in the government wants to *work* for their handouts, especially when allowed to perform at an egregious level for the same handout. If you *do not apply* yourself, it is a handout. If you play politics *instead* of tending to your responsibilities, it is a handout. If you *delegate* more responsibilities than you *actually* accept and tend to yourself, it is a handout. These activities, political correctness and on-the-job politics, are in a constant state of vacillation. Those attempting to conform to or align with the perceived or anticipated power base, which they are dependent on to secure their ambitions, only exasperate an already acute-

ly unstable condition in the workplace and serves no function. Those who insist on-the-job politics be played, have no place in government. It flies in the face of everything this government and country are(supposedly) based upon.

My year and a half sojourn, attempting to gather information from the same Agency and the same Organization via Freedom of Information Act requests, has resulted in an average 20% valid result. The remaining FOIA requests were returned, "No records found"; records I have written, submitted, and know exist. Information is not to be expected from this Agency or Department. They do exist, but you have to desire and possess a willingness to produce them first.

When making a FOIA request to the DOT OIG, the response was, "We currently have a backlog of FOIA requests, and your request will be processed accordingly," equating to 0% valid results.

The records are not being found due to an unwillingness of the Departments and Agencies to release the information. It is nothing more than a despicable way to protect themselves from self-incriminating information releases. Knowledge is power; withholding knowledge keeps the requester powerless, which is desired by all government agencies. This is not a surprise either, but expected. It further removes accountability from the agencies and the violators of policy. These games are as old as dirt and should not surprise anyone. It is just another disappointing failure in government leadership to respond maturely and responsibly.

Being a very proficient troubleshooter in my own right, I possess very strong analytical investigative skills, and as stated before, I am not bound by political desires, games that cloud my judgment or lead me down a primrose path. I have troubleshot avionic systems from the simple, to the most complex for almost 30 years. I deal with facts, solid data, and laws of physics that never change, regardless of the pressure placed upon them, political or otherwise. These things cannot be coerced, called upon for favors, nor are they subject to justifications, or manipulations to satisfy the self-serving. They are fixed and unchanging.

This is not to say I am not a people person. I have served as a Team Lead in private industry, with outstanding results, *and* employee satisfaction. I have found from experience that people respond very favorably to an atmosphere of true fairness and equality, void of favoritism. My government service has been limited to Temporary Delegations of Authority as Supervisor and Lead man. The abilities and attributes most desired in private industry are not as appreciated in the federal sector, such as results, efficiency, and an equal contribution by all employees. By Federal Standards, I am a radical or non-team player, because I do not believe in preferential treatment or on the job politics. I am fair, practical, impartial and expect each employee to perform at, or above, a predetermined level commensurable with the nature of the work and expected outcomes. I do not make exceptions, except for injuries or special short-term situations, because I am compassionate and gracious, though not to the point of having those qualities abused. Typical Government Management does not tolerate that type of radical thinking, because it eradicates

the political power of tricks & favors, so commonly relied upon in federal service for accomplishing virtually everything.

When you remove the politics from any situation, you have much better odds of accomplishing the stated objectives; even an untainted investigation. It is human nature that when more options are given a human being, the more options will be utilized and justified, regardless of need or subjective nature of the chosen options.

I have remained an Avionic Technician because of my devotion to aviation safety and my deep commitment to the safety of Domestic and International travelers. I believe completely, that any safety related service provided by the government, should be treated with total seriousness and a keen respect for the life of others. To ensure that respect of others, starts with respect for the employees of those agencies and leadership that is committed to Excellence. I have very little confidence in the ability of the present Division Management to ensure compliance of true safety related issues. The observed nonchalant approach to *all* of their responsibilities, witnessed violations of Federal Aviation Regulations, a general degradation of ethics and employee morale, and an increased reliance upon lies and deceit to elude accountability, serves to increases my lack of confidence in the *SAFETY RELATED* activities of this Organization.

I have a son, two daughters, a wife, and other loved ones that utilize the services provided by the FAA. You and your family members do too. For those reasons, I have a very deep commitment to safety and do not want to be *remotely* responsible for the death of any of them. I am extremely disturbed by the indifferent attitudes of Management and the approach taken by these lack luster performers. They demonstrate a total lack of respect for the Pilots that fly Agency aircraft performing the Inspections of Navigation Systems and the procedures used to navigate the Airways, Approaches, and Departures prior to release to industry for use and periodic inspections of those previously established. Because of the lack luster performance and desire for favored status of some of my coworkers and Management, I feel compelled to perform the services I deliver to the absolute best of my abilities, not because it is so rewarding for me, not because it gains me status, but because if I do not make a superhuman effort to make up for their shortcomings, who will? They have proven they will not. Sometimes a person HAS to sacrifice their own ambitions, goals and dreams because of the degree of need presented them. I could have hugged, snuggled and entertained my way into a more self-serving position, but it is not all about *me* and would have been irresponsible to do so.

The sheer number of aircraft and passengers that take to the sky each day outnumber the potential deaths of all service members serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, at any given time, and probably the entire losses of World War II, *each day*. Speaking of WWII, when Pearl Harbor was attacked, we were being our typical fun loving, unassuming Americans. We were not concerned with a possible attack; we were having fun, partying, blowing off steam, and generally being the irresponsible countrymen we are. We were not being vigilant, or remaining cognizant of the vulnerability of our position; we are far too confident, brave, brazen and bold to be concerned with possibilities we have disregarded. I look at that day, the day of

9/11, and try not to be that typical, caviler American. I try not to invite disaster into my life because of my own laziness, stupidity or recklessness. While it does come to me from time to time, it mainly comes from petty, contrite individuals who lack personal integrity. All I can do is hope other people learn from the vivid historical moments of our past and do better to avoid the same mistakes. Until that day comes, I will continue to persevere; doing what is right and good, regardless of the cost extracted from me by those wallowing in stupidity, laziness and self-righteousness, it will not last forever.

I have also stayed because I love a challenge and attempting to challenge or affect the attitudes and direction of how business is conducted within AVN 300, is the most formidable challenge I have found. It is the kluge of all kluges, The Mother of Kluges, with a significant potential for loss of life and agency assets, period. I cannot stand to see such apathetic, indifferent attitudes, supposedly guide, and direct the maintenance of the FAA Fleet. The mentality of the Leadership is a throwback to Neanderthal man, ignoring the state of modern flight. Modern flight does not depend on doped fabric or bailing wire anymore, but on modern, sophisticated, highly integrated Avionic Navigation Systems, well beyond the vision of these mechanic minded individuals.

Today, modern aviation is more dependent than ever on the complex Avionic Systems installed in aircraft. With measures such as Reduced Vertical Separation Minimums, Required Navigation Performance, a desire to move to Direct Flight and other significant improvements in Navigation Systems, based on the advances in Microprocessor Technology and the Navigation Systems dependent on these technological improvements to hold these expected tolerances. The mechanic mentality possessed by those in authority, serve to hinder, not improve the state of aviation.

FAA Flight Inspection Aircraft *are* modern aircraft, utilizing the latest in Avionic Technology, and are the means by which these afore mentioned National Aerospace System requirements are measured, quantified and tracked. Every advancement in aviation and navigation, be it software or hardware, is applied to these aircraft, often before being released for commercial use because of its effect within/on the NAS operation. Every new NAS system is evaluated with these aircraft to ensure seamless integration of the new system. These aircraft and the systems they contain are the insurance policy relied upon to ensure the safety of the NAS. All air travel is dependent upon the NAS. *Every* air traveler, commercial, private, military, domestic or international, are users of the NAS.

Airworthiness basics, such as wings, landing gear and propulsion systems are fully matured systems with little landmark advances in the future. However, Avionic Navigation Systems are continually evolving and morphing as quickly as microprocessor technology and software solutions. These are in addition to, *above and beyond*, basic airworthiness. To continue the dogmatic approach of FAA Flight Inspection, as these mechanic background Managers have chosen, is insane. To continually ignore the systems that fly the aircraft, the technicians that maintain them and disregard them as frivolous "*extras,*" in favor of tire kicking is stupid. The only "stick flyers" are in the GA area and do not operate in the strict environments of Class A or B

Airspace. Sophisticated Avionic Systems are the only way the required tolerances of Class A or B can be met. NO modern aircraft in commercial service, passenger carrying or cargo, are stick flown. Takeoff and landing are the ONLY phases of flight that require "hands on", every other phase of flight is controlled by Autopilot-coupled Navigation, facilitated by Flight Management Systems integrated with an array of highly sophisticated, highly integrated Avionic Systems.

I know all of the members of the Management Team; I have interfaced with and viewed them in action as mechanics, inspectors, and Lead men prior to their ascension to Management. They hold the same opinions now as then; some things of a highly technical nature will *never* be understood or recognized by a mechanic. They focus is on the rudimentary, the lower level thinking that is the basis of mechanics, and it restricts their ability to comprehend technologies of a higher level beyond "righty tighty, lefty loosey." The duties of today's FAA aircraft mechanic is the most simplistic function in aviation. Any duty that required special or advanced skills, has been done away with. The FAA does not have an engine shop, hydraulic shop or a wheel and tire shop, today. All of these functions have been contracted out to venders. There are no special skills within the FAA aircraft mechanic realm. Every maintenance action is written in step-by-step, detailed instructions, backed up in pictorial form for those unable or too lazy to read. Aircraft mechanic functions have been reduced to unbolting faulty or time-limited items, and bolting on vender supplied new or refurbished items, checking fluid levels and refilling as needed, and watching a fueling contractor place fuel on the aircraft. These aircraft mechanics are as far from being Aerospace Engineering Technicians as the Earth is from the Sun. If a person can read a comic book, they can perform the functions of an FAA aircraft mechanic. There is no requirement or need for cognitive or analytical skills to perform these functions. Every function can be, and usually is, performed entirely by rote. To compensate for the simplicity of tasks and their inabilities, they rely on intimidation, domination, crude and rude tactics, in an attempt to justify their imagined importance. Derogatory comments and defamation of character are the preferred method of defense, when questioned on the exaggerated importance of these positions, at the expense of other more skilled positions. These individuals have *never* possessed Management qualities, but have filled those positions by the good old boy network of mechanic promotion.

While the entire Department should have Quality Leadership, the FAA is the most critical. Some people will not agree with me on that, any more than with anything else I have to say. You tell me, how many trains, busses, or ships fall up into the sky? None! With the exception of Cruise Ships, which one has the most potential for complete loss of life per incident? Commercial aircraft. The FAA, more than any other Agency within the Department of Transportation, deserves to have the very best Managers and Leadership, because of the inherent danger to so many people worldwide. Ethics, Integrity, Good Moral Judgment, and above all *ACCOUNTABILITY*, are *MUST HAVE* items. There is a serious void of these characteristics in AVN 300 at present.

I had hoped for more positive responses from some of my former coworkers, than was given. I believe their inability to give honest; truthful information, is largely

due to the political pressures felt in the workplace. You cannot really expect too much from people that are still in a mechanic dominated, , spiteful, vindictive, repulsively mean spirited environment of politics, void of ethics, integrity, and morals. Do not delude yourself into thinking my removal has not had a significant impact on the concerns of, or the need for self-preservation, on the part of the workforce. Especially when you consider my removal was based on false allegations and perjured testimony, that has been blindly supported by every employee appeals process, in the interest of keeping the status quo. The need for self-preservation existed before, but is quintessential now. I am a dedicated, conscientious Avionic Technician that is fully cognizant of the modern state of aviation, who has consistently troubleshoot the most difficult system malfunctions and restored the affected systems back to a fully operational status. I am also fully aware of the required management philosophies and techniques to raise the morale, effectiveness and efficiency of this Division. I strive for excellence in my duties and responsibilities, therefore I expect the same from the Management Team I am subject to. It is my expectation of Excellence in Management, that makes me a target for this Management Team. They are NOT driven to Excellence and have no desire to change their self-expectations.

I would like to preface these responses with a response to footnote #1. This Inspector General's Office believes it is of great interest and very important to note I was terminated prior to raising my allegations. That is not true. I submitted these allegations on February 20, 2006, via FedEx delivery, to the Office of Special Counsel. I was sent home on administrative leave February 16, 2006, Charles Kelley terminated my access to my Lotus Notes on February 17, 2006. I believe this was a premeditated move to deny access to e-mails, reports and other information, saved in my files, which could be used to support my allegations to the Office of Special Counsel. There was no other reason to suspend my access to Lotus Notes at that time, I had not been recommended for removal, a decision for removal had not been made, nor had an investigation of the allegations against me been made at that time. These allegations were made utilizing personal files maintained by myself at home. I had no access to the recent e-mails concerning N85 and the autopilot malfunction it was experiencing. Without access to my most recent files, I misquoted N85 as N86. You will note some of these allegations are from earlier dates, but are very serious and indicate the continuous Managerial abuses within AVN 300 that exist today and will continue to exist tomorrow.

To be more specific and direct on this pseudo-gation; Bob Connor, Frank Smith, Frank Bridges, J.D. Bittle, James Wilson and James Cochran are the Managers and Supervisors in Oklahoma City, that have been and still are involved in the direct circumvention and violations of the guidelines contained in the General Maintenance Manual and FARs. They always have been. Thomas Pickle, Luvern Doktor (retired), nor Joseph Doubleday is ever directly involved. They just offer "unofficial" advice, or hypothesize what may be the way to handle a particular situation, or turn a blind eye to the unfolding events. That is the whole idea behind surrounding yourself with layers of cronies and delegation of responsibilities, you are never directly involved, but you do have input, even if you choose not to input, which ultimately determines the direction taken.

Congress dictated we be as responsible as Industry, when they mandated the change to a PART 135 Certificated operation. Thus far, we have lied and cheated our way out of compliance. We still claim, "We are the FAA and we can do whatever we want", and we do, we are just more clandestine and surreptitious in the way we go about it!

Details

1. N85 came to the Alaska Line Maintenance Station with a malfunctioning Cockpit Voice recorder. The aircraft Pilot in Command when it arrived was Ken Jack; I do not remember who was Second in Command. I had talked to Dan Wheeler via telephone, and was informed the Cockpit Voice was failing to pass Self-Test, and had been for some time. I was asked to fix it while the aircraft was in Anchorage, to which I replied OK. The aircraft was scheduled to fly most of the time while in Alaska, and I had very little opportunity to work it for required time to resolve the issue. The aircraft was due to depart on an Asian itinerary, with the flight inspection of Singapore International Airport the highest priority. I was unable to fix the Self-Test function before the departure and had "forced" it to indicate a false "pass" condition, by re-initiating the Self-Test repeatedly, subsequently "confusing the Built-in-Test function". I verified the Cockpit Voice Recorder was functioning properly during normal operations, by plugging in a headset to the phones port and listening to the sound recorded from each Station on the aircraft. It was only the Self-Test portion that was failing. I did admit this to Erika Vincent during the investigation. When the aircraft returned to Anchorage, a different flight crew operated it. The Cockpit Voice Self-Test was still malfunctioning. I still did not have ample time to repair the malfunction before N85 departed for Oklahoma City.

I was on my way to the logbook room, to write up N85's Cockpit Voice recorder and the ECTM Strain Gage fault, when Charles Kelley stopped me, asked what I was doing, and instructed me ***NOT*** to write the items up. I explained that I had already ascertained the write ups could & would be deferred under provisions of a DDL. One write up would be deferred 3 days, the other for 6 days, giving adequate time for the aircraft to arrive in Oklahoma City, fly for a few days if needed, but that they would *HAVE* to be addressed. I always wrote up known, demonstrable malfunctions, even if there were MEL or DDL items, to ensure *some* action was taken. Even if the action taken only consisted of the items being taken out of the MEL/DDL, signed off without working or repairing the item and returned to service. Someone would *HAVE* to make the effort to circumvent normal procedures. That was usually Robert Connor, especially if it was an Avionic item, because Avionic items do not fall into an Airworthiness category, as far as mechanics are concerned. **I** was the person who asked Mike Ryder to make a special effort to check the Cockpit Voice Recorder Self-Test before departure and to write it up. We both agreed it was not necessary to write it up in Anchorage before departure because it would only be MEL'd here.

Charles Kelley, like the other supervisors and managers of AVN 300, think this is the FAA Army or FAA Marine Corp, and that they have absolute, complete control over each employee. This is NOT the Army or Marine Corp, this is a civilian agency. However, it is being ran as a pseudo-military operation, by ex-military supervisors

and Managers. It offends me to be treated as if I were in the military, when I *know* I am employed by a Civilian Agency. I do not appreciate Management assuming they have the right to control my thoughts or actions. If I wanted to be directed in everything I did without choices, and enjoyed being told to shut-up and stand in the corner until further notice, I would be in the military today, but I do not, therefore I am not. I did not sign away any of my Constitutional Rights to work for the FAA. This *Army* mentality did not exist before the arrival of Joe Doubleday. I did not sign up for duty in Joe Doubleday's Army, I was employed as an Avionic Technician, performing as I always have, well before he arrived. Management makes every attempt to totally control each aspect of an Avionic Tech's function, except for the actual work. There is *some* realization they are completely incompetent when it comes to Avionic Systems, but there is an attempt to control every other aspect. Mechanics desire Avionic Technicians to be seen, but not heard. They expect Avionic Technicians to utilize their brilliance to troubleshoot extremely complex malfunctions that escape their limited comprehension, make their charts and graphs of operational readiness and performance look good, and they take all of the credit, but do NOT expect Avionic Technicians to express higher level thoughts.

More than anything else, I do not appreciate being ordered to circumvent provisions of the GMM or FARs. I do not do that of my own volition and I cannot respect anyone who does. Managers and supervisors that insist and demand circumvention of FARs and GMM directives by technicians, should be immediately be removed from any position of authority. This kind of behavior and criminal activity is like a malignant cancer that infects everything around it and continues to spread. Violations of FARs *ARE* criminal offences, punishable by law, FAA Managers and Supervisors *should not be granted immunity from those laws*. The National Transportation Safety Board, National Safety Institute and every other safety related body, agree that an accident is the result of a series of poor judgments and actions. Managers and Supervisors that commit these offences are playing Russian Roulette with other people's lives, they can do that with their own lives, but they *DO NOT* possess the authority to subject unwitting and unwilling participants to their games. Do you volunteer to let them play with your life this way? Live up to the responsibilities *you* have accepted and do something about it.

2. As stated earlier I did not have access to this e-mail, because of the revocation of my Lotus Notes access. For the record, I miss-stated N86 had the Autopilot/Flight Director problem. It was N85 with the Autopilot problem. Both aircraft had been in Anchorage in the preceding months. However, I did not miss-state what was relayed to me, *VERBALLY* by the Pilots of the aircraft. At *NO TIME* did either Pilot claim they had to "stick fly" the aircraft. *It was not written up that way, or stated in the logbook*. I did not receive an offer to fly with the aircraft, which was normally what I did when an aircraft had a chronic issue. I was frequently asked to fly with an aircraft to observe in flight malfunctions and had flown with many aircraft in the past. Although I like these two Pilots and regard them as very skilled and knowledgeable, they are a bit quirky at times.

The assumptions made by the DOT OIG on this problem are one thousand percent **wrong**! These faults *DID NOT* occur over a two-month period in 2005, as assumed.

is 1A-1B, 1A-2A, Pilots Channel or 2A-2B, 2B-1B, Copilots Channel. All data is circulating redundantly in these Aux Channels, hence, a dual, double redundant System. Because of this design and the ability of the IAPS to monitor itself for accurately processed data, it will automatically select the mode of operation, side-to-side, or upper to lower, dependent upon the *quality* of processed data. It will change the mode of operation *solely* dependent upon the *quality* of the data, allowing the highest quality, most accurate information to be utilized and displayed at all times. Because of the way this System operates, it makes an intermittent malfunction difficult to locate. Malfunctions of a very intermittent **and** random nature, such as this one are extremely difficult to locate. Other than the basic complexities of a highly integrated, *multi-microprocessor controlled* system, the fact that this condition ONLY occurred in the dynamic state; flight, makes it an even more difficult malfunction to locate, because of the variables associated with it cannot be duplicated in the static state; on the ground. The aircraft had to be in flight AND experiencing enough air turbulence to exert the required force on the strapping module wiring, to cause it to bounce, and tug on the pins inside the module, which caused the malfunction to manifest. The IAPS system *has* to process the information a predetermined number of times *before it is considered valid information and displayed,* making it next to impossible to predict when it would occur.

The following is an e-mail of the problem and fix, as sent to the System Engineer.

To: Derek A Blackford/AMC/FAA@FAA
From: Michael Dunkin/AAL/FAA
Date: 07/20/2005 05:28PM
Subject: N 85

Andy, How are you doing? I hope you had a good time vacationing in D.C..

I have some information regarding N 85 that you may need. For some time now, N 85 has been experiencing a fault that has caused the FD "V" bar on the Pilots Primary Flight Display to switch to a double cue display without any outside intervention. It seems that I had heard of this problem before I transferred to Anchorage, but never had the opportunity to see it or fix it, before transferring. The A/C has been up here for several weeks now and the first crew wrote it up before departing for home.

The write up was valid and factual; it has been a chronic problem, which does void the compliance with RVSM & RNP, when it occurs. You can view the discrepancy and the sign off in ILM; I cannot copy & paste it here because I do not have rights to Q.A. type files. When the crew experiences the "Double Cue" fault, the FD Select Panel becomes inoperable and does not respond to any input; also, the Autopilot Select Panel is disabled and will not allow the Autopilot to transfer to the "off" side. The A/C is flying "something," but you have no indication of what you are actually flying and you are unable to make any changes to the FD/AP selections.

I found the record of the fault in the LRU Diagnostic Fault History pages. It had occurred 106 times, the 106th time being on 07JUL05 @ 1925Z. That corresponds to

the crew report, that it occurred about two hrs into flight. I saw them taxi out around 09:15am and they were gear in the wells by about 09:30am (local time).

I called Collins and talked to a tech rep and he was leaning towards the FD/AP card. What it turned out to be was the strapping plug inside the IAPS cage. It came from the factory without back shells or strain reliefs on the plugs. There was an excessive amount of wire hanging from the plugs and the excess was wrapped in Teflon tape, and tied with string tie. It was a nasty mess that caused the wires located in the upper half of the plug, to be pulled taunt and stressing the connections. I took pictures of the original plug configuration and of the "fix," I applied. These strapping plugs really need back shells and strain reliefs. I can see where at some time in the near future we will be experiencing more problems along these lines, if we do not address this now. I am thinking that the extra stress induced in the strapping plug will be transferred into the IAPS strapping receptacles which are directly connected to the motherboard, and that could cause an untold number of problems. Problems not only for the flight crews, but for the maintenance techs as well, trying to troubleshoot weird problems, with the only "real
fix" being motherboard repairs or changes.

Anyway, we will talk more next week.

Andy was not too enthusiastic to hear this, because what I believed to be a nasty factory installation turned out to be something we had done during a mod. The strapping plugs were there from the factory, but at some point, a mod was installed that required adding some wires to the strapping plug. One of our technicians did the nasty job of adding the wire, splices, and the big wad of Teflon tape. I believe Andy was the one who wrote the mod. Because he is an Engineer sitting in an office somewhere with very little hands on aircraft or mod experience, he overlooked and dismissed adding back shells to the plugs to stabilize the strapping, or addressing the increased stress on the wires and pins. However, I think we may have saved $2.25 during the installation!

Mike Ryder could have very well experienced the problem in June 2005, and finally put it in writing after "living with it" 18+ months, but the malfunction was not fixed at that time! Someone took a maintenance action; cleaned or reseated a connector, a component, rolled the Pilot and Copilot Flight Director/Autopilot Units, or replaced a perfectly functioning part, or just signed it off as repaired because they could not duplicate the problem, but *the aircraft was not repaired* at that time. Mike Ryder just had not experienced it again following the sign-off. The malfunction *required* the aircraft to be experiencing significant air turbulence *before* it would manifest. That explains why Bill Sauble was so irritated in July 2005. The malfunction had finally been written up after 18 months of verbal complaints and living with the problem. It supposedly repaired, but it continued to occur. That also explains why the Pilots Diagnostics Display only had 20 or less recorded faults and the Copilots Diagnostic Display had 106 logged faults on it in July 2005. Someone attempted to repair the malfunction and cleared the Fault Diagnostic Data on the Pilots side in order to track the number of occurrences and the frequency of the malfunction.

Experiencing this malfunction at cruise altitude may not have been very significant to the crews, but if it was occurring during an autopilot-coupled assent from take-off, decent into an approach, or during a Flight Inspection Profile where altitude is a much more crucial factor, I am positive it became a very significant event. Altitude is *the* critical factor here, it provides the means of recovery from an uncontrolled or unexpected flight event. During Flight Inspections it could, and probably did, cause the profile to be executed several times before accurate inspection data could be obtained.

When the aircraft was in Anchorage in July 2005, Bill Sauble was a little grumpy and very irritated with the Flight Director/Autopilot System malfunction. That is when the aircraft was finally downed with a very detailed, lengthy, write up. Immediately, Charles Kelley started having a fit, because the aircraft had been written up. He believed it had been written up in an attempt to make the Anchorage Line Station look bad(He went into these goofy, paranoid episodes from time to time; it is just a side effect of the "climbing-the-ladder-syndrome" he suffers from. At the time, he was jockeying for a promotion, which he secured with my dismissal, and was fearful of anything that might affect his chances to secure the promotion). I tried to reassure him that was not the case. I have a reputation of attacking chronic problems and malfunctions, because I genuinely care about the status of the fleet, without letting go until the problem is found and resolved. I am not a quitter, nor do I give up on any malfunctions. I told him the only reason it was written up here, was because of my excellent troubleshooting abilities and these people knew if it was ever going to be fixed; it would be me that fixed it. I was unable to convince him that it was not a plot hatched to make Anchorage look bad.

Some months later, when the aircraft and same crew were in town, Charles Kelley instructed me "not to talk with the crew". Despite his instructions, I am obligated to interface with the crew in the performance of my duties. During one of those encounters, Bill Sauble confirmed the aircraft IAPS system was *finally, truly* restored to normal operational status and that the aircraft had failed to malfunction since I repaired it.

While Mike Ryder is a good pilot and is *USUALLY* a "stickler" for properly reporting maintenance issues, he is also human and subject to the political pressures that are applied to him. At one time he WAS the Oklahoma City Flight Inspection Field Office Manager, NOW he is a regular Line Pilot. He is also smart enough to realize that reporting issues that do not get resolved or do not have the potential to be resolved, or that result in a command from high not to be written up again, is not a politically astute thing to do. He flew Challenger 601's for five years without writing up the very, very obvious Weather Radar/Radome malfunction, due to political pressure NOT to write it up. An errant decision made by Maintenance Managers, based on faulty information led to the demand. I am confident that the way the Radar issue was initially handled had a major influence on what the Pilots were reporting. If it appeared to be a nuisance issue, as viewed by Maintenance Management, they would just be told to "live with it" because there was no solution to the problem, creating more on-the-job political fallout. Maintenance has ALWAYS taken the position that reporting issues like this and the Radar issue was just a result of "cry ba-

by, prima donnas, Pilots". Maintenance has NO RIGHT to prejudge the malfunction reporting by the Flight Crews.

Background information: Joseph Doubleday instituted the change from AVN 300's Part 91 Operational Certificate, to the Part 135 Operational Certificate. Lavern Doktor was his successor, Thomas Pickle was Second in command under Lavern Doktor, and became Lavern Doktor's successor. When Joseph Doubleday vacated the AVN 300 position, he became AVN 2. He has since been relegated back to the AVN 300 position. Regardless of who made the initial decision, Mr. Doubleday administered the AVN 300 position from the AVN 2 position, and as such made all "command" decissions.

All of the Pilots knew the Radar was bad, but Joseph Doubleday had *incorrectly* made the statement to AVN 200(Operations Division), that the radar issue was an anomaly that could not be corrected, and to direct the Pilots to stop writing it up. Mr. Doubleday was wrong! The data used to come to this conclusion was old, out dated data. Mr. Doubleday, as are Mr. Doktor and Mr. Pickle, of mechanic backgrounds and are *ignorant* of Avionic Equipment functions and Avionic software. They can only repeat what they are told. They attempt to answer Avionic issues without any true Avionic knowledge, and declare their righteousness because of position, not knowledge. Under this repressive, mechanic knowledge regime, any Avionic issue that cannot be corrected by under trained technicians, or is determined to be a "non-issue" from a mechanic standpoint is let go, unreported, uncorrected or put on hold(soon to be forgotten as ever existing). Regarding this particular issue, I had spent the previous four years as an Instructor in the FAA Academy, delivering the very latest data to Airworthiness Safety Inspectors on Weather Radar & Windshear Detection Systems.

Unlike Mike Ryder, I do not bow to political pressure. I do the right thing, regardless. While flying with a problem plagued aircraft in the South Pacific, I had an opportunity to witness the Radar malfunction first hand. After my attention was called to the Radar Display, by the Flight Crew, while encountering a large weather system in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, I decided to revisit the issue. Encounters with large turbulent thunderstorms, in the vastness of the Pacific Ocean, without a place to go to avoid it, and WITH a faulty Radar set, is something NO Air Crew should be subjected to, regardless of the smug, self-righteousness of someone unwilling to subject themselves to the same dangers. Mr. Doubleday is JUST another federal employee, NOT a King, Commander-in-Chief, or GOD. He does not OWN the lives of the Air Crews or the aircraft they fly. Despite the claim the issue could not be resolved, I suspected it could. I armed myself with all of the relevant information, and the results of the initial tests used to determine the "un-addressable anomaly" and analyzed the data. From the same test data used to come to that faulty conclusion, *but* with the correct, current information(which was also correct and current at the time the decision was made, just ignored), I did something about it. I filed a complete report containing excerpts from the Manufactures Installation Manual describing the Radar System, it's functions, required equipment, transmissivity reports on the Radome sent out for testing, and all other pertinent data, to *EVERY* AVN 300 Manager and Supervisor, Engineering Staff and the AVN

200 Operations Manager. The e-mailed report requested return receipts for delivery as well as read receipts. I was notified that every person received the report and read it within two days of sending it. Not a single person contacted me, and no action was taken on it. The information I provided to correct the error was scuttled for fifteen months, and was only acted upon after providing the Program Director, AVN 1, with the 15 month old information contained in my report. The original cost of my solution was thirty thousand dollars. After more than 15 months initial delay, 12 or more months attempting to find an alternate solution by the Engineering Staff(as directed by Maintenance Management), the cost of my solution had tripled in cost to ninety thousand dollars(equipment costs only). So, as a result of Mr. Doubleday's(Lavern Doktor, Thomas Pickle) attempting to secure his position, based on faulty data, it took almost three years, ninety thousand dollars in equipment costs and a year + in Engineering wages to arrive at the same fix. The equipment purchased was the *exact, identical* equipment spec'ed in my original report. That is not efficient or effective, just the cost of a government executives vanity. I pursued it in the interest of safety of ALL the Flight Crews and very expensive FAA assets. This issue was no different. Although Mike Ryder still has his job with the FAA, and I was removed by false allegations, lies, manipulation, and perjured testimony. I *know* I did the right thing, in the BEST interests of the FAA. I do not suffer from a martyr complex, but I do have a conscious and I am unwilling to place people in a sacrificial position, like Mr. Doubleday will, for the sake of penny-pinching, or a lack of intelligent, safety decisions. This is not the Army, Marine Corp, or entrepreneurial venture funded by blood. We are discharged with the preventing of loss of life and the spilling of blood. We are not here to willingly, knowingly place anyone in harm's way, regardless of what our ego dictates.

FAA Management still insists there is a problem with the Radar set, claiming the malfunction exists when Long-Range modes are selected. The stories told might impress the DOT OIG, and convince them the stories told are correct, however they are not technically competent enough to comprehend the Sensitivity Time Control circuitry contained in a Radar set, or how it affects a Radar set's performance when long range settings are selected. When the technical data is applied to the Management explanation, the story does not hold water. This lack of technical knowledge by administrative types allow significant misrepresentations of technical systems operations to be accepted as fact, which is NOT the case. Tech-speak is not equivalent to legalize and never will be.

*As a side note; Sometimes I believe my coworkers and supervisors resent the fact that I possess such a high degree of troubleshooting skill. It was normal procedure to assign me to aircraft with malfunctions that other technicians had attempted to repair without success. Sometimes, up to as many as four technicians had worked the same problem without effecting the necessary repairs, creating multiple write ups for the same condition. Often, excuses have been made or stories have been told, that reflect a lack of knowledge, training or self application to resolve the issue, after I have restored an aircraft system to a fully operational state. While it may be embarrassing to them when this occurs, it leaves me feeling underappreciated and undervalued when my efforts are dismissed as, "that's your job, that's what you are supposed to do". It was their job too, they failed to do it, but they still

made the same wages. The longer I live and the more I deal with people like this, the more evident it becomes that, "The only reward for a good worker, is more work".*

*It is precisely this level of system complexity and required "out of the box" thinking that is missed by these penny pinching, Mechanic Minded Management types. This continued type of thinking will at best result in an untold amount of excessive maintenance man hours attempting to locate and resolve these types of issues or at worst result in the loss of more Air Crews and agency assets. These Mechanic Minded Management types, who refuse to acknowledge the HIGHLY TECHNICIAL NATURE of modern aircraft Avionic Systems (including the Flight Inspection Systems utilized to ensure a proper functioning NAS), instead view them in the simplistic opinions of the mechanic and insist that soon, the complex will be simple, that is stupid! Just step back for a moment and look around. Do you see anything that has gotten more simplistic in recent history? Yes, we have cell phones, computers and other devices, so communication and work is easier, but is the technology that makes it possible, simple in itself? How about all of the other simple things that came to mind? Does what makes them simple, reflect simplicity? It is exactly this ignoring of fact (**blatant ignorance**) which is hindering the efficiency and effectiveness of the FAA Aircraft Maintenance Workforce, and possibly other government workforces, by people unwilling to step into the present, acknowledging fact and utilizing/developing appropriate, civilian Management skills.*

3. I did, in fact, enter the Emergency Exit lighting failure into ILM as required. I also repaired the malfunction. Upon inspecting the logbook records of N96 *PRIOR* to my repair of the system, three separate logbook entries will be found. Not one *WAS ENTERED* into ILM as required, *AND* Robert Connor, Supervisor, worked and signed off each one. As to Mr. Kelley's assertions regarding established maintenance procedures, he is wrong! Charles Kelley has a very vivid imagination and interjects it into all most everything he says. He believes that constructing a convincing *sounding* answer is a good as the correct answer, but he is wrong. Each page in a logbook is sequentially numbered, that is true. Each page is *not* tracked in ILM as he states, if there has been no activity recorded on the page, no ILM entry is required. It is extremely easy to "lose" loose pages not attached to the logbook. I did not want any of the information submitted lost. ILM is designed to track *activities*, not pages. He has again, fabricated a story that entertains, based in partial fact, but is *not* reflective of fact. Unless he produces the page and paragraph concurring with his statements, it is a fabrication. The reason for entering the information into the logbook as I did, was due to the three previous attempts made by Robert Connor which failed to resolve the issue. Each of the three previous attempts of repair was *never* entered into ILM or tracked. Faulty Emergency Lighting Systems are a *grounding* item, they are considered critical systems. To treat this fault, the way it was, is a direct violation of the FARs. Alaska Airlines was fined over one million dollars, for leaving an aircraft with a faulty Emergency Lighting System in service for four days. You may say, "Well that's a passenger carrying operation, this isn't." I say, "FARs are FARs regardless. If you are under the FARs, you have no choice but to comply, regardless of the operation."

While we are the FAA, we are governed by and compelled to comply with the FARs, we are not exempt. What is needed is more training, development of better troubleshooting skills and Management with the required ethics and integrity to comply with the regulations we are under. Circumventing Federal Aviation Regulations, creating a culture incorporating criminal activity into daily job tasks and fostering unethical activities is not the answer, nor should be required of a workforce. There is no acceptable reasoning or justifications to be offered that can make this an acceptable practice.

4. In 2002, the Nose Wheel Landing Gear Strut on N57 was found to be damaged beyond limits by the maintenance team led by Tony Cardona.
Upon calling for a replacement strut, J.D. Bittle instructed the maintenance team of Tony Cardona to "install new actuator seals in the nose strut assembly and put it back in the aircraft." He also stated, "Do you know how much nitrogen we can buy for $25,000? (The cost of a replacement strut). We can service that strut for ten years with that much nitrogen!" David Osborne was the mechanic who attempted to "polish out" the gouges in the strut. John Ratterman was the mechanic who Post-It noted the maintenance manual for all of the applicable Nose Wheel Steering Operational Checks due because of any removal and/or replacement of a nose gear strut. Branch Manager Frank Bridges and Assistant Branch Manager J.D. Bittle refused an offer by Lee Jacobs, machinist, to examine the damaged nose strut of N57 with the proper equipment used to determine an out of tolerance condition. The strut was reassembled with new seals and reinstalled on the aircraft. Robert Connor was the Supervisor who removed the Post-It notes from the maintenance manual and disregarded the Nose Wheel Steering Operational Checks. The Maintenance Inspection Package paperwork was completed that night and the aircraft was released from Maintenance for a flight the next day. The Flight Crew attempted to taxi out for launch the following day, when the Air Crew detected problems with the Nose Wheel Steering and returned to the hanger, declared an aborted flight and wrote the problems up. I tried to contact Thomas Accardi, AVN 1, Aviation Systems Safety Program Director, the same day to inform him I was reporting the incident to the Fight Standards District Office as an Unsatisfactory Condition Report. I was unable to speak with Mr. Accardi, and was directed to Joseph Doubleday, AVN 2, by the office secretary. I informed him as to what was happening and what I was going to do. In return, he gave the information to Lavern Doktor, AVN 300, and Thomas Pickle, AVN 301. After returning from the Division Meeting conducted by Joseph Doubleday, AVN 2, Thomas Pickle, AVN 301, had the Nose Landing Gear Strut removed from N57 and disassembled for inspection by himself. That afternoon when I arrived at work for the swing shift, the damaged Nose Strut was marked very heavily with red marker, "Damaged beyond limits!" This *WAS NOT* the typical way of conducting business. Mr. Pickle, nor any Division or Assistant Division Manager has *EVER* been involved with the actual maintenance or inspection processes in the division. It was a *VERY SERIOUS* allegation against the Management Team, to attempt the forcible return of *UNSERVICEABLE EQUIPMENT* into service. Mr. Pickle, AVN 301 inspected the strut himself , to crucify me, if it was found to be serviceable. However, the strut was found to be unserviceable and replaced with the Nose Strut removed from N59. The damaged strut was replaced free of charge, under warranty by LearJet. It didn't cost the division a single cent to replace, but there

was a desire to forgo the replacement cost and return an unserviceable part to active service, by a member of this Management Team. Some 5 or 6 months later I received a letter from Mr. Pickle, stating the unserviceable condition of N57's Nose Strut had been discovered during normal maintenance activities. That **was not** the case, the aircraft had been released for service, *with* an unserviceable landing gear. Mr. Pickle's letter only led me to believe all interested/involved parties had been brought into complicity at that time.

5. In 2002, J.D. Bittle *DID* improperly direct Mark Adams to make a repair to a wing rib that is prohibited by the Manufactures Maintenance Manual. There seems to be some confusion as to which aircraft it was, at this point. The Federal Aviation Regulations specifically state that a repair or replacement procedure covered by the Aircraft Manufactures Maintenance Manual *CANNOT BE SUPERCEEDED* by another publication. I do not care how many times it has been inspected, or by whom, it was not in compliance with the Manufactures Maintenance Manual at the time it was performed. A hundred repetitions of the same lie, does not make it a truth. The Aircraft Manufactures Maintenance Manual instructions were superseded with another publication, another FAR violation. The aircraft in question can be easily identified by noting J.D. Bittle's signature in the Corrective Action block.

6. This is *NOT* true. At a previous date, Mr. Murphy had been reprimanded for insubordination by a previous supervisor. Mr. Murphy made claims to his coworkers he refused to work on his Birthday. When February 4, 2005 came, Mr. Murphy did not show up for work and did not call in as required. Charles Kelley came out on the hanger floor several times during February 4, 2005, asking if any of us had heard from him, the answer was always no. Charles Kelley took offence to this and reprimanded Mr. Murphy for AWOL in February 2005, for not calling in or showing up for work on February 4, 2005. I do not know how many of these reprimands given by Charles Kelley were in written format, but I suspect most were of a verbal nature. Mr. Murphy was the *heir apparent* to the Supervisors Throne in the Anchorage Maintenance Line Station. He had been expected to assume the Throne by Charles Kelley and James Cochran, when Charles Kelley vacated the Throne. Every effort was made to dismiss and down play any inappropriate action on Mr. Murphy's part. He was a recipient of very blatant favoritism by both Charles Kelley and James Cochran. He never received the disciplinary action his actions warranted, as an employee.

RE: Foot Note #3.
Flight Standards aircraft N18 *WAS* flown for an extended time in an "out of rig" condition. Robert Connor *IS* part of the Management Team and is the person who disregarded the "out of rig" condition. The out of rig condition was not addressed until Michael Casey, Flight Standards Fleet Manager, confronted me with a complaint about the condition. I asked Robert Connor why he had not taken the report seriously and his response was that had overheard the pilots talking about two or three other aircraft with the same condition, each requiring a different amount of pitch trim in order to launch and that *he did not think* they knew what they were talking about. It is NOT Robert Connor's OR anyone else's place to disregard or fail

to take the appropriate maintenance actions in conjunction with a Pilot entered discrepancy, based on what THEY think. These Pilots are the people operating the aircraft, not Robert Connor. All of this can be verified by talking to Michael Casey, Greg Bousie, and Mike Boler. Mike Boler was assigned to Hanger 9 to oversee and ensure AVN Maintenance properly addressed each Maintenance Item written up by Flight Standards Pilots. This assignment was a direct result of my interfacing with Michael Casey on Flight Standards Aircraft Maintenance issues, providing detailed information and photographs of the slip shod maintenance being performed on Flight Standards aircraft.

RE: Foot Note #6.
Mr. Murphy's quadriplegic condition is not at issue here and has no bearing on this matter. He is a quadriplegic by his own doing. It was his abusive, wild, alcoholic behavior that put him where he is today. The only bearing it has as far as this is concerned, is the fact he was wild and abusive, on and off the job. He often came to work bragging of drinking three or 4 cases of beer and 2 or 3 bottles of hard liquor a weekend, getting on his snow machine and racing 90 mph on a frozen lake, or some other equally dangerous stunt. Dan Murphy was tempting death at every corner. Dan was a bully that abused everything within his sight, men, women, minorities, you name it, and he had a deep contempt for all of them. None of the people he shared his hatred with deserved it, but they got it anyway. He was like Charles Kelley, a lying, backstabbing, vindictive, self-serving brat that tried to manipulate everything to serve himself. I have compassion for his condition, but I try to stay focused on the brighter side of this tragedy. I am glad God let him live and presented him an opportunity to grow, mature, and learn how to respect those women and minorities he is now dependent upon to help him with his life. I hope he really can learn to appreciate others regardless of their race or sex. I hope he takes the opportunity to reconcile with his mother and sister before the opportunity passes by. I sincerely hope he can mature and grow, instead of becoming more hate filled and bitter.

RE: Comments made on Dan Wheelers behalf.
Dan Wheeler and I have been coworkers for 16 years. That does not mean I agree with everything Dan does or the motivation that drives him to some of the things he is willing to do to gain acceptance. As my Team lead, and prodded by his Supervisor, Frank Smith, Dan has attempted to direct me to perform illegal, non-conformal Ramp Calibrations and other violations of FARs and GMM requirements, for the sake of expediency. I have always refused to comply with those requests. I take the work that I perform *very* seriously, in fact, probably more seriously than many of my coworkers. I realize how quickly things can turn bad, so I approach my duties with the utmost safety consciousness I can muster. I *will not* circumvent FARs or knowingly, willingly perform any action that is of a questionable nature on an aircraft. I never have, too much is at stake. I am *acutely aware* that **nothing** falls into the sky, but that aircraft can fall **from** the sky, and I do not take that lightly. It is an absolute shame the only time this organization tightens up is after tragedy strikes, even then it is short lived. Although it is a common belief in Supervision and Management circles, that 100% operational aircraft do not exist, I know

that to be untrue. I have produced too many 100% operational aircraft in my lifetime to accept that attitude.

RE: The last note worthy item.
The expenditure of money is a very big thing to AVN 300. Every corner is cut in an effort to reduce spending. While you say that is what should be done during times of tight budget, you are overlooking the fact that AVN 300 is a Franchised Organization. Moneys are pledged as "bonus" money for completing mod's, checks or other activities ahead of schedule. At the end of the year, that bonus money is divided by the number of employees and distributed as a yearend bonus. That is good, and bad. The bonus money that is pledged to the completion of activities comes directly from money that is saved by non-expenditures and by the man hours not utilized. By buying the cheapest parts available, omitting parts like back shells, overlooking the repair of what mechanics believe are unnecessary Avionic Systems, attempting to force non-serviceable units in to use, forgoing a little training here and there, are all targets of opportunity to mechanics in management. For what, a bigger bonus at the end of the year? Isn't that cool! I can act as if I *AM* an entrepreneur running my own personal business, making profits and saving money, getting a fatter and fatter bonus each year. That is not right. It serves as the wrong motivation. It leads to very unwise and dangerous cost cutting efforts (dictums by Managers), for nothing more than a few dollars in yearly bonus. It also serves to reduce the quality of the delivered product, due to the short cuts taken during the process. I have found non-functioning systems on aircraft just released from modification or scheduled maintenance checks. The cause of the non-functioning systems range from connectors left disconnected to improper terminations, to faulty components in systems signed off as functioning just a day or two before. The aircraft work packages have been completed and signed off, but the work has not. To compromise safety and reliability for the sake of a few bonus dollars is too self-serving for me. The bonuses are usually less than two percent of a person's normal wages and would be better utilized for much needed training. It would be far more expedient to expect AND extract, an equal amount of work from EACH and EVERY employee. That is not done at present. There are employees that work harder avoiding the work they are being paid to do, than it takes to do it. There are employees who believe they were hired to entertain supervisors and managers and are allowed to do just that. Management appears to appreciate a circus atmosphere over a working atmosphere, which serves no purpose other than to demoralize the adults that take their duties and responsibilities as seriously as they should be taken. Repeated instances of overlooking lazy, work-dodging, poor performance, has led to very low morale. These hangers and organization are no more Joe Doubleday's personal property to do with how he pleases, than the Anchorage hanger and assets were Dan Murphy's to do with how he pleased. These are just two examples of people in the government who claim ownership of government assets for themselves.
Contrary to the popular beliefs held in Washington D.C., that the workforce needs to be reformed, it is the lack luster performance of Management that needs reforming. It is the repetition of poor Management and Supervision decisions, a lack of ability to conform to already established work policies and guidance, that has led to undesired workforce performance. Conformity to principles and policies of fair, equitable, ethical treatment of the workforce, without the unfair, inequitable, un-

ethical favoritism currently practiced by Supervisors and Management would be met favorably by the work force. A demonstrable adherence to these policies, ensuring a level field for all employees, removing those truly deserving of replacement, would go a very long way to ensure an efficient and effective workforce. My thoughts are, "If you are unable to Lead, inspire and reward your employees with a work place free of favoritism, intimidation, with fair treatment for all and more training opportunities across the board, you need to leave the organization, retire or just go somewhere else".

As you can tell, I am not in compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act. I will not limit full disclosure of information for the sake of saving paper. Too many important pieces of information are being left out, skewing reports and investigations in an undesirable direction and leaving them hollow, in name of reduced paperwork. I do not relish blowing the whistle on this organization, I am proud to be an Avionic Technician working in the interests of the flying public. I was proud to be an FAA employee, until this gang of hoodlums came into power and turned my place of employment into a corrupt den of liars, thieves and criminals. I would prefer the situation never existed, but not every person feels compelled to do what is correct. I wish more effort was taken to ensure these things did not happen, that Quality and Excellence were the rule, but complacency is the rule, not the exception in AVN 300. If I think it is important enough to report, I guarantee I will not be skimpy on details. This IS the first time in eighteen years, I have taken my complaints outside the agency, so you can bet I take these issues very seriously. I wish someone else would. Yes, I have repeated the same information at times, but hopefully you will grasp the seriousness of these issues. Thank you for your tolerance.

Conclusion

It is obvious to me the former ASIs that have, and still occupy the Division Manager's position, have used their influence with the ASIs responsible for administering the Maintenance Certificate of AVN 300, to reduce and mitigate the seriousness of violations of FARs I have reported, through manipulation and compromise. So much, in fact, that the UCRs I filed against the Division have vanished into thin air. Also, due to the same influence pedaling, I believe this investigation has not been conducted with an objective interest in the truth or facts of the allegations. I believe it has been an exercise in interagency politics and void of any serious regard of the allegations. The implication that FAA Managers and Supervisors are more trustworthy than any other employees, have the right to endanger other employees lives through their negligence, and the inherent ramifications to those non-management employees questioned, exemplifies the need for truly independent investigations of matters of a serious nature. This report Mr. Calvin L. Scovel III is so proud of and attests to its validity, is nothing more than an exercise in wasting taxpayer money. It is a sham and a farce, without merit, and should be treated as such.

Sincerely,

Michael L. Dunkin

Michael L. Dunkin