

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
6995 Springfield Center Drive  
Springfield, VA 22150



Transportation  
Security  
Administration

July 24, 2024

Hampton Dellinger  
Special Counsel  
Office of Special Counsel

RE: OSC File No. DI-23-000586

Dear Mr. Dellinger:

The attached report is in response to the July 20, 2023, referral of the above-captioned matter to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regarding a disclosure received by your office. The Secretary referred this inquiry to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for an investigation and response. The Secretary's authority to approve this report has been delegated to the TSA Administrator.<sup>1</sup> The Secretary may delegate his "functions to any officer, employee, or organizational unit of the Department" unless delegation is specifically restricted by law.<sup>2</sup> The statutory authority for the Secretary's function of approving and signing reports of investigation to respond to referrals by OSC does not restrict the Secretary's authority to delegate that function.<sup>3</sup> I am the designated official authorized to oversee the investigation, take any appropriate action determined to be necessary in accordance with the statute, and sign and transmit the resulting investigation report.<sup>4</sup> The Department's findings are provided in the attached Report of Investigation (ROI).

OSC characterized Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) Transportation Security Manager (TSM) [REDACTED] disclosure as alleging that there was malfunctioning screening equipment at BOS. OSC requested that TSA investigate the following allegations:

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<sup>1</sup> See DHS Delegation No. 00002, DHS Delegation No. 00013, and TSA Management Directive No. 100.0.

<sup>2</sup> 6 U.S.C. § 112(b). "When a statute delegates authority to a federal officer or agency, subdelegation to a subordinate federal officer or agency is presumptively permissible absent affirmative evidence of a contrary congressional intent." *U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC*, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

<sup>3</sup> See 5 U.S.C. § 1213(d).

<sup>4</sup> See TSA Management Directive No. 100.0 which states "The Deputy Administrator reports directly to the Administrator and is authorized, in his/her own capacity and under his/her own title, to act for the Administrator and to perform any functions the Administrator is authorized to perform, including through delegation by the Administrator or a Management Directive."

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- The Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) machines at Boston Logan failed to detect known security threats during TSA officer training exercises;
- Boston TSA management and the Boston Federal Security Director (FSD) failed to investigate these potential security vulnerabilities; and
- Any additional or related allegations of wrongdoing discovered during the investigation of the foregoing allegations.

In response to OSC's request, the TSA Investigations Division conducted an investigation into the allegations raised by TSM [REDACTED]. Additionally, to provide background information on the AIT and the AIT algorithm, TSA invited the Acting Special Counsel, the Chief of the Disclosure Unit, and other OSC officials to TSA for a classified briefing. This briefing occurred on November 6, 2023.

The investigation determined that the AIT machines at BOS did not fail to detect known security threats during TSA officer training exercises and that BOS leadership conducted an immediate review of the incident and took appropriate actions in compliance with applicable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

Specifically, the investigation revealed that the training aid used by the officers during the training exercise [REDACTED] which was designed to be used as an overt training aid. The purpose of an overt training aid, [REDACTED], is for the screening workforce to gain an understanding of how an explosive can look and feel and is not intended to be used for screening by the AIT machine. This [REDACTED] was confirmed by the Transportation Security Explosives Laboratory to not be [REDACTED] that would cause the AIT machine to alarm; the material did not fall within the parameters that the AIT machine was designed to detect. Therefore, there was no failure to detect a known security threat when the TSOs took the replica through the AIT.

With regard to the allegation that BOS management and the FSD failed to investigate these potential security vulnerabilities, the investigation determined that BOS leadership took appropriate actions once notified of the alleged security vulnerability. Specifically, the AITs were taken out of service and ordered to be recalibrated in compliance with the Screening Policies SOP. Since the recalibration was successful, the AIT was put back into service. Additionally, although not required by SOP, BOS leadership requested a technician service the AIT machines to ensure they were working properly.

Please note that this report contains Sensitive Security Information (SSI) that is controlled under 49 C.F.R. Parts 15 and 1520, must be handled and protected accordingly, and cannot be publicly released. TSA's SSI office will conduct a review and redaction of the report for public release which will be forwarded to you as soon as possible. Per the request of OSC, all employees are

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referenced by position title in the ROI and OSC will be provided a key identifying employees by name and position.

If you require further information regarding these matters, please do not hesitate to contact [REDACTED], Assistant Chief Counsel, in the Office of Chief Counsel at 202-631-5716.

Sincerely,

**HOLLY E  
CANEVARI**

Holly Canevari  
Deputy Administrator

Digitally signed by  
HOLLY E CANEVARI  
Date: 2024.07.25  
15:34:40 -04'00'

cc: Melanie Harvey  
Executive Assistant Administrator  
Security Operations

Julie Scanlon  
Executive Assistant Administrator  
Enterprise Support


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

# SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

## Cover Sheet



For more information on handling SSI, contact [SSI@dhs.gov](mailto:SSI@dhs.gov).

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Transportation  
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Administration

# PRIVACY ACT COVER SHEET

**WARNING:** These documents contain information subject to the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, as amended. Please ensure appropriate measures are taken to safeguard these records.



**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION  
TSA INVESTIGATIONS**

**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION**

**CASE NUMBER:** I23-00576

**TITLE:** Security Screening Equipment Vulnerability

**CROSS REFERENCED CASES:** N/A

**SUBJECT(S):** N/A

**ALLEGATION(S):** 5 U.S.C. §1213 allegations – (1) The Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) machines at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) failed to detect known security threats during TSA officer training exercises; and (2) Boston TSA management and the Boston Federal Security Director (FSD) failed to investigate these potential security vulnerabilities.

**PERIOD OF INVESTIGATION:** June 6, 2023 – May 31, 2024

**CASE STATUS:** Closed

**INVESTIGATED BY:** Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] and Deputy Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED]

**REPORT BY:** Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED]

Digitally signed by  
[REDACTED]  
Date: 2024.06.27  
09:41:00 -04'00'

[REDACTED] – Field Operations  
Assistant Director  
TSA Investigations

June 27, 2024  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

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- ☐ Anti-Harassment Program
- ☐ Other \_\_\_\_\_
- ☒ File

**Report of Investigation (ROI) Handling:** The ROI and information contained herein is subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552A, Public Law 93-579) and thus may not be released outside official channels. This material must be safeguarded from unauthorized disclosure, and should not be left unattended or discussed with unauthorized persons, and must be retained in a security container when not in use.

This report is provided to management to take appropriate action. Outside of the official adjudicative process this report or any portion thereof may not be released to the subject of the investigation or any individual identified herein, or their representatives, or reproduced without the written consent of TSA Investigations.



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### **Origin of Case:**

On July 25, 2023, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Investigations (INV) received a referral from TSA's Chief Counsel's office (CC) indicating that the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Inspector General declined to investigate the Whistleblower Disclosure, Office of Special Counsel (OSC) File No. DI-23-000586, and referred it to TSA INV to investigate. **(Exhibit 1).**

Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) TSA employee, Transportation Security Manager (TSM) 1, disclosed allegations that AIT machines at BOS failed to detect a known security threat during Transportation Security Officer (TSO) training exercises and BOS TSA management and the Boston FSD failed to investigate these potential security vulnerabilities.

### **Summary of the information with respect to which the investigation was initiated:**

The whistleblower disclosure forwarded to INV is related to the alleged failure of the BOS AIT to detect a known threat, and the failure of BOS leadership to investigate the potential security vulnerability.

### **Description of the of the investigation:**

INV interviewed the whistleblower, TSM 1, Federal Security Director (FSD) 1, Deputy Federal Security Director (DFSD) 1, Assistant Federal Security Director-Screening (AFSD-S) 1, Supervisory Transportation Security Specialist-Explosives (STSS-E) 1, Transportation Security Specialist-Explosives (TSS-E) 1, and AIT Program Manager (PM) 1.

INV also reviewed the Screening Policies Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), and provided [REDACTED] training aid to the Transportation Security Explosives Laboratory in Atlantic City, NJ for testing.

### **Summary of any evidence obtained from the investigation:**

The investigation revealed that BOS used training aids to enhance threat detection training provided to members of the screening workforce. The training aid at issue was a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to be used as an overt training aid to increase officer awareness and develop an understanding of the myriad of ways in which an explosive can look and feel. The [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was designed to be used in an overt manner, and was confirmed by the Transportation Security Explosives Laboratory to not [REDACTED] for which the AIT was designed to identify. Additionally, the investigation revealed that BOS leadership took appropriate actions

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with respect to looking into the alleged security vulnerability, in compliance with applicable SOP, after being informed of the potential security vulnerability.

**Listing of any violation or apparent violation of any law, rule, or regulation:**

INV found no violation or apparent violation of any law, rule or regulation.

**A description of an action taken or planned as a result of the investigation:**

No action was taken given the investigation determined that the [REDACTED] used by BOS employees to test the AITs was not [REDACTED] for which the AIT was designed to identify, and further, that BOS leadership took appropriate actions regarding the alleged security vulnerability, and acted in accordance with the applicable SOP, when notified by the whistleblower of the potential security vulnerability.

**Allegation #1:**

The AIT machines at BOS failed to detect known security threats during TSA officer training exercises.

**Findings 1:**

On March 14, 2023, INV received a hotline complaint (INV HL23-00770) from BOS TSM 1. Separately, on July 25, 2023, INV received a referral from TSA's CC regarding OSC File No. DI-23-00586. In both instances, TSM 1 alleged that on March 11, 2023, while serving as the TSM at BOS Terminal E, he responded to the security checkpoint at the request of a subordinate Supervisory Transportation Security Officer (STSO) and was informed that a TSS-E performed a training demonstration with a Lead Transportation Security Officer (LTSO). They utilized an overt [REDACTED] training aid from the "Pelican Case" training tool kit. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After receiving a full explanation of what occurred, the TSM initiated a conference call with his immediate superior, Deputy Assistant Federal Security Director – Screening (DAFSD-S) 1, TSS-E 1 and AFSD-S 1 and expressed his concerns about the failure of the AIT machines to detect the anomaly. **(Exhibit 2)**

INV interviewed TSS-E 1 on October 25, 2023, who stated that he was working at the Terminal E checkpoint handling an explosive alarm resolution on a passenger's property. He stated that after resolution of the alarm, he was approached by LTSO 1 and informed that the AIT machine was

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not alarming on a [REDACTED] training device [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He further stated to the LTSO that the training aids are primarily used for x-ray and pat-down training. TSS-E 1 informed INV that the AIT machine did alarm when the LTSO [REDACTED] in the AIT machine. **(Exhibit 3)**

INV interviewed AFSD-S 1, who stated that on the evening of March 11, 2023, she was informed by TSM 1 that three (3) AIT machines at BOS Terminal E failed to detect an anomaly on a LTSO during the use of an overt training device [REDACTED] during targeted pat-down screening search training. AFSD-S 1 stated that TSM 1 believed there was a software issue which caused the AIT machines to fail to recognize the anomaly the TSOs expected to be generated when they placed the overt training device [REDACTED] AFSD-S 1 informed INV that BOS was awaiting a software update for the AIT machines which would allow for a gender neutral option when scanning passengers. This software update was not initiated or completed on the AIT machines in BOS Terminal E. However, AFSD-S 1 informed INV that this software update had no bearing on the ability of the AIT machine to recognize threats given the overt training device, [REDACTED] was not intended to be scanned through the AIT machines, rather, it was designed to give the TSOs increased awareness of the packaging of various explosives by being able to hold, observe and feel the item. **(Exhibit 4)**

AFSD-S 1 stated the overt training device utilized during the training exercise was a locally produced training device that was designed to provide BOS TSOs additional security awareness training. This overt training device, designed by BOS TSS-E subject matter experts, was designed to give TSOs the ability to observe, feel and touch [REDACTED] but was not designed or authorized as an official AIT testing device or AIT training device; it was not intended or authorized to be scanned through the AIT. The overt training device [REDACTED] [REDACTED] were securely contained inside a Pelican case and both were initially introduced to all BOS TSOs and management staff via email in January and February of 2023, along with a fact sheet and specific instructions on how both devices would be used in training. As stated in the emails dated January 19 and February 15, 2023, the intent [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was to bolster BOS' Threat Detection Action Plan. The goal was to provide every security officer an opportunity to physically and visually inspect both historical and trending threat devices. These emails reiterated that the training materials, to include the [REDACTED] were to be used in an overt manner to increase officer awareness and develop a healthy respect for the ways in which an explosive looks and feels. **(Refer to Exhibit 4)**

INV interviewed DFSD 1 who stated that the overt training items, [REDACTED] were not authorized testing items; they were not intended to be screened through the AIT machines. She also stated that these training items were designed to afford BOS TSOs an opportunity to observe and feel what an explosive would look/feel like during screening. The items were training devices for individual awareness only and that the AIT machine did not fail to recognize them because they were not intended to be recognized by the AIT machine. **(Exhibit 5)**

INV interviewed FSD 1 who also stated that the training item used to test the AIT was not created for the AIT, rather, it was only to be used in training exercises wherein the trainee can observe and feel the item which was clearly indicated in the email instructions that accompanied the training aid. **(Exhibit 10)**

INV interviewed STSS-E 1 on November 27, 2023. STSS-E 1 provided no additional pertinent information about the creation of the training aid [REDACTED] and was unsure who in T&D provided the item to the airport for training purposes. STSS-E 1 also stated that he did not know whether the Training Aid [REDACTED] would or would not show up in the AIT machine as an anomaly. **(Exhibit 6)**

INV interviewed AIT PM 1. In his initial statement dated January 29, 2024, after being provided a picture of the [REDACTED] used by BOS TSOs, he stated that the training aid appeared to be [REDACTED] not designed to be used to test the AIT. PM 1 indicated [REDACTED] would most likely not produce an alarm. **(Exhibit 7)**

After speaking with PM 1, on January 3, 2024, INV delivered the [REDACTED] training aid to the Transportation Security Explosive Laboratory in Atlantic City, NJ, for testing. PM 1 stated that the Transportation Security Explosive Laboratory inspection of the article provided by BOS showed severe degradation [REDACTED]

As a result, [REDACTED] the AIT machine to alarm.  
**(Refer to Exhibit 7)**

PM Mastin further stated the training aids provided to the field are very old and none of the simulants in the training kit were ever designed to test the AIT machines, rather, they were *WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.*

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designed to test an X-Ray based system particularly for Advanced Technology X-Ray which was deployed in the field prior to the AIT machines. **(Refer to Exhibit 7)**

### **Allegation 2:**

The BOS FSD and senior leadership failed to investigate the potential security vulnerabilities.

### **Findings 2:**

INV interviewed AFSD-S 1 on October 24, 2023, who stated that she was informed on the evening of March 11, 2023, by TSM 1, that three (3) AIT machines at BOS Terminal E failed to detect an anomaly during a TSO training exercise. AFSD-S 1 stated that these three (3) AIT machines located at BOS Terminal E were shut down by TSM 1. **(Refer to Exhibit 4)**

AFSD-S 1 stated that she conducted multiple conference calls on the evening of March 11, 2023, to ascertain what caused the AIT machines at BOS Terminal E to fail to detect an anomaly during the focused pat down training evolution conducted by the TSOs. AFSD-S 1 stated that the conference calls included the following; TSM 1, TSS-E Morrison, DAFSD-S 1 and Deputy Assistant Federal Security Director – Threat Assessment Programs (DAFSD-TAP) 1. **(Refer to Exhibit 4)**

***Agent's Note:** The TSS-E program is part of TAP and therefor under DAFSD-TAP 1's purview.*

AFSD 1 stated during her review of what occurred, she ascertained that the TSOs utilized an overt training device [REDACTED] which was not intended to be scanned through the AIT machine and was not expected to elicit an anomaly or alert when scanned through the AIT machine. She further indicated that the AIT Machines did not receive a recent software

update as was asserted by TSM 1; the software update planned for the AIT machines would allow for a gender neutral option to be applied when scanning passengers, and had no bearing on the exercise being performed. AFSD-S 1 also indicated that the AIT machines were calibrated at the beginning of the shift per the Screening Policies SOP, Chapter 11, Equipment Requirements, Section 2, AIT, which also requires that if there is an Invalid test, the AIT must be re-calibrated and if the AIT is successfully re-calibrated, it can be placed back in service. An invalid test according to the Field Evaluation Testing (FET) Program Handbook is when a threat item does not cause the screening technology to alarm as intended by the test. Based on this information, AFSD-S 1 instructed TSM 1 to re-calibrate the AIT machines, and if successful, place them back into service. **(Refer to Exhibit 4)**

AFSD-S 1 stated, prior to conducting a review, she requested a Priority One ticket be initiated, which would ensure immediate technician service for the AIT machines. After completion of her

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discussions with all parties involved in the incident and a review of the facts surrounding the incident on March 11, 2023, the AIT equipment was re-calibrated according to SOP and she downgraded the request to a Priority Two. AFSD-S 1 maintained the technician request out of an abundance of caution. AFSD-S 1 further stated that the priority two tickets were initiated and each AIT machine was checked and cleared by a contractor AIT technician on March 13, 2023 at approximately 4:15 a.m.; approximately thirty-two hours later. **(Refer to Exhibit 4)**

INV interviewed DFSD 1 on October 25, 2023, who stated she was aware of the steps taken by AFSD-S 1 on the night of March 11, 2023. DFSD 1 stated that AFSD-S 1 attempted to notify her on March 11, 2023, but due to the time of the call, she was not awake to answer the telephone. DFSD 1 stated that she met with AFSD-S 1 in person on Monday, March 13, 2023. DFSD 1 was aware AFSD-S 1 also contacted FSD 1. **(Refer to Exhibit 5)**

DFSD 1 stated the BOS senior leadership team followed all protocols required by the Screening Policies SOP, Chapter 11. DFSD 1 explained that the protocols when a screening operator received an invalid result during testing, the SOP was to conduct a re-calibration of the AIT machines, which BOS did. **(Refer to Exhibit 5)**

In his statement, FSD 1 reiterated that BOS leadership followed applicable SOP by recalibrating the AITs upon learning of the alleged security vulnerability, and as a precaution, a P2 maintenance ticket was opened. Approximately 36 hours later, an AIT Technician evaluated and cleared the AITs. **(Refer to Exhibit 10)**

AFSD-S 1 stated that on April 19, 2023, she set up a meeting with TSM 1 and STSS-E 1 to discuss the overt training items and their appropriate usage. She stated that at this meeting, STSS-E 1 provided an overview of the training items located in the training Pelican case. She also stated that STSS-E 1 explained the training items intended use was outlined in the guidance email sent to all BOS staff in January and February 2023. The training materials, to include the [REDACTED], were to be used in an overt manner to increase officer awareness and develop a healthy respect for the ways in which an explosive looks and feels **(Refer to Exhibit 4)**

AFSD-S 1 stated that she emphasized to TSM 1 that the items in the Pelican training case were not designed to be utilized as an authorized AIT testing item, but rather as a visual and tactile reference for all TSOs. During the meeting AFSD-S 1 stated that STSS-E 1, TSM 1 and herself discussed layers of security, equipment limitations and following SOPs. AFSD-S 1 stated that at the conclusion of the meeting, she asked TSM 1 if he had any additional concerns and he stated that he had no additional concerns. **(Refer to Exhibit 4)**

### **OTHER INVESTIGATIVE ASPECTS**

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***Agent's Note:** The BOS [REDACTED] training aid was delivered to the Transportation Security Explosive Laboratory in Atlantic City NJ on January 3, 2024 for testing. Testing of the [REDACTED] training aid was completed on February 24, 2024.*

Evidence Listing/Disposition Status:

1. [REDACTED]. Currently at Transportation Security Explosive Laboratory in Atlantic City NJ. **(Exhibit 8)**

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<b>EXHIBITS</b>	
<b>Exhibit Number</b>	<b>Description</b>
1	Memorandum of Interview or Activity (MOI/A) of case origination, dated November 28, 2023.
2	MOIA of Original Hotline Complaint dated March 14, 2023.
3	MOI of TSS-E 1, dated October 25, 2023.
4	MOI of AFSD-S 1, dated October 24, 2023.
5	MOI of DFSD 1, dated October 25, 2023.
6	MOI of STSS-E 1, dated November 27, 2023.
7	MOI of PA 1, dated January 29, 2024.
8	MOA of Replica Sheet Explosive Testing.
9	MOI of TSM 1, dated February 7, 2024.
10	MOI of FSD 1, dated April 25, 2024.

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Witness Key

TSM 1 - [REDACTED]  
AFSD-S 1 - [REDACTED]  
DFSD 1 - [REDACTED]  
FSD 1 - [REDACTED]  
STSS-E 1 - [REDACTED]  
TSS-E 1 - [REDACTED]  
DAFSD-S 1 - [REDACTED]  
PM 1 - [REDACTED]  
LTSO 1 - [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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# Exhibit

# 1

**SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**



**TSA INVESTIGATIONS  
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY**

Type of Activity: <input type="checkbox"/> Personal Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Records Review <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other	Date: June 6, 2023
Activity or Interview of: Case Origination	Conducted by: Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] Special Agent [REDACTED] Philadelphia Field Office, Investigations  Location of Interview/Activity: Transportation Security Administration, Alternate Worksite

**Subject Matter/Remarks**

On March 14, 2023, Transportation Security Administration, Investigations received a referral from Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. The referral cited a complaint by Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) Transportation Security Manager [REDACTED], which stated, "Security screening equipment malfunction. Ongoing use of improperly functioning security, screening equipment despite reporting and [sic] known concerns." Specifically, [REDACTED] cited three Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) machines at BOS Terminal E failed to alarm on a Lead Transportation Security Officer who cleared the AIT after he placed a "[REDACTED] training aid from the 'Pelican Case' training tool kit"

**Agent's Note:** See attachment 1 Memorandum from Principal Deputy Chief Counsel [REDACTED], Office of Chief Counsel Titled Whistleblower Disclosure, OSC File No. DI-23-000586; dated July 25, 2023

Case Number I23-00576	Case Title: Security screening equipment malfunction
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Revised May 10, 2022

**WARNING:** This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.

# Attachment

# 1

# SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION



Transportation  
Security  
Administration

## MEMORANDUM

To: Kimberley Thompson  
Assistant Administrator  
TSA Investigations

From: [REDACTED]  
Principal Deputy Chief Counsel  
Office of Chief Counsel

Date: July 25, 2023

Subject: Whistleblower Disclosure, OSC File No. DI-23-000586

Chief Counsel's office has become aware of a whistleblower disclosure filed with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC), which alleges that TSA may have engaged in conduct that constitutes a substantial and specific danger to public safety. The specific allegations made by the whistleblower, a Transportation Security Manager (TSM) assigned to Screening Operations at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS), are described in the attached letter from OSC to Secretary Mayorkas. According to OSC, the allegations to be investigated are: (1) the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) machines at Boston Logan failed to detect known security threats during TSA officer training exercises; (2) Boston TSA management and the Boston Federal Security Director (FSD) failed to investigate these potential security vulnerabilities; and (3) any additional or related allegations of wrongdoing discovered during the investigation of the foregoing allegation.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 1213, the Special Counsel has determined that there is a substantial likelihood that the information provided discloses a substantial and specific danger to public safety. Consequently, the agency is required to conduct an investigation of the allegations and prepare a report for the Special Counsel. 5 U.S.C. § 1213(c).

On July 21, 2023 the DHS Office of General Counsel (OGC) informed us that the DHS Office of Inspector General has declined the opportunity to investigate this matter. Therefore, TSA Investigations is required to conduct an investigation.

OSC requires that the investigation include an interview of the whistleblowers. In addition, the report of investigation must include:

**WARNING:** This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 1S and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 1S and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 1S and 1520.


## SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

- (1) a summary of the information with respect to which the investigation was initiated;
- (2) a description of the conduct of the investigation;
- (3) a summary of any evidence obtained from the investigation;
- (4) a listing of any violation or apparent violation of any law, rule or regulation; and
- (5) a description of an action taken or planned as a result of the investigation, such as:
  - a. changes in agency rules, regulations or practices;
  - b. the restoration of any aggrieved employee;
  - c. disciplinary action against any employee; and
  - d. referral to the Attorney General of any evidence of criminal violation.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 1213(e), OSC must transmit a copy of the report to the complainant, unless it contains evidence of a criminal violation, which has been referred to the Attorney General. I note that ultimately OSC will provide the report, among other things, to the President and the congressional committees with jurisdiction over DHS/TSA.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Assistant Chief Counsel Sarah Grafton, who may be reached at (571) 439-9735. Please also keep her apprised of the status of this investigation so that she may inform the DHS OGC and OSC of developments, as appropriate.

Sincerely,



-- Digitally signed by

Date: 2023.07.25  
11:07:34 -04'00'

Principal Deputy Chief Counsel

Attachment (1): OSC Referral Letter

cc: Holly Canevari  
Acting Deputy Administrator

*WARNING:* This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.

# Exhibit

# 2



**SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**



**TSA INVESTIGATIONS  
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY**

Type of Activity: <input type="checkbox"/> Personal Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Records Review <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other	Date: March 14, 2023
Activity or Interview of:  Transportation Security Manager [REDACTED] original Hotline compliant Reference HL23-00770	Conducted by: Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] Philadelphia Field Office, Investigations  Location of Interview/Activity: 2 International Plaza Drive Philadelphia, PA 19113

**Subject Matter/Remarks**

On March 14, 2023, Transportation Security Administration, Investigations Hotline received a memorandum from Transportation Security Manager [REDACTED] reference Advanced Imagery Technology Performance Deficiencies at the TSA International Security Checkpoint (ECHO2) at BOS-Logan International Airport.

*Agent's Note: Memorandum from [REDACTED] emailed to the TSA Investigations Hotline compliant program dated March 14, 2023, see attachment 2.*

Case Number I23-00576	Case Title: Security screening equipment malfunction
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Revised May 10, 2022

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# Attachment 2



## MEMORANDUM

TO: TSA Investigations Hotline Complaint Program (HL23-00770)

FROM: [REDACTED], TSM (Transportation Security Manager)

RE: The International Security Checkpoint at TSA BOS-LOGAN Int'l Airport /

AIT Performance Deficiencies

DATE: 14 MARCH 2023

I am writing concerning performance deficiencies I observed in the 3 AIT units at the TSA International Security Checkpoint ("ECHO2") at BOS-LOGAN International Airport.

On SAT, March 11, 2023 at approximately 1900 while on duty and serving as the TSM in Terminal E at BOS-LOGAN International Airport, I responded to the ECHO2 Security Checkpoint at the request of a subordinate STSO of mine. I was informed that TSS-E [REDACTED] was performing a training demonstration with LTSO [REDACTED] utilizing a sheet explosive training aid from the "Pelican Case" training tool kit. This [REDACTED] training aid was [REDACTED] of LTSO [REDACTED]. LTSO [REDACTED] was then scanned in each of the 3 AIT units at ECHO2 and none of the AIT units detected what should have been [REDACTED].

Each of the 3 AIT Units cleared LTSO [REDACTED] without showing any alarms [REDACTED] explosive training aid had been placed.

After receiving a full explanation of what had occurred, I initiated a conference call with my immediate superior, Deputy AFSD-Screening [REDACTED].

After being briefed, Deputy [REDACTED] then initiated a Bridge Conference Call through the Boston Security Coordination Center in which I, Deputy [REDACTED], TSS-E [REDACTED] and AFSD [REDACTED] all participated.

I described in detail the problem encountered by TSS-E [REDACTED] in the training he had conducted in each of the 3 AIT units at the ECHO2 Security Checkpoint and advised that I stopped utilizing the AIT equipment as a result of this issue, and further advised that we were screening passengers at that moment exclusively through the WTMD.

This Conference Call concluded with the advice from AFSD [REDACTED] that I should open the smaller alternate checkpoint known as ECHO1 and utilize the AIT at that location 2 such that AIT screening was taking place at one of the 2 available International Security Checkpoints, and that AFSD [REDACTED] would get back to us with further instructions.

About 30 minutes later, at approximately 2029, I was called by Deputy [REDACTED] and instructed to "re-calibrate all 3 AIT units [at ECHO2] and if they passed the re-calibration, to put these AIT units back into service," or words to that effect.

All 3 AIT units passed re-calibration and the 2 AIT units associated with the operational mod-sets then being utilized at ECHO2 were placed back in service for passenger screening.

Shortly after placing these AIT units back into service, I was informed by the STSOs on duty that on March 3, 2023, a BOS FET test was conducted at ECHO2 and the test was deemed invalid. I was informed that the test consisted of [REDACTED] the AIT and was screened utilizing the AIT equipment.

I was informed that the AIT did not generate [REDACTED] alarm during this BOS FET test and for that reason, the test was deemed invalid.

I sent the email appended below and marked as "Exhibit 1" to Deputy [REDACTED], with a copy to AFSD [REDACTED], at approximately 2122 hours on SAT, 03/11/2023.

On MON, 03/13/2023 at 1043, I forwarded that same email to FSD [REDACTED] with a copy to DFSD [REDACTED] and AFSD [REDACTED] expressing my continuing concern about this matter.

I filed my complaint with the TSA OIG that same morning.

The STSOs on duty on SAT evening, 03/11/2023 were extremely concerned that the AIT units were not picking [REDACTED] and formed the opinion that these AIT units were not functioning as intended.

I have similar concerns about these AIT units, as did TSS-E [REDACTED].

I am extremely reluctant to dismiss the concerns of my subordinates and my colleagues in matters of this kind, and I do not take comfort in the possible explanation that was provided to me. I was told that recent changes in the AIT algorithms downloaded to the

3

AIT equipment to accommodate the concerns expressed recently by some passengers may be the explanation for the AITs failing to pick up [REDACTED] on 03/11/2023 and [REDACTED] the BOS FET test on 03/03/2023.

I am extremely concerned about retaliation and retribution for my having made this disclosure. Just as an example of my concern, prior to this disclosure I was offered a substitute RDO next week for training I am participating in this week which occurs on one of my RDOs. I was originally offered SAT, 03/25/2023 as my replacement RDO, but after giving notice of my disclosure and for reasons that are not clear to me, that offer was withdrawn and the date of WED, 03/22/2023 was substituted instead.

This may seem like a very small matter but that is often how things are carried out here at TSA BOS-LOGAN. It is often the little things that seem to be the focus for retribution, at first, to send the message, with greater consequences often following shortly thereafter.

As of this writing, I have not had any reply to my notifications to senior TSA BOS-LOGAN leadership about this problem. I remain deeply concerned that these AIT units, and perhaps others, continue to fail to [REDACTED]. In fact, I was instructed on SAT, 03/11/2023 "not to further test the AITs" (or words to that effect), as had occurred on SAT, 03/11/2023 during TSS-E [REDACTED] training exercise, and as of this writing, I am unaware of any testing or other remediation efforts to address these AIT deficiencies.

Very respectfully,

[REDACTED], TSM - 617.212.1111

**EXHIBIT 1:**

**(Copied and Pasted)**

**From:** [REDACTED] >

**Date:** Saturday, Mar 11, 2023 at 9:22 PM

**To:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**Subject:** BOS FET test at ECHO2 3/2/23 PM deemed invalid

██████ - Confirming our telephone conversation a moment ago, the above captioned test on lane 2/3 AIT was deemed invalid as the test did not generate the expected anomaly.

4

That invalid test on 3/2/2023 appears to be consistent with what we reported on our conference call this evening.

Given these 2 data points, my recommendation is that we not utilize the equipment until a resolution to the problem is in place.

We are presently utilizing the equipment, as we have been instructed so to do and in conformity with the instructions I was given.

Very respectfully,

[REDACTED], TSM

## EXHIBIT 2:

**(Copied and Pasted)**

**From:** [REDACTED] >

**Date:** Monday, Mar 13, 2023 at 10:43 AM

**To:**

Cc:

**Subject:** FW: BOS FET test at ECHO2 3/2/23 PM deemed invalid

Good morning FSD [REDACTED],

Please review the email appended below.

I remain extremely concerned about this issue and I reiterate herein my recommendation as contained in the penultimate paragraph of the appended email. Similar expressions of concern were voiced to me by Terminal E PM leadership Officers, as well as others.

I have reported this matter to DHS OIG.

Kindly see a related email being sent to you at this time by my attorney, [REDACTED].

Very respectfully,

TSM

Sent with BlackBerry Work

([www.blackberry.com](http://www.blackberry.com))

**From:** [REDACTED] >

**Date:** Saturday, Mar 11, 2023 at 9:22 PM

**To:**

**Subject:** BOS FET test at ECHO2 3/2/23 PM deemed invalid

██████ - Confirming our telephone conversation a moment ago, the above captioned test on lane 2/3 AIT was deemed invalid as the test did not generate the expected anomaly.

That invalid test on 3/2/2023 appears to be consistent with what we reported on our conference call this evening.

5

Given these 2 data points, my recommendation is that we not utilize the equipment until a resolution to the problem is in place.

We are presently utilizing the equipment, as we have been instructed so to do and in conformity with the instructions I was given.

Very respectfully,

██████, TSM

Sent with BlackBerry Work  
([www.blackberry.com](http://www.blackberry.com))

# Exhibit

# 3



**SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**



**TSA INVESTIGATIONS  
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY**

<b>Type of Activity:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Personal Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Records Review <input type="checkbox"/> Other	<b>Date:</b> October 25, 2023
<b>Activity or Interview of:</b> Transportation Security Specialists – Explosives [REDACTED]	<b>Conducted by:</b> Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] Special Agent [REDACTED] Philadelphia Field Office, Investigations  <b>Location of Interview/Activity:</b> Transportation Security Administration Boston Logan International Airport

Subject Matter/Remarks

On October 24, 2023, Transportation Security Administration, Investigations Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] and Special Agent [REDACTED] interviewed Transportation Security Specialists –Explosives (TSS-E) [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was notified that the interview was being recorded and he was not the subject of the inquiry.

[REDACTED] stated that on the day in question, he was responding to Terminal E TSA checkpoint at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) for an explosive alarm resolution on a passenger's property.

[REDACTED] stated that after resolving the alarm, he remained at the TSA checkpoint to talk with the supervisors.

[REDACTED] stated that each of the terminals has a TSSE provided pelican case with training aids which can be used by Transportation Security Officers for training purposes.

[REDACTED] stated that some Lead TSOs (LTSO) and TSOs pulled out two training aids, [REDACTED] to practice pat down procedures.

<b>Case Number</b> I23-00576	<b>Case Title:</b> Security screening equipment malfunction
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Revised May 10, 2022

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## MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)

stated that the training aids are primarily used for x-ray and pat down procedure training.

[REDACTED] stated that during the pat down training, one of the LTSOs went into the Advanced Image Technology (AIT) machine [REDACTED]

██████████ stated that the LTSO scanned himself with the AIT machine in an attempt to generate an alarm for pat down training.

██████████ stated that after the LTSSO did not receive an alarm, he approached ██████████ and explained what he did to attempt to generate the alarm.

stated that he advised the LTSO

stated that the LTSO decided to scan himself at additional AIT machines [REDACTED] and consistently did not receive an alarm.

stated that the LTSO advised the supervisors none of the AIT machines in Terminal E alarmed

██████████ stated that after the LTSO explained his concerns to the supervisors they decided to call the Transportation Security Manager (TSM) on duty.

██████████ stated that a TSM arrived at the checkpoint, and the supervisors explained their concerns about the AIT machines.

██████████ stated that because of the lack of alarms on the AIT machines, the supervisors and TSM discussed the issue and a conference call was initiated with a Deputy Federal Security Director.

██████████ stated that after the conference call concluded, Priority One tickets were initiated on all three AIT machines.

██████████ stated that after the conference call was completed, he made his way back to his office to finish his shift.

██████████ stated that the male LTSO, weighed approximately 200 lbs. and about 5 foot, 8 inches to 10 inches tall. ██████████

Case Number:  
I23-00576

Case Title:  
Security screening equipment malfunction

Revised May 10, 2022



## MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)

## MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)

stated that the training aids were provided to the TSOs to practice targeted pat downs.

██████████ stated that the targeted pat down was conducted when the AIT detected an anomaly. The AIT displayed the anomaly on an Avatar and the TSO utilized the image to conduct the targeted pat down.

stated they forced an alarm

stated that he was unsure if the actual training would make the AIT alarm.

stated that he did not make the training [REDACTED]. He did not know what it was made of.

stated that it was a standard TSA- issued

██████████ stated he was told by other TSS-Es in his office, the older training aids may not alarm in the AIT or CT machine because algorithms improved and they did not meet the algorithm requirements.

stated,

stated that he did not know if the training aids used that day were meant to be used for testing or not.

██████████ stated that on this day, the TSOs were training, not testing the AIT machines and were attempting to procedure an anomaly to practice pat down procedures.

stated that he did not know who could advise if the [REDACTED] would alarm on the AIT machine.

██████████ stated TSSEs explained to him that the ██████████ was not a good aid for the AIT because it was not made to mimic actual ██████████ (other than for pat-down or x-ray).

██████████ stated that the training aid was old and may not be detectable due to the new algorithms and may only be good for X-ray training.

██████████ stated that once the issue with the AIT was identified, the machines were shut down and Priority One tickets were filed.

██████████ stated that during Field Evaluation Testing if the AIT failed to pick up the anomaly, then the test was considered invalid.

Case Number:  
I23-00576

Case Title:  
Security screening equipment malfunction

Revised May 10, 2022

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)

████████ stated that during the training, the TSO may have used ██████████ the AIT machine in an attempt to force an alarm.

*Agent's Note:* The audio file will be uploaded and maintained in the Electronic Case Management System.

**Attached:**

████████ written statement, dated October 25, 2023.

Case Number:  
I23-00576

Case Title:  
Security screening equipment malfunction

Revised May 10, 2022

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# Attachment

# 3

£ **Transportation  
Security  
Administration**

Y [redacted] [redacted], who has been identified to me as a federal law enforcement officer and special

agent with TSA investigations. I am making this statement of my own free will, without any duress or coercion.

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Wc.ex.n himself with the training still in place

Initials: *SM* 25 Oct 2023



# SWORN STATEMENT

(Continuation of statement of Jo )\G.--ody #0r(7:11

on the remainder of the AIT machines at the checkpoint. The lead TSD then told the supervisors that none of the AIT machines found [REDACTED] on his person. This was probably caused by the training aid not being actual explosives, ~~and how~~ <sup>Tom</sup> Unfortunately, some of the training aids we have available [REDACTED] This means the ~~atgo~~ <sup>Tom</sup> software on some of the screening equipment

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decided to call the manager. Once the manager arrived at the checkpoint the supervisors showed him their

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I did not make the training [REDACTED] and do not know what it is made from.





Transportation  
Security  
Administration

# SWORN STATEMENT

The training aids are primarily used for X-ray training and put down training.

JBW 25 Oct 2023

I, S. J. G. T.

I have read this entire statement consisting of L pages. I have been given the opportunity to make any corrections necessary to make the statement accurate. All of the information contained in this statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that I may be prosecuted for perjury or making false statements if I have intentionally misrepresented anything contained in this statement. I have not intentionally omitted any information or knowledge I have that relates to the matters under investigation or review.

[Redacted Signature]

Signature

Signed and sworn to before me, this? day of

October 2023

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Witness

[Redacted]

Special Agent  
Transportation Security Administration  
Department of Homeland Security  
Authority to administer Oath: U.S.C. § 303  
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# Exhibit

# 4



**SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**



**TSA INVESTIGATIONS  
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY**

<b>Type of Activity:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Personal Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Records Review <input type="checkbox"/> Other	<b>Date:</b> October 24, 2023
<b>Activity or Interview of:</b> Assistant Federal Security Director – Screening [REDACTED]	<b>Conducted by:</b> Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] Special Agent [REDACTED] Philadelphia Field Office, Investigations  <b>Location of Interview/Activity:</b> Transportation Security Administration Boston Logan International Airport

Subject Matter/Remarks

On October 24, 2023, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Investigations Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] and Special Agent [REDACTED] interviewed Assistant Federal Security Director – Screening [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was notified that the interview was being recorded and she was not the subject of the inquiry.

[REDACTED] stated that she was made aware of a concern that Transportation Security Manager (TSM) [REDACTED] had raised regarding the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) machines not identifying a training item while Transportation Security Officers (TSO) were conducting training on the evening of March 11, 2023.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] explained that he was made aware of AITs not alarming after TSOs utilized the training aids [REDACTED] from the training pelican case. The supervisor and Lead Transportation Security Officer (LTSO) attempted to elicit an alarm to initiate pat-down screening but the AIT equipment did not alarm.

[REDACTED] stated that the TSOs were utilizing an overt training item that was created for TSO to pass around in order for them to look, feel, and touch; it was designed for the TSOs to get an idea of what [REDACTED] looked like.

<b>Case Number</b> I23-00576	<b>Case Title:</b> Security screening equipment malfunction
---------------------------------	--

Revised May 10, 2022

**WARNING:** This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)

█████ stated that these training aids were design as an overt replica training item not as a testing item.

█████ stated that the TSOs took that overt training item █████ and covertly placed it on a TSO and proceeded to test all three AIT machines at Terminal E utilizing this training device and none of the three AIT machines consistently detected the overt training item.

█████ stated that based on their findings from the “inappropriate” testing and opinions of the supervisor and LTSO on site, all three AIT machines were taken out of service at Terminal E on the night of March 11, 2023.

█████ stated that Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) initiated use of locally created training aids in January 2023. This additional initiative was developed to enhance threat detection training for all TSA personnel at the airport.

█████ stated the training aids were developed by local BOS Transportation Security Specialist – Explosives (TSS-E) and introduced to the workforce as an overt training material along with a fact sheet overview of the materials. Each terminal had a set of these training aids which were designed to give the TSOs increased awareness by being able to hold, look and feel the item.

█████ stated that Supervisory TSS-E (STSS-E) █████’ email, dated January 19, 2023, introduced the pelican case with the overt training aids to all TSMs.

█████ stated that on February 15, 2023, █████ distributed the overt training item █████ plus fact sheet to all TSMs with guidance and direction on how the overt training item would be used.

█████ stated that the overt training items were not designed to be used in a covert manner and this fact was briefed to all TSMs at BOS.

*Agent’s Note:* █████ was asked to explain the events of the evening of March 11, 2023.

█████ stated that on the evening of March 11, 2023 at approximate 8:00 p.m. she dialed into a conference call with Deputy Assistant Federal Security Director (DAFSD) █████.

█████ stated that █████ expressed concern that there was a software issue with the AIT equipment in Terminal E.

█████ stated that it was during this conference call that she was informed by █████ that █████ was the item being used during the training.

Case Number:  
I23-00576

Case Title:  
Security screening equipment malfunction

Revised May 10, 2022

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)

█████ stated she learned the TSOs took the training █████, placed it on their person covertly █████, stepped into the AIT and used a variety of different positions in an attempt to elicit an alarm from IT equipment.

█████ stated that the AIT equipment did create an anomaly in certain areas but not consistently.

█████ stated that the TSOs were dressed in standard TSO uniform during the testing/training.

█████ stated that █████ had indicated to her that he shut down all three AIT machines at Terminal E due to a potential software issue and that there was a discussion about opening Priority One tickets for all three AIT machines.

█████ stated that she was not one hundred percent sure a software update had been completed and whether this might be the cause of the issue with the AIT equipment, so she initiated a call to confirm.

█████ stated that she received confirmation that no software updates had not been initiated at BOS.

█████ stated that there was a supervisor on duty that could calibrate the AIT machines and that █████ was the manager on duty but may not have been trained in the use of the equipment.

█████ stated that she informed █████ that no additional testing of the AIT equipment should take place and instructed █████ to open and utilize the AIT at the secondary Terminal E1 TSA security checkpoint, after conducting a calibration test.

█████ stated that she contacted DAFSD - Threat Assessment Programs █████ who had oversight of TSSEs and the BOS training department and discussed her concerns with █████ about training, limitations of technology, calibration requirements, authorized testing and the inappropriate █████ usage of the AIT equipment.

█████ stated that she asked █████ to contact TSS-E █████ and gain his knowledge of the incident that occurred on the evening of March 11, 2023.

█████ stated that █████ informed her that █████ was present conducting alarm resolution on personal property and upon completion of that task he was approached by the TSOs who referenced the issues with the AIT machines.

█████ stated that based on the conversation █████ had with █████, it was determined that the TSOs were inappropriately using the training item to test the equipment.

Case Number:  
I23-00576

Case Title:  
Security screening equipment malfunction

Revised May 10, 2022

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)

█████ stated that based on her knowledge of the situation, the usage of the training item that was not designed as a testing item, and limitations of the AIT, she contacted █████ and advised her to reach out to █████ and ensure re-calibration of AIT equipment was performed.

█████ stated that she advised █████ that if all AIT equipment at Terminal E passed re-calibration, to return AIT equipment to use and downgrade the equipment tickets to Priority Two.

█████ stated that the Priority Two ticket would still require a technician (contractor) to review and assess the AIT equipment concerns.

█████ stated that the equipment tickets were opened on March 11, 2023 at approximately 8:00 p.m. and closed out on March 13, 2023 at approximately 4:15 a.m.

█████ stated that on March 13, 2023, BOS management initiated a fact finding inquiry into the incident to determine exactly what happened on the evening of March 11, 2023.

█████ stated that on April 19, 2023, she set up a meeting with █████ and █████ to discuss the overt training items and their appropriate usage.

█████ stated that █████ provided an overview to her and █████ of the training items in the training pelican case and explained the training items intended use (reference made to the guidance email sent in January and February).

█████ stated that she emphasized to █████ that the items in the pelican case were not designed to be utilized as an authorized testing item (in the AIT equipment), but rather for visual and tactile reference.

█████ stated that █████ acknowledged that he was unaware that the items in the pelican case were not designed to be an actual testing object.

█████ stated █████ and █████ discussed the layers of security, equipment limitations, following Standard Operating Procedures and additional security related topics.

█████ stated that prior to the conclusion of the meeting, she asked █████ if he had any additional concerns and he stated that he had no additional concerns.

█████ stated that authorized BOS personnel have conducted daily authorized field testing on the AIT equipment in Terminal E and there have been no reported additional issues.

Case Number:  
I23-00576

Case Title:  
Security screening equipment malfunction

Revised May 10, 2022

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)

**Agent's Note:** The audio file will be uploaded and maintained in the Electronic Case Management System.

Attachments:

1. [REDACTED] written statement dated October 24, 2023.
2. January 19, 2023 email from [REDACTED] to BOS team reference checkpoint training materials.
3. February 15, 2023 email from [REDACTED] to BOS team reference Checkpoint training materials – Overt use.
4. Sensitive Security Information [REDACTED] explanation.
5. Picture of [REDACTED] training device.

Case Number:

I23-00576

Case Title:

Security screening equipment malfunction

Revised May 10, 2022

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# Attachment

# 4

SWORN STATEMENT

**6i- TransP.ortation  
--V Security  
- Administration**

I, 1, having been duly sworn, hereby make the following statement to S, who has been identified to me as a federal law enforcement officer and special agent with TS Investigations. I am making this statement of my own free will, without any duress or coercion.

\*\*\*SEE ATTACHED STATEMENT\*\*\*

I have read this entire statement consisting of 5 pages. I have been given the opportunity to make any corrections necessary to make the statement accurate. All of the information contained in this statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that I may be prosecuted for perjury or making false statements if I have intentionally misrepresented anything contained in this statement, I have not intentionally omitted any information or knowledge I have that relates to the matters under investigation or review.

Signed and sworn to before me, this DL day of C 'c-lr: Q Y, 20B

Witness

4  
Special Agent  
Transportation Security Administration  
Department of Homeland Security  
Authority to administer oaths: 5 U.S.C. § 303  
**SI A. /f t&,-**



## Statement of Record

### Steps Taken in Response to Equipment Concerns

October 24, 2023

To the best of my knowledge the following is my recollection of the events and steps taken in response to TSM [REDACTED] sharing concerns about the AIT equipment, in Terminal E TSA Security Checkpoint.

As background, TSA BOS initiated use of locally created training aids in January 2023 as an additional initiative to enhance threat detection training provided to the Screening team. The training aids are created by our local BOS TSSEs, and are introduced as overt training material when they are distributed, to be utilized with fact sheets that are provided for the leadership to provide context to the particular threat item. Additionally, the items are directed to be used in an overt manner to increase officer awareness to hold, look and feel the item. Each terminal has a pelican case that houses these items. TSMs and STSOs can sign the items out daily to use them in shift briefings. Supervisory TSSE [REDACTED] introduced the pelican case and overt checkpoint training material to the TSMs via email on January 19, 2023.

On February 15, 2023, Supervisory TSSE [REDACTED] introduced an overt training item [REDACTED] to the TSMs, along with guidance and direction for use of the item and a one-page sheet for discussion to provide context on the item.

On Saturday, March 11, 2023, at approximately 20:00, I was dialed onto a conference call with one of my Screening Deputies DAFSD [REDACTED], and TSM [REDACTED]. TSM [REDACTED] shared concerns he had believing there was a software issue with the Advanced Image technology (AIT) equipment in Terminal E. TSM [REDACTED] shared that during a training initiative the officers and one of the TSSEs ([REDACTED]) were utilizing one of the items from the pelican case and placing it on their person [REDACTED] and trying to generate alarms on the AIT. The officers were using a variety of different methods to test the equipment and due to not consistently receiving alarms concluded there was a software issue, and closed the AITs. TSM [REDACTED] was the management official onsite, and believed there was a software issue.

To the best of my recollection the steps I took on the conference call are as follows: I instructed TSM [REDACTED] to ensure there was no additional unauthorized testing being conducted. Out of an abundance of caution while I continued reviewing the situation I initially concurred to open the priority 1 tickets to ensure a technician responded to evaluate the AITs. I instructed TSM [REDACTED] that he needed to open and utilize the AIT at the secondary El TSA Security Checkpoint to ensure we had AIT available in Terminal E. I could not recall if we had already initiated a Gender Neutral Software update at our BOS AOR, as we were in discussion of receiving the update and rollout at Spoke airports - I confirmed TSA BOS did not initiate this on a secondary phone call I made that night.

Following the conference call, I reached out to my Threat Assessment Programs (TAP) DAFSD [REDACTED]. As the TAP DAFSD, [REDACTED] has oversight of the TSSEs, as well as the Training Department (who would have been involved in rolling out the Gender Neutral changes on AIT). I provided [REDACTED] with the background of what TSM [REDACTED] shared on the call, and asked that she reach out to the TSSE to get his direct input and any additional insight. [REDACTED] reached out to TSSE [REDACTED] and returned my call. In reviewing the reported concerns, I discussed many things with [REDACTED] to include - the training we all knew of on the limitations of the technology, calibration requirements and standards, the method in which the officers were inappropriately using the training items (these were not authorized testing items), as well as inappropriately using the AIT equipment [REDACTED].

Based on the review of the information I had, I reached back out to DAFSD [REDACTED] and provided her my assessment and the discussion I had with TAP DAFSD [REDACTED]. I directed [REDACTED] to reach out to TSM [REDACTED], and first ensure a re-calibration was completed on all the AITs. If the AITs successfully passed calibration, they

12 23

were to return the AITs to use, and they could downgrade the equipment tickets to a Priority 2. The priority 2 ticket would still provide a response from the technician to review and assess the AIT concerns reported by the STSO.

The equipment tickets were open on March 11, 2023 at approximately 20:00, and closed out on March 13, 2023 at approximately 04:15.

On Monday morning, March 12, 2023, after reviewing the incident reported over the weekend BOS management initiated a fact-finding which was conducted by FAM [REDACTED]. I don't recall the exact date the fact-finding was completed, however, on April 19, 2023 I reached out to TSM [REDACTED] and set up a meeting to address any ongoing concerns he had on the subject of the AITs. Myself, and Supervisory TSSE [REDACTED] met with TSM [REDACTED] in the lower level Terminal C Admin space from approximately 13:45 - 14:30. These discussion notes are not all inclusive and to the best of my recollection. I asked TSM [REDACTED] to share with us what technology he was concerned with. TSM [REDACTED] his part on March 11, 2023, he was made aware that the AITs had not alarmed after TSA personnel had utilized the pelican case item on their person. They had attempted to get an alarm to utilize for pat-down practice, and the equipment did not alarm. He also shared and he was not present at the time and was called up to the situation. He stated he was concerned with the technology during the test items not alarming, as well as a previous field (FET) test he was aware of that was invalid.

STTSE [REDACTED] provided an overview of the item in the pelican case that TSM [REDACTED] referenced, and explained the items intended use (referencing the guidance sent in January/February. Additionally, that the item was not designed, or an authorized "test item". There were instructions that were sent via email to the TSMs when the STTSE [REDACTED] introduced the item which explained the intended use. TSMs should have briefed their STSOs and teams, and through the conversation it did not appear that TSM [REDACTED] had done so. Testing is conducted by a dedicated team, with authorized testing material. TSM [REDACTED] acknowledged that he was not aware the item wasn't designed to be an actual testing object, and understood the machines have software and algorithms pre-determined and thoroughly tested prior to being deployed and utilized. Also, the calibrations required of the equipment.

We talked about layers of security and that equipment has limitations and are tools to us. We discussed some layers including the Officer/front line engagement, following SOP, secure flight vetting, TSOC, K9, and ATLAS.

Prior to ending the meeting, I asked if TSM [REDACTED] had any more concerns that would need discussion/clarification. TSM [REDACTED] was satisfied with the meeting and stated he had no additional concerns and the meeting ended. I do not recall having further conversation with TSM [REDACTED] on this concern. My understanding of our meeting was he was satisfied with the discussion.

[REDACTED]

Assistant Federal Security Director - Screening  
Transportation Security Administration  
Massachusetts / Logan International Airport, Boston (BOS)  
ACK, BOS, HYA, MVY, ORH, PVC  
Cell: 857-488-9066  
Office: 617-561-2051

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2012

**Selec . Elizabeth**

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**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent** Thursday, January 19, 2023 8:08 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Checkpoint training materials- Overt use  
**Attachments:** TSA-Form452FI NALv191018.pdf

Good Morning Screening Mgmt. Team

There's a lot of moving parts and pieces from various groups in support of bolstering Boston's *Threat Detection Action Plan*. One such new effort will be introduced today as we'll be delivering training materials consisting of both replica training aids & supplemental briefing packets to each checkpoint for self-directed use.

The goal of this is to provide every security officer an opportunity to physically and visually inspect both historical and trending threat devices. The supplemental packet is to be used by the TSM/STSO to guide the discussion and provide additional relevant information on the threat items. It is not bullet point briefing notes, so I recommend reviewing prior to briefing.

To be clear, this is in addition to the training aids that my team rotates on a weekly basis which are scenario based and designed to be used in a covert manner; that is a separate element in support of the BOS TDAP. These new training materials are to be used in an overt manner to increase officer awareness and develop a healthy respect for the myriad ways bombs look & feel.

The materials are to be accounted for at all times and secured when not actively being used. Please adhere to proper accountability practices and document accordingly on TSA Form 452 when these sensitive items are in use & returned. Please

see attached TSA Form 452 to print additional copies as needed. If a replica training aid is unaccounted for, notifications are to be made immediately to your D-AFSD.

When not in use, the training materials **will** be safeguarded in the manager's office in a black Pelican 1550 case secured with a combination lock, code 0911. The Pelican cases will NOT be rotated and they will remain in your custody. However, they **will** be periodically updated with new training aids and briefings at which time notifications will be made and new property transfer receipts initiated for proper control measures.

Please exercise care and caution when handling these items; they are training aids not designed to withstand rough handling. Any need for repair or concerns otherwise regarding this program should be directed to

[REDACTED]

V/r,

[REDACTED]

Supervisory Explosives Specialist  
Boston Logan International Airport (BOS)  
617-851-3564

[REDACTED]

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, February 15, 2023 7:01 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]

**Subject:** FW: Checkpoint training materials- Overt use  
**Attachments:** TSA-Form452FINALv191018.pdf; [REDACTED] 1 pager.doc

Good Morning,

\*\*New training aid- [REDACTED]

Later this morning, each of the Pelican cases will be outfitted with a [REDACTED] simulant to be passed around and give context to this particular threat item. Please see the attached 1 pager for talking points to help guide the discussion (current NPW).

I'll take any questions/concerns. If you've got any feedback on how the Inspire 13 device has been received by the frontline, I'd be grateful to hear it. For the time being, the Inspire device will remain in your custody.

V/r,

[REDACTED]  
Supervisory Explosives Specialist  
Boston Logan International Airport (BOS)  
617-851-3564

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 19, 2023 8:08 AM

To:

**Subject:** Checkpoint training materials- Overt use

Good Morning Screening Mgmt. Team

There's a lot of moving parts and pieces from various groups in support of bolstering Boston's *Threat Detection Action Plan*. One such new effort will be introduced today as we'll be delivering training materials consisting of both replica training aids & supplemental briefing packets to each checkpoint for self-directed use.

The goal of this is to provide every security officer an opportunity to physically and visually inspect both historical and trending threat devices. The supplemental packet is to be used by the TSM/STSO to guide the discussion and provide additional relevant information on the threat items. It is not bullet point briefing notes, so I recommend reviewing prior to briefing.

To be clear, this is in addition to the training aids that my team rotates on a weekly basis which are scenario based and designed to be used in a covert manner; that is a separate element in support of the BOS TDAP. These new training materials are to be used in an overt manner to increase officer awareness and develop a healthy respect for the myriad ways bombs look & feel.

The materials are to be accounted for at all times and secured when not actively being used. Please adhere to proper accountability practices and document accordingly on TSA Form 452 when these sensitive items are in use & returned. Please see attached TSA Form 452 to print additional copies as needed. If a replica training aid is unaccounted for, notifications are to be made immediately to your O-AFSD.

When not in use, the training materials will be safeguarded in the manager's office in a black Pelican 1550 case secured with a combination lock, code 0911. The Pelican cases will NOT be rotated and they will remain in your custody. However, they will be periodically updated with new training aids and briefings at which time notifications will be made and new property transfer receipts initiated for proper control measures.

Please exercise care and caution when handling these items; they are training aids not designed to withstand rough handling. Any need for repair or concerns otherwise regarding this program should be directed to

[REDACTED]


V/r,

[REDACTED]

Supervisory Explosives Specialist  
Boston Logan International Airport (BOS)  
617-851-3564



## SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION



**WARNING:** This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520,

# Exhibit

# 5

**SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**



**TSA INVESTIGATIONS  
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY**

Type of Activity: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Personal Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Records Review <input type="checkbox"/> Other	Date: October 25, 2023
Activity or Interview of: Deputy Federal Security Director [REDACTED]	Conducted by: Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] Special Agent [REDACTED] Philadelphia Field Office, Investigations  Location of Interview/Activity: Transportation Security Administration Boston Logan International Airport

Subject Matter/Remarks

On October 25 2023, Transportation Security Administration, Investigations Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] and Special Agent [REDACTED] interviewed Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) Deputy Federal Security Director [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was notified that the interview was being recorded and she was not the subject of the inquiry.

[REDACTED] stated her recollection of the incident that occurred in March 2023 was that Transportation Security Officers (TSO) utilized training items provided by the BOS Transportation Security Specialist – Explosive (TSS-E) group. The training items were not authorized testing items; they were not meant to be screened through the Advanced Image Technology (AIT) machines. These training items were designed to afford BOS TSOs an opportunity to see and feel what an explosive would look/feel like during screening. The items were training devices and that the AIT machine did not fail to recognize them because they were not intended for the AIT machine.

[REDACTED] stated headquarters provided the airports, including BOS, with authorized testing devices; BOS was not authorized to create testing devices.

Case Number I23-00576	Case Title: Security screening equipment malfunction
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Revised May 10, 2022

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)

█████ stated BOS took additional steps to enhance threat detection by providing similar items (to the testing items) to increase TSO knowledge base; these training device were built locally by the TSS-E program.

█████ stated that testing devices come from the Red Team and the Field Evaluation Test (FET) division.

█████ stated, on March 11, 2023, TSOs used a training device built by the local BOS TSS-E program.

█████ stated she believed her first conversation with Assistant Federal Security Director - Screening █████ was Sunday, March 12, 2023. █████ met with █████ in person on Monday, March 13, 2023 to discuss the next steps.

█████ stated █████ contacted Federal Security Director (FSD) █████ on Sunday, March 12, 2023.

█████ stated everything █████ did to resolve the security concerns were text book.

█████ stated that on Monday, March 13, 2023, she met with █████ and reviewed the steps █████ took prior to directing the AIT machines back into operation.

█████ stated that on Monday, March 13, 2023, based on Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) she made the decision to conduct a fact finding inquiry in order to understand in more detail what transpired the night of March 11, 2023.

█████ stated, on March 11, 2023, █████ was notified via a conference call with Deputy Assistant Federal Security Director (DAFSD) █████, that █████ received a telephone call from Transportation Security Manager (TSM) █████, who closed down the AIT machines after they failed to identify a threat.

█████ stated that “not identifying a threat” were █████s words.

█████ stated █████ gathered all of the facts from █████’s point of view because he was the TSM that night.

█████ stated calibration was the SOP after any AIT machine experienced an invalid issue.

█████ stated it was her understanding that █████ called DAFSD - Threat Assessment Programs █████ to discuss the situation.

█████ stated that █████r included TSS-E █████ on the phone call for a clear understanding on what occurred at the checkpoint.

Case Number:  
I23-00576

Case Title:  
Security screening equipment malfunction

Revised May 10, 2022

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)

*Agent's Note: The TSS-E program is managed by TAP supervisor.*

██████████ stated that during the conversation between ██████████, it was determined that the employees were conducting unauthorized testing of AIT machines with training props.

██████████ stated that per the SOP and the guidelines provided by Headquarters, if an AIT machine successfully calibrated, then it was fully operational.

██████████ stated that out of an abundance of caution, ██████████ advised ██████████ to leave the three AIT machines in shutdown status and call in a Priority One ticket on all three machines in Terminal E.

██████████ stated that ██████████ instructed ██████████ to stop any and all additional unauthorized testing.

██████████ stated that ██████████ instructed ██████████ to have someone calibrate the AIT machine at the E1 checkpoint and if it passed calibration, then open that lane.

██████████ stated that ██████████ ordered the opening of the E1 checkpoint because she knew it would provide added security at the Terminal having at least one AIT operating in addition to the Walk Through Metal Detectors at the main checkpoint.

██████████ stated that ██████████ had additional conversation with ██████████ and after reviewing the events of March 11, 2023, ██████████ advised her to have all three AITs recalibrated and if all passed calibration, have them placed back into service per SOP.

██████████ stated that after ██████████ had gathered the additional facts about the incident and after the machines had been properly calibrated, ██████████ or her designee downgraded the Priority One ticket to a Priority Two ticket.

██████████ stated that leaving the Priority Two ticket open was out of an abundance of caution because as stated all machines passed calibration.

██████████ stated that leaving the Priority Two ticket open would ensure a technician would look at all three machines.

██████████ stated that a technician did review all three machines and closed all three Priority Two tickets at approximately 4:15 a.m. on Monday morning March 12, 2023.

██████████ stated that authorized testing is only conducted by Headquarters Red Team and locally controlled FET team headed by the training department.

Case Number:  
I23-00576

Case Title:  
Security screening equipment malfunction

Revised May 10, 2022

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)

██████████ stated that when the Red Team conducts testing in BOS, there have been instances where the authorized test was deemed “invalid”.

██████████ stated that it was not SOP for the Red Team to direct the airport to shut down the machines even if an authorized test was deemed invalid.

██████████ stated that the Senior Leadership team in BOS followed all protocol as designated by the SOPs which also mirrored the equipment protocol when an authorized Red Team test produced an invalid result.

██████████ stated that the testing objects they used were unauthorized testing objects and the machines calibrated correctly.

██████████ stated that after the March incident, several Red Team testing was conducted and to the best of her knowledge there were a few invalid test results on the same machinery.

██████████ stated that on all Red Team testing cycles, invalids are common however, that does not take out the equipment as long as the equipment calibrated properly.

██████████ stated that an email was sent out by Hawkes to the BOS employees referencing the checkpoint training materials and the advised the training material items were meant to give the TSOs at BOS, an opportunity to see and feel what an explosive looked/felt like.

██████████ stated after all of the information was gathered about the event on March 11, 2023, BOS leadership followed SOP to ensure there were no security concerns.

██████████ stated that in 2015, headquarters rolled out Mission Essential training and that she and the FSD spoke with all of the TSOs at the training.

██████████ stated that the Mission Essential training emphasized the fact that there are layers of security and that equipment was there to assist the TSOs, however, it was only one layer of security.

**Agent’s Note:** The audio file will be uploaded and maintained in the Electronic Case Management System.

Attachment(s):

1. ██████████ written statement.
2. January 19, 2023 email from STSSE ██████████ to BOS team reference checkpoint training materials.

Case Number:  
I23-00576

Case Title:  
Security screening equipment malfunction

Revised May 10, 2022

**SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**

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**MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)**

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3. February 15 email from [REDACTED] to BOS team reference Checkpoint training materials – Overt use.

Case Number:

I23-00576

Case Title:

Security screening equipment malfunction

Revised May 10, 2022

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# Attachment

# 5

SWORN STATEMENT



Transportation  
Security  
Administration

I,                     , having been duly sworn, hereby make the following statement to                     , who has been identified to me as a federal law enforcement officer and special agent with TSA Investigations. I am making this statement of my own free will, without any duress or coercion.

\*\*\*SEE ATTACHED STATEMENT\*\*\*

I have read this entire statement consisting of 3 pages. I have been given the opportunity to make any corrections necessary to make the statement accurate. All of the information contained in this statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that I may be prosecuted for perjury or making false statements if I have intentionally misrepresented anything contained in this statement. I have not intentionally omitted any information of knowledge I have that relates to the matters under investigation or review.

Signed and sworn to before me, this 11 day of April, 2023.

Transportation Security Administration  
Department of Homeland Security  
Authority to administer oaths: 5 U.S.C. § 303

*6aw h /ffJ>Uf*

The following is a statement pertaining to actions taken by Senior Leadership in BOS referencing AIT equipment in Terminal E on 3/11/23:

On Saturday, 3/11/23 an incident occurred in Terminal E whereby a checkpoint LTSO and STSO were utilizing training pieces provided by our TSSE group to test the AIT. This is considered unauthorized testing and not allowed. It is my understanding that when the training devices were used by the LTSO and STSO in the AIT, the AIT didn't alarm. As a result of the AIT not alarming, they called TSM [REDACTED] to the checkpoint and advised him of that fact. Although TSM [REDACTED] should have been aware that this was "unauthorized testing", which would have caused the equipment not to show an alarm, it is assumed he did not as he did not act on that fact. Furthermore TSM [REDACTED] was advised that the LTSO [REDACTED] in the AIT, and the machine did alarm. TSM [REDACTED] and the LTSO assumed that the AIT was operating incorrectly and to my knowledge he advised that all 3 AIT machines at E be shutdown. This left the checkpoint operating with only walk-thru metal detectors (WTMD) which in fact created a larger vulnerability as a WTMD is unable to detect a non-metallic explosive.

My understanding is that TSM [REDACTED] then contacted DAFSD [REDACTED] who brought up a conference call to include AFSD-S [REDACTED]. I learned on Sunday 3/12/23, that on the conference call, [REDACTED] several questions about the equipment to include the calibration of the equipment. Per SOP and our guidelines, if a machine successfully calibrates, then it is fully operational. Out of an abundance of caution, [REDACTED] advised TSM [REDACTED] to leave the 3 AITs in a shutdown status and call in a PI (Priority 1) ticket on the 3 machines. She also instructed TSM [REDACTED] to stop all unauthorized testing. She instructed him to have someone calibrate the AIT at the EI checkpoint and if it passed calibration, then open that lane. She did this knowing that it would provide added security in the Terminal having at least 1 AIT operating in addition to the WTMDs at the main checkpoint.

It is my understanding that [REDACTED] then called DAFSD-TAP, [REDACTED] to discuss the situation. [REDACTED] included TSSE Morrison on the phone so that they could get a clear understanding on what had actually occurred at the checkpoint. During the conversation, it was determined that the employees were incorrectly using the training devices as testing devices. This was unauthorized and against SOP. This was clarified to AFSD [REDACTED] by DAFSD [REDACTED] -that the employees had [REDACTED] in the AIT and the machine did alarm and DAFSD [REDACTED] confirmed to AFSD-S [REDACTED], the AIT should have alarmed due to an anomaly being where it shouldn't have been [REDACTED]. This proved to AFSD-S [REDACTED] and DAFSD [REDACTED] that TSM Gould didn't have a clear working knowledge of the technology as he should have.

AFSD [REDACTED] then called back DAFSD [REDACTED] and advised her to have all 3 AITs calibrated and if all passed calibration to put them back into service. As per SOP, when a machine passes the calibration, it is fully operational. At some point on Saturday evening, AFSD [REDACTED] or her designee downgraded the PI tickets to P2. Leaving the P2 ticket open was done out of an abundance of caution because as stated all machines passed calibration but AFSD-S still left an open P2 ticket to ensure a technician would look at all 3 machines. The technician did review all 3 machines and closed all 3 P2 tickets out at approximately 0415 on Monday morning.

[REDACTED] 3/23/23

In 2015, Headquarters training rolled out a Mission Essential (MI) training, whereby each class was opened by a Senior Leader. This training reiterated to our employees that the equipment is there to assist you, TSA has several layers of equipment and no one piece of equipment is perfect, hence why we have several layers of security. All employees received that training to include TSM [REDACTED] For newer employees, they receive the same training when they attend the AIT training. Both the STSO & LTSO who were conducting the unauthorized training have attended either MI or AIT training.

Authorized testing is only conducted by the Headquarters Red Team and local controlled FET team headed by the training department. When the Red Team conducts testing in BOS, there have been instances where the authorized test is deemed "invalid", when that occurs a machine is not shut down. As long as the machine has passed calibration, the machine is fully operational. The Senior Leadership team in BOS followed all protocol as designated by the SOP which also mirrors equipment protocol when an authorized Red Team test produces an invalid result. ----- : ; r-----

End of *KITJ* *mean.*

3/3 [REDACTED] 1/25/23

\_\_\_\_\_

**From:** [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED]

[illegible]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Good Morning Screening Mgmt. Team

There's a lot of moving parts and pieces from various groups in support of bolstering Boston's *Threat Detection Action Plan*. One such new effort will be introduced today as we'll be delivering training materials consisting of both replica training aids & supplemental briefing packets to each checkpoint for self-directed use.

The goal of this is to provide every security officer an opportunity to physically and visually inspect both historical and trending threat devices. The supplemental packet is to be used by the TSM/STSO to guide the discussion and provide additional relevant information on the threat items. It is not bullet point briefing notes, so I recommend reviewing prior to briefing.

To be clear, this is in addition to the training aids that my team rotates on a weekly basis which are scenario based and designed to be used in a covert manner; that is a separate element in support of the BOS TDAP. These new training materials are to be used in an overt manner to

increase officer awareness and develop a healthy respect for the myriad ways bombs look & feel.

The materials are to be accounted for at all times and secured when not actively being used. Please adhere to proper accountability practices and document accordingly on TSA Form 452 when these sensitive items are in use & returned. Please see attached TSA Form 452 to print additional copies as needed. If a replica training aid is unaccounted for, notifications are to be made immediately to your D-AFSD.

When not in use, the training materials will be safeguarded in the manager's office in a black Pelican 1550 case secured with a combination lock, code 0911. The Pelican cases will NOT be rotated and they will remain in your custody. However, they will be periodically updated with new training aids and briefings at which time notifications will be made and new property transfer receipts initiated for proper control measures.

Please exercise care and caution when handling these items; they are training aids not designed to withstand rough handling. Any need for repair or concerns otherwise regarding this program should be directed to [REDACTED]

V/r,

[REDACTED]  
Supervisory Explosives Specialist  
Boston Logan International Airport (BOS)  
**617-851-3564**

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2023 7:01 AM  
To: [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED]

Good Morning,

I'll take any questions/concerns. If you've got any feedback on how the Inspire 13 device has been received by the frontline, I'd be grateful to hear it. For the time being, the Inspire device will remain in your custody.



# Exhibit 6

**SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**



**TSA INVESTIGATIONS  
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY**

Type of Activity: <input type="checkbox"/> Personal Interview <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Telephone Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Records Review <input type="checkbox"/> Other	Date: November 27, 2023
Activity or Interview of: Supervisory Transportation Security Specialist – Explosives ██████████	Conducted by: Special Agent in Charge ██████████ Special Agent ██████████ Philadelphia Field Office, Investigations  Location of Interview/Activity: Transportation Security Administration, Alternate Worksite

**Subject Matter/Remarks**

On November 27, 2023, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Investigations Special Agent in Charge ██████████ and Special Agent ██████████ had a discussion via telephone with Supervisory Transportation Security Specialist –Explosives ██████████ regarding his knowledge of the Training Aid ██████████ used at Boston Logan International Airport.

██████████ stated that he did not create or make the Training Aid ██████████ and was unaware of what it was made of.

██████████ stated that the training aid had been provided by the Office of Training & Development (T&D) but was unsure who in T&D provide this item to the airport for training purposes.

██████████ stated that he did not know whether the Training Aid ██████████ would or would not show up in the AIT machine as an anomaly.

**Agent's Note:** ██████████ is the originator of the January 19, 2023 and February 23, 2023, emails reference the Checkpoint training materials – Overt use.

Case Number I23-00576	Case Title: Security screening equipment malfunction
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Revised May 10, 2022

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# Exhibit

# 7

**SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**



**TSA INVESTIGATIONS  
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY**

<b>Type of Activity:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Personal Interview <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Telephone Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Records Review <input type="checkbox"/> Other	<b>Date:</b> December 13, 2023
<b>Activity or Interview of:</b> AIT Program Manager [REDACTED]	<b>Conducted by:</b> Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] Special Agent [REDACTED] Philadelphia Field Office, Investigations <b>Location of Interview/Activity:</b> Telephone Interview

Subject Matter/Remarks

On December 13, 2023, Transportation Security Administration, Investigations Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] and Special Agent [REDACTED] interviewed via telephone Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) Program Manager [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was notified that the interview was being recorded and he was not the subject of the inquiry.

[REDACTED] stated that he received a high level brief from the Chief Counsel office that there was a whistleblower compliant in Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) around some past activity that they had been doing.

[REDACTED] stated that he was not aware that the activity involved [REDACTED] until [REDACTED] conducted some interviews in Boston.

*Agent's Note:* When [REDACTED] refers to [REDACTED], he is referring to SAIC [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that he was aware that they were doing some test activities and that the system failed the testing and that there was concern about the Leidos low probability of false alarm (LPFA) performance.

[REDACTED] stated that the new algorithm had been rolled out and that the new algorithm does many things.

<b>Case Number</b> I23-00576	<b>Case Title:</b> Security screening equipment malfunction
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Revised May 10, 2022

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)

█████ stated that he could give a high level briefing on the detection results details of the algorithm if need.

█████ that this new algorithm is a new generation of algorithm performance and is the first cut of the machine learning algorithm.

█████ stated the new generation algorithm is a Tier 3, replacing the previous version of Tier 2 and that the detection performance gets better as you go up in Tiers.

█████ stated that the new generation of Tier 3 lowers the false alarms by about 50% and add gender neutral that reduces the cognitive burden on the TSOs.

█████ stated that he would have to get the specific time frame that the algorithm was rolled out at BOS.

█████ stated that Nationwide rollout started in January of 2023 and was completed sometime in July of 2023.

*Agent's Note:* In a follow up email to this agent, █████ stated that the BOS LPFA install occurred from March<sup>th</sup> through March 23<sup>rd</sup> this date is after the initial whistleblower compliant was received.

█████ stated that as part of Steven's investigation in BOS, I was sent a pictures of training aid █████ that was used in BOS.

█████ in █████ stated that the picture of the █████ training aid provided to him was not the █████ training aid provided to the field.

█████ stated that the training kits in the field are very old and none of the simulants in training kit were ever designed for AITs, they were designed for X-ray based systems particularly for Advanced Technology (AT)s.

█████ stated that how a AT system looks at something is different than how an AIT system looks at something and so we have never quantified if the actual simulants themselves we have in the field are AIT simulants.

█████ stated that based on the picture of the BOS training aid, it appears to be █████ and not any type of simulant that would be used in explosive testing.

█████ stated that the BOS device was not necessarily set up act as an explosive to physically trigger our systems.

█████ stated that TSA remit is to look for things that pose a catastrophic lost to an aircraft and █████ does not pose that threat.

Case Number:  
I23-00576

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Security screening equipment malfunction

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)

█████ stated that the way the AIT looks a threat has to do with how millimeter waves react with the specific material, how shiny it looks to the system and reflectivity meaning how the millimeter waves bounce off the materials itself.

█████ stated that something that is a simulant for an AIT is something while it is not an actually explosive, from that reflectivity stand point it is identical or identical enough that the system thinks it is an explosive and will alarm on it.

█████ stated that it is not likely that a piece of █████ would reflect the same as a simulant in the AIT.

█████ stated that to be sure that the █████ would not react the same as a simulant he would have to test the █████ in the lab located in FAA Technical Center in Atlantic City, NJ.

*Agent's note: The █████ training aid from BOS was delivered to the lab in Atlantic City on 1/3/2024 and testing was completed on the █████ on 02/24/2024.*

█████ stated that AIT is preset to detect anything on the prohibitive item list, explosives, guns and knives.

█████ stated that he had no knowledge of whether HQ was notified of the BOS incident prior to Chief Counsel bringing it to his attention.

█████ stated that he gave a classified briefing on AIT algorithms detection capabilities to head of the Office of Special Counsel.

█████ stated that AIT is looking for a normal person with normal parts within a normal range and it not alarming on it. █████  
█████

█████ stated that the way the AIT works, everything matters, the person, their height, weight, how they carry their weight and what they are wearing what they have on underneath your clothes.

█████ stated that if during training the TSO is wearing anything a passenger should be able to wear according to the SOP; the system should be set to perform as assigned.

Case Number:  
I23-00576

Case Title:  
Security screening equipment malfunction

Revised May 10, 2022

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**SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**

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**MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)**

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█████ stated that if a TSO is wearing there TSA jacket, which is something a standard passenger would not be allowed to wear and that would affect the machine's performance.

