

Office of Special Counsel
1730 M Street, N.W., Suite 218
Washington, D.C. 20036-4505

13 JULY 2015

Office of Special Counsel,

I have reviewed the supplemental report submitted by the Department of the Navy and want to submit the following comments to their report as a part of my allegations that employees at the Navy Strategic Systems Programs, Washington Navy Yard, D.C., engaged in conduct that constituted a violation of law, rule or regulation, gross mismanagement, and a substantial and specific danger to public safety.

- a. The additional comprehensive security-in-depth review and submitted report of the Department of the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) and its Commander to determine if additional corrective action is needed and if the SSP Commander was negligent in his duties was overseen by the Vice Chief of naval Operations (VCNO) and the Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF).
- b. I want to go on record to say that the VCNO, USFF, and the Commander of SSP were all classmates from the Naval Academy, class of 1982, I believe that these relationships are relevant to the integrity of the findings themselves and question whether this additional investigation and the comments provided that he was not negligent in his duties in this supplemental report are even objective in nature.
- c. While I applaud SSP for implementing the task by the SECNAV based on the Navy's own IG report of SSP, which are the same ones that were earlier divulged by myself and are the basis of my whistleblowing disclosure, it does not negate the fact that I disclosed these same security

violations numerous times to my chain of command to include the Commander of SSP and they were not acted upon.

- d. When the Commander of SSP found out that I continued to report up the chain of command, as required by my duties as the Physical Security Specialist/Assistant Security Manