Aviation Safety Inspector

Re: OSC File Nos. DI-20-000827- DI-20-000863, DI-21-000350, and DI-21-000353

Dear Mrs. Bradley;

I have spent a considerable amount of time reviewing the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Report of Investigation, which was submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Transportation. I request that this letter be added to the record and be made public.

I would note at the outset, that the number of employees raising concerns about the Atlas/Polar operation should be giving both the DOT and the FAA some concern. If current and former employees of the Certificate Management Team (CMT) felt comfortable speaking about their experience about overseeing the certificate, it would be clear that there are significant and systemic oversight issues. Atlas has far too much influence over the determinations of the CMT.

One reason why Atlas has too much influence is because FAA management (at all levels as far as I can tell) is willing to do the bidding of Atlas when it seeks to remove an employee from oversight of its operation. My story is a cautionary tale in that regard. I earnestly raised safety concerns about Atlas’ operation. Atlas then made baseless allegations against me arguing that I was holding them to too high a standard. The FAA then took the complaints made by Atlas verbatim and attempted to discipline me for what it (the FAA) described as “negligence.” It also attempted to please Atlas by removing me from the Atlas certificate. In the letter removing me from the certificate, the FAA said it was necessary because I had caused a “lack of trust” between the FAA and Atlas. This assertion shows that the FAA is attempting to treat Atlas like a client rather than a regulated entity. I stand by all of the safety issues I raised while on the Atlas certificate.

To that end, I want to clarify that the items identified as being investigated in this report do not address in any substance the many items I have raised as a safety concern. When charging me with “negligence”, the Agency identified seven “specifications”. Some of those specifications did not involve me at all but rather a different inspector. The ones that did pertain to me are not addressed in this report. However, they all address significant safety concerns that I raised in accordance with the duties of my position. Atlas then complained to the FAA about the safety concerns I had raised. These complaints were made due to my diligence in holding Atlas Air accountable for complying with the Code of federal Regulations (CFR) but then falsely labeled by the FAA as negligence.

Prior to proposing discipline, the FAA proceeded to investigate the complaints made by Atlas, and stated that “some of the charges were partially substantiated”. These charges that were “partially substantiated” were also strictly based on what was conveyed to the investigators by Atlas Air. At no point was I asked specifics about the complaints brought against me. Instead I was asked broad and general questions. Upon completion of this “investigation” my local management team, again with no evidence, proceeded to remove me from the Atlas/Polar certificate Management Team (CMT), and then proceeded to propose a suspension of 14 days with no pay. I continue to contend that these actions had
a chilling effect on all employees associated with the Atlas certificate and perhaps the certificate Management Office (CMO) at large. The actions taken by the FAA made clear to employees that their jobs are more secure if they don’t raise safety concerns than if they do. That has a devastating effect on the safety culture we are supposed to be promoting.

I submitted a rebuttal to my local management team in which I provided actual and documented proof that Atlas Air made false and slanderous claims about my work on the Atlas/Polar CMT. This proof included the actual documents which I reviewed, emails, counter points to the Atlas claims, and to this day I have no idea if my rebuttal was even read by any member of management. None of this is reviewed in this report.

Atlas Air has for years skirted and openly violated the CFRs, myself and another Aviation Safety Inspector (ASI) were the ones who identified a majority of these findings. The other ASI was also charged with the same things that were brought against myself. The primary goal of these charges was to have myself and the other ASI removed from the CMT, thus reducing the amount of findings against Atlas/Polar Air.

I would also like to add that this entire Whistle Blower process was very disheartening and will probably cause me to never file again. There is an abundance of evidence that shows Atlas/Polar Air are consistently violating CFRs, and their own manuals, with little to no action by the FAA. The legitimate fear of retaliation by Atlas and FAA management makes it likely that these violations will continue to be tolerated.

Thank you,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Aviation Safety Inspector