Mastin stated that had BOS reached out to HQ about the AIT issue, he would have been one of the people notified.

█████ also stated that there may be a high level SOP in terms of maintenance activity that could not be resolved however, he may or may not be notified because of Priority One or Priority Two maintenance ticket being placed on the AIT.

█████ stated that the specific details of the TSA's detection requirements are classified but provided the following SSI summary of the BOS model based simulant and explosive kit.

█████ stated that the model based simulant was no longer in a single piece. Even when the pieces are put together the model based simulant from BOS had still lost a substantive amount of █████.

█████ stated that this lost ensured the model based simulant was below █████ it was meant to simulate and because of this issue, the model based simulant from BOS would not be expected to cause the AIT machine to alarm on this object.

**Agent's Note:** The audio file will be uploaded and maintained in the Electronic Case Management System.

**Attachment(s):**

1. █████ written statement, dated January 29, 2024.
2. █████ email dated 12-14-2023
3. █████ supplemental written statement dated February 22, 2024.

Case Number: <b>I23-00576</b>	Case Title: <b>Security screening equipment malfunction</b>
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Revised May 10, 2022

**WARNING:** This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.



# Attachment

# 7

**SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**



**Transportation  
Security  
Administration**

**Transportation Security Administration  
Investigations (INV)  
Statement Form**

<b>Name:</b>	[REDACTED]	<b>i</b>
<b>Duty Assignment:</b>	Advanced Imaging Technology, TSA	
<b>Current Position:</b>	Program Manager	
<b>Pay Band:</b>	K Band	
<b>Telephone Number:</b>	571-227-1207	
<b>Investigators:</b>	SAIC [REDACTED] & DSAIC [REDACTED]	
<b>I,</b>	[REDACTED]	<b>. hereby make the following statement to</b>
<b>DSAIC</b>	[REDACTED]	<b>SAIC [REDACTED] and</b>
		<b>who has identified him/herself to me as an</b>
<b>Investigator with TSA Investigations.</b>		
<p>I am the Program Manager for Advanced Imaging Technology (AITs) at TSA Headquarters. The AIT program identifies, tests, procures, deploys, and sustains equipment that detects threats concealed on passengers. AIT systems are used to screen passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats including weapons, explosives, and other objects concealed under layers of clothing, without physical contact, reducing the need for pat-down searches. Currently, there are three AIT systems on the TSA's qualified products list; the PV-1, manufactured by Leidos, the PV-2, manufactured by Leidos, and the QPS-201, manufactured by Rohde &amp; Schwarz. AITs use Automated Target Recognition (ATR) software that eliminates passenger-specific images and instead auto-detects potential threats by indicating their location on a generic outline of a person. The generic outline is identical for all passengers.</p> <p>TSA field employees have several means by which to report an issue with their equipment. The main means is to put in a maintenance ticket. For Leidos machines, this leads to a Leidos Field Service Technician being dispatched to inspect the machine and put it back into operation. All Leidos Field Service actions are recorded in TSA's system which is maintained and overseen by our Integrated Logistics Support Team. The vast majority of issues are resolved this way in the field, and no one from my team is ever alerted to the problem. The Program Office is only involved with maintenance tickets when the Leidos technician is unable to resolve the issue, at which point the Integrated Logistics Support team brings in the Program Office to assist in an additional investigation/support.</p> <p>In January of 2023 TSA began a full scale rollout of a new algorithm to all Leidos AITs. The algorithm completed nationwide rollout in June of 2023. My records indicate BOS Logan was upgraded from March 20<sup>th</sup>, 2023 to March 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2023. Known as Leidos Low Probability of False Alarm (LPfa), this algorithm had been certified by TSA testing to increase detection, reduce false alarms, and reduce cognitive burden</p>		

## SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

on the Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) by eliminating the need to identify a passenger's gender prior to beginning AIT screening.

On June 1<sup>st</sup>, after returning from leave, I was made aware of a BOS whistleblower complaint that had been sent to the TSA HQ AIT team on May 31<sup>st</sup>. The email alerting us to the complaint came through our Legislative Affairs office as a result of a Congressional inquiry on the subject. The context for the complaint came from a separate Office of Special Counsel (OSC) email sent to TSA investigations. Both emails came to me on June 1<sup>st</sup>. The context indicated that the new Leidos algorithm was failing to detect known security threats during TSA officer training exercises, including by failing to detect simulated explosive materials distributed to TSA security officers for the purpose of conducting TSA officer training exercises.

As this complaint has never come up to me through my normal course of business, I never reached out to local TSA to discuss the matter. As a result, all context received was from Congress, OSC, or the Investigations Team. The Congressional and OSC correspondence were sent to me either through Legislative Affairs or through our Office of Chief Counsel.

The context provided indicates that the test occurred on March 13<sup>th</sup> and our data indicates the BOS algorithm installation began on March 20<sup>th</sup>. Because the complaint occurred prior to the algorithm being installed, it is not possible for these tests to have occurred on the new algorithm. Furthermore, on November 2<sup>nd</sup>, we received an image from the investigations team showing that the item in question is not an approved AIT simulant.

As discussed above, our systems are designed to detect prohibited items, while alarming as little as they can on non-prohibited items. Because we cannot bring live explosives into live airport environments, simulants are used in their place. While made up of inert material, from a machine's perspective a simulant is close enough to the real thing to cause an alarm. As a result, we would expect a fielded AIT to alarm on a validated ATT simulant in line with the detection capability identified in the lab. At this time, we have confirmed that the item used in BOS is not a verified AIT simulant. TSA has enlisted the Transportation Security Laboratory to inspect the item and perform a scientific analysis to determine whether its characteristics are in line with a AIT simulant. Assuming the lab confirms this to not function as an AIT simulant, then any alarms generated are known as false alarms. TSA intends for all algorithms to minimize false alarms so as to decrease physical contact between the passengers and our officers.

Page 2 of 4  
**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552

**WARNING:** This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.


**SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**

**I have read this entire statement consisting of: 4 pages. I have been given the opportunity to make corrections. All of the information contained in this statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that I may be prosecuted for perjury or making false statements if I have intentionally misrepresented anything contained in this statement. I have not intentionally omitted any information or knowledge I have that relates to the matters under investigation or review.**

**I swear or affirm that the testimony I have provided in this electronic statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.**

**I certify that I am making this statement of my own free will, without any duress or coercion. The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.**

**Signature:**


X 

**For TSA/INV Use Only**

**I issued this Statement Form and electronically received the electronically signed record above.**

**The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.**

**Signature of Primary Investigator:**


X 

**SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**

**For TSA INV Use Only**

**The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.**

**Signature of Witness:**

**X** 

**Page 4 of 4**

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**PUBLIC DISCLOSURE TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552**

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**From:** [REDACTED]  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Hello  
**Date:** Thursday, December 14, 2023 4:15:03 PM  
**Attachments:** [BOS Statement.docx](#)

---

Here is my draft statement attached. It is amended from my verbal statement because I was able to go back and find that the BOS Low Pfa install occurred from March 20<sup>th</sup> through the 23<sup>rd</sup>. According to the context provided to me through OSC and Investigations, this is after the complaint was registered. As a result the statement by the complainant that the testing was performed on the algorithm was not possible. In our review of the complaint we did not identify that discrepancy until now.

[REDACTED]  
Program Manager  
Advanced Imaging Technology  
Office: (571) 227-1207  
Mobile: (202) 510-2912  
Transportation Security Administration  
Cube: 58102

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2023 10:44 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Hello

Hello [REDACTED],

Sorry for the delay. Let's do Wednesday at 10:00 am.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]  
TSA Investigations – Philadelphia  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
Mobile (404) 414-6771  
Office (610) 537-9082

---

**From:** [REDACTED] >  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 6, 2023 9:22 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Hello

- Tuesday: 8:30-9:30, 11-4:15
- Wednesday: 10-11:30, 3-4:15
- Thursday: Not really available.

[REDACTED]  
Program Manager  
Advanced Imaging Technology  
Office: (571) 227-1207  
Mobile: (202) 510-2912  
Transportation Security Administration  
Cube: 58102

---

**From:** [REDACTED] >  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 6, 2023 8:31 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED] >  
**Subject:** RE: Hello

Good Morning [REDACTED]

We are going to need to interview you reference the Boston AIT case. Are you available Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday of next week?

It will either be a phone or WebEx interview, it does not need to be in person.

Please let me know your availability and I will get it scheduled.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Work  
([www.blackberry.com](http://www.blackberry.com))



**SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**



**Transportation  
Security  
Administration**

**Transportation Security Administration  
Investigations (INV)  
Statement Form**


<b>Name:</b> [REDACTED]
<b>Duty Assignment:</b> Advanced Imaging Technology, TSA
<b>Current Position:</b> Program Manager
<b>Pay Band:</b> K Band
<b>Telephone Number:</b> 571-227-1207
<b>Investigators:</b> SAIC [REDACTED] & DSAIC [REDACTED]
I, [REDACTED], hereby make the following statement to SAIC [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who has identified him/herself to me as an Investigator with TSA Investigations.
<p>The following is my updated statement about the BOS Simulant based off analysis performed at the Transportation Security Laboratory:</p> <p>The specific details of the TSA's detection requirements are classified. The following is an SSI summary. TSL inspection of the article provided by BOS shows it to be a severely degraded simulant from the BOS Model Based Simulant and Explosive kit. It is no longer in a single piece. When the pieces are put together, it has lost a substantive amount [REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>Pictures and descriptions of both the object, and a new simulant, are provided below for further clarification and understanding.</p>

Page 1 of 4  
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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

	Picture of simulant upon receipt. Was folded in quarters and broken down the center.	


SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Boston Simulant



ery fragile & not contained in original packaging. When received, it was folded, obviously has been previously folded many times. Many cracks and breaking apart.

New Simulant



Example of brand new, undamaged simulant of proper dimensions.

---

**I have read this entire statement consisting of: 4 pages. I have been given the opportunity to make corrections. All of the information contained in this statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that I may be prosecuted for perjury or making false statements if I have intentionally misrepresented anything contained in this statement. I have not intentionally omitted any information or knowledge I have that relates to the matters under investigation or review.**

**I swear or affirm that the testimony I have provided in this electronic statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.**

**I certify that I am making this statement of my own free will, without any duress or coercion. The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.**

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Signature:

X

[Redacted Signature]

**For TSA INV Use Only**

I issued this Statement Form and electronically received the electronically signed record above.

The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.

Signature of Primary Investigator:

X

[Redacted Signature]

**For TSA INV Use Only**

The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.

Signature of Witness:

X

\_\_\_\_\_

# Exhibit

# 8

**SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**



**TSA INVESTIGATIONS  
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY**

Type of Activity: <input type="checkbox"/> Personal Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Records Review <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other	Date: January 5, 2024
Activity or Interview of: Boston Logan Replica sheet explosive training aid delivered to TSA Explosive Lab in Atlantic City, NJ.	Conducted by: Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] Philadelphia Field Office, Investigations
	Location of Interview/Activity: TSA Explosive Lab in Atlantic City, NJ.

**Subject Matter/Remarks**

On January 5, 2024, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Investigations Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] the Boston Logan [REDACTED] training aid used in the training exercises on March 11, 2023 to the TSA Explosive Lab in Atlantic City, NJ for testing.

***Attachment:***

*TSA Investigations Certified Inventory of Evidence form.*

Case Number I23-00576	Case Title: Security screening equipment malfunction
--------------------------	---

Revised May 10, 2022

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**TSA INVESTIGATIONS  
CERTIFIED INVENTORY OF EVIDENCE**

Evidence Held Against Boston Logan International Airport – AFSD-S [REDACTED]		Case No. I23-00576	
		TSA Investigations Field Office PFO	
Evidence Inventoried by (Signature/Date) SAIC [REDACTED]		Date of Inventory December 21, 2023	Page 1 of _
Witnessed by (Signature/Date) SAIC [REDACTED]		[REDACTED] (Signature/Date) SAIC [REDACTED] 01/05/2024	

Item No.	Date Received	Quantity	Description of Evidence Taken /Location Taken From	Value
1		1	[REDACTED] (photo attached) Received in unopened fedex tracking number 7745 7679 3418	
TOTAL →				

**NOTICE**

The attached materials are part of a Privacy Act system of records and should be disseminated only to those within TSA with a need to know the information in the course of their official duties. The attached materials should not be disseminated outside of TSA without the express written consent of the subject employee or after consultation with TSA's Privacy Act Officer or the Chief Counsel's office. An individual who wrongfully discloses information covered by the Privacy Act may be subject to criminal penalties.







**TSA INVESTIGATIONS  
CHAIN OF CUSTODY REPORT**

TSA Investigations Case Number/Case Title:		Date/Time Property First Acquired:	Disposition Date/Time
Item Number:	Taken by: Special Agent's Name/Signature	Purpose Taken:	Date/Time Taken
1	[REDACTED]	Transfer for testing	1/3/24
1	[REDACTED]	Testing	1/5/24

Remarks:  
Boston Logan International Airport AFSD-S [REDACTED] shipped the material via fedex to SA [REDACTED] at Baltimore Washington International Airport; the unopened package was received by SA LaNee Reaves on December 27, 2023 and transferred by hand to SAIC [REDACTED] on 1/3/23







# Exhibit

## 9

**SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**



**TSA INVESTIGATIONS  
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY**

Type of Activity: <input type="checkbox"/> Personal Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Records Review <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other	Date: February 7, 2024
Activity or Interview of: Microsoft Teams interview of [REDACTED] Attorney [REDACTED] present also.	Conducted by: Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] Deputy Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] Philadelphia Field Office, Investigations  Location of Interview/Activity: TSA Microsoft Teams

**Subject Matter/Remarks**

On February 7, 2024, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Investigations Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] and Deputy Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] conducted a Microsoft Teams interview with [REDACTED] a Transportation Security Manager (TSM) and his attorney [REDACTED] regarding the following two Whistleblower allegations. 1. The Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) machines at Boston Logan failed to detect known security threats during TSA officer training exercises; 2. Boston TSA management and the Boston Federal Security Director (FSD) failed to investigate these potential security vulnerabilities.

During the interview, [REDACTED] reiterated everything in his original complaint memorandum that was sent to TSA Investigations Hotline on March 14, 2023 and added no new information.

**Agent's Note:** See attachment 9 (Original TSA Investigations Hotline Complaint submitted by TSM [REDACTED] dated March 14, 2023).

Case Number I23-00576	Case Title: Security screening equipment malfunction
--------------------------	---

Revised May 10, 2022

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# Attachment 9

# MEMORANDUM

TO: TSA Investigations Hotline Complaint Program (HL23-00770)

FROM: [REDACTED] TSM (Transportation Security Manager)

RE: The International Security Checkpoint at TSA BOS-LOGAN Int'l Airport /

AIT Performance Deficiencies

DATE: 14 MARCH 2023

I am writing concerning performance deficiencies I observed in the 3 AIT units at the TSA International Security Checkpoint ("ECHO2") at BOS-LOGAN International Airport.

On SAT, March 11, 2023 at approximately 1900 while on duty and serving as the TSM in Terminal E at BOS-LOGAN International Airport, I responded to the ECHO2 Security Checkpoint at the request of a subordinate STSO of mine. I was informed that TSS-E [REDACTED] was performing a training demonstration with LTSO [REDACTED] utilizing a [REDACTED] training aid from the "Pelican Case" training tool kit. This [REDACTED] training aid was [REDACTED] of LTSO [REDACTED]. LTSO [REDACTED] was then scanned in each of the 3 AIT units at ECHO2 and none of the AIT units detected what should have been [REDACTED].

Each of the 3 AIT Units cleared LTSO [REDACTED] without showing any alarms [REDACTED] where the [REDACTED] training aid had been placed.

After receiving a full explanation of what had occurred, I initiated a conference call with my immediate superior, Deputy AFSD-Screening [REDACTED].

After being briefed, Deputy [REDACTED] then initiated a Bridge Conference Call through the Boston Security Coordination Center in which I, Deputy [REDACTED], TSS-E [REDACTED] and AFSD [REDACTED] all participated.

I described in detail the problem encountered by TSS-E [REDACTED] in the training he had conducted in each of the 3 AIT units at the ECHO2 Security Checkpoint and advised that I stopped utilizing the AIT equipment as a result of this issue, and further advised that we were screening passengers at that moment exclusively through the WTMD.

This Conference Call concluded with the advice from AFSD [REDACTED] that I should open the smaller alternate checkpoint known as ECHO1 and utilize the AIT at that location 2 such that AIT screening was taking place at one of the 2 available International Security Checkpoints, and that AFSD [REDACTED] would get back to us with further instructions.

About 30 minutes later, at approximately 2029, I was called by Deputy [REDACTED] and instructed to “re-calibrate all 3 AIT units [at ECHO2] and if they passed the re-calibration, to put these AIT units back into service,” or words to that effect.

All 3 AIT units passed re-calibration and the 2 AIT units associated with the operational mod-sets then being utilized at ECHO2 were placed back in service for passenger screening.

Shortly after placing these AIT units back into service, I was informed by the STSOs on duty that on March 3, 2023, a BOS FET test was conducted at ECHO2 and the test was deemed invalid. I was informed that the test consisted of a role-player [REDACTED] who entered the AIT and was screened utilizing the AIT equipment.

I was informed that the AIT did not generate [REDACTED] alarm during this BOS FET test and for that reason, the test was deemed invalid.

I sent the email appended below and marked as “Exhibit 1” to Deputy [REDACTED] with a copy to AFSD [REDACTED] at approximately 2122 hours on SAT, 03/11/2023.

On MON, 03/13/2023 at 1043, I forwarded that same email to FSD [REDACTED] with a copy to DFSD [REDACTED] and AFSD [REDACTED] expressing my continuing concern about this matter.

I filed my complaint with the TSA OIG that same morning.

The STSOs on duty on SAT evening, 03/11/2023 were extremely concerned that the AIT units were not [REDACTED] and formed the opinion that these AIT units were not functioning as intended.

I have similar concerns about these AIT units, as did TSS-E [REDACTED].

I am extremely reluctant to dismiss the concerns of my subordinates and my colleagues in matters of this kind, and I do not take comfort in the possible explanation that was provided to me. I was told that recent changes in the AIT algorithms downloaded to the

3

AIT equipment to accommodate the concerns expressed recently by some passengers may be the explanation for the AITs failing to pick up the [REDACTED] on 03/11/2023 and by inference, the [REDACTED] role player in the BOS FET test on 03/03/2023.

I am extremely concerned about retaliation and retribution for my having made this disclosure. Just as an example of my concern, prior to this disclosure I was offered a substitute RDO next week for training I am participating in this week which occurs on one of my RDOs. I was originally offered SAT, 03/25/2023 as my replacement RDO, but after giving notice of my disclosure and for reasons that are not clear to me, that offer was withdrawn and the date of WED, 03/22/2023 was substituted instead.

This may seem like a very small matter but that is often how things are carried out here at TSA BOS-LOGAN. It is often the little things that seem to be the focus for retribution, at first, to send the message, with greater consequences often following shortly thereafter.

As of this writing, I have not had any reply to my notifications to senior TSA BOS-LOGAN leadership about this problem. I remain deeply concerned that these AIT units, and perhaps others, continue to fail to [REDACTED]. In fact, I was instructed on SAT, 03/11/2023 "not to further test the AITs" (or words to that effect), as had occurred on SAT, 03/11/2023 during TSS-E [REDACTED] ison's training exercise, and as of this writing, I am unaware of any testing or other remediation efforts to address these AIT deficiencies.

Very respectfully,

[REDACTED] TSM - 617.212.1111

**EXHIBIT 1:**

**(Copied and Pasted)**

**From:** [REDACTED] >

**Date:** Saturday, Mar 11, 2023 at 9:22 PM

**To:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



**Subject:** BOS FET test at ECHO2 3/2/23 PM deemed invalid

██████ - Confirming our telephone conversation a moment ago, the above captioned test on lane 2/3 AIT was deemed invalid as the test did not generate the expected anomaly.

4

That invalid test on 3/2/2023 appears to be consistent with what we reported on our conference call this evening.

Given these 2 data points, my recommendation is that we not utilize the equipment until a resolution to the problem is in place.

We are presently utilizing the equipment, as we have been instructed so to do and in conformity with the instructions I was given.

Very respectfully,

[REDACTED], TSM

## EXHIBIT 2:

**(Copied and Pasted)**

**From:** [REDACTED] >

**Date:** Monday, Mar 13, 2023 at 10:43 AM

**To:**

Cc:

**Subject:** FW: BOS FET test at ECHO2 3/2/23 PM deemed invalid

Good morning FSD

Please review the email appended below.

I remain extremely concerned about this issue and I reiterate herein my recommendation as contained in the penultimate paragraph of the appended email. Similar expressions of concern were voiced to me by Terminal E PM leadership Officers, as well as others.

I have reported this matter to DHS OIG.

Kindly see a related email being sent to you at this time by my attorney, [REDACTED].

Very respectfully,

TSM

Sent with BlackBerry Work

([www.blackberry.com](http://www.blackberry.com))

**From:** [REDACTED] >

**Date:** Saturday, Mar 11, 2023 at 9:22 PM

**To:**

**To:**

**Cc:**

**Cc:**

**Subject:** BOS FET test at ECHO2 3/2/23 PM deemed invalid

██████ - Confirming our telephone conversation a moment ago, the above captioned test on lane 2/3 AIT was deemed invalid as the test did not generate the expected anomaly.

That invalid test on 3/2/2023 appears to be consistent with what we reported on our conference call this evening.

5

Given these 2 data points, my recommendation is that we not utilize the equipment until a resolution to the problem is in place.

We are presently utilizing the equipment, as we have been instructed so to do and in conformity with the instructions I was given.

Very respectfully,

██████, TSM

Sent with BlackBerry Work  
([www.blackberry.com](http://www.blackberry.com))

# Exhibit

# 10

**SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**



**TSA INVESTIGATIONS  
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY**

Type of Activity: <input type="checkbox"/> Personal Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Records Review <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other	Date: April 25, 2024
Activity or Interview of: Microsoft Teams interview of [REDACTED] Federal Security Director (FSD) Boston Logan International Airport	Conducted by: Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] Philadelphia Field Office, Investigations  Location of Interview/Activity: TSA Microsoft Teams

**Subject Matter/Remarks**

On April 25, 2024, at 10:00 am, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Investigations Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) [REDACTED] and Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] a Microsoft Teams interviewed Boston Logan International Airport Federal Security Director (FSD) [REDACTED] regarding the following two Whistleblower allegations: 1. The Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) machines at Boston Logan failed to detect known security threats during TSA officer training exercises;

2. Boston TSA management and the Boston Federal Security Director (FSD) failed to investigate these potential security vulnerabilities.

FSD [REDACTED] was made aware that INV was conducting an Office of Special Counsel official investigation and that the interview was being conducted via Microsoft Teams and audio recorded, which he verbally acknowledged the Audio Recording Notification. Please see attached written statement for additional information.

[REDACTED] stated that the incident that occurred on the evening of Saturday March 11, 2023 was not a training exercise and that the training aids [REDACTED] that had been provided for TSO awareness training were used inappropriately by the TSOs to conduct testing of the AIT machines.

Case Number I23-00576	Case Title: Security screening equipment malfunction
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Revised May 10, 2022

**WARNING:** This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)

█████ stated that he was advised via phone by AFSD █████ that TSM █████ had taken 4 AITs out of service due to their failure to detect an overt training aid that had been provided for awareness training.

█████ stated that he directed AFSD █████ to recalibrate the AIT machines and if all passed proper TSA HQ testing and calibration, then have them place back in-service.

█████ also stated that as a precaution, a P2 maintenance ticket request for inspection of the equipment would be initiated.

- Attachment(s):**
- 1. FSD’ s █████ Written Statement, dated May 13, 2024.

**Note:** The audio interview files will be maintained in the case file and the case management system.

Case Number: I23-00576	Case Title: Security screening equipment malfunction	Case Ti
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Revised May 10, 2022

# Attachment 10



Transportation  
Security  
Administration

Transportation Security Administration  
Investigations (INV)  
Statement Form

Name: [REDACTED]
Duty Assignment: Boston, Massachusetts
Current Position: Federal Security Director
Pay Band: TSES
Telephone Number: 617-561-2718
Investigators: SAIC [REDACTED]
I, [REDACTED] hereby make the following statement to [REDACTED] who has identified to me as an Investigator with TSA Investigations.
<p>1. The Advanced Imaging Technology [AIT] machines at Boston Logan failed to detect known security threats during TSA Officer training exercises;</p> <p>The incident that occurred on the evening of Saturday March 11, 2023 was not a training exercise. The items used by the Officers to conducting an AIT scan of them self was assigned to the Manages and Supervisors to be used in briefings only. When these briefing items were distributed they came with very clear instructions to be use as Visual and Touching Aids.</p> <p>2. Boston TSA Management and the Boston Federal Security Director [FSD] failed to investigate these potential security vulnerabilities;</p> <p>In the evening of Saturday March 11, 2023, I was advised by my Assistant Federal Security Director for Screening [AFSD [REDACTED]] that Manager [REDACTED] had taken 4 AITs out of service by using our Visual and Touching Aids as a testing item. I directed AFSD Selecky to test and calibrate each AIT, all AITs passed the proper TSA HQ testing and calibration. I put all of the AITs back in service and as a precaution we opened a P2 maintenance ticket request for inspection. The following day each P2 ticket was closed confirming the AITs were operating correctly.</p>

**I have read this entire statement consisting of: 3 pages. I have been given the opportunity to make corrections. All of the information contained in this statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that I may be prosecuted for perjury or making false statements if I have intentionally misrepresented anything contained in this statement. I have not intentionally omitted any information or knowledge I have that relates to the matters under investigation or review.**

**I swear or affirm that the testimony I have provided in this electronic statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.**

**I certify that I am making this statement of my own free will, without any duress or coercion. The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.**

-

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**TSA INV Use Only**

**I issued this Statement Form and electronically received the electronically signed record above.**

**The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.**

**Signature of Primary Investigator:**

**X**

[REDACTED]



**For TSA INV Use Only**

**The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.**

**Signature of Witness:**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**X** \_\_\_\_\_

A large black rectangular box redacting the signature of the witness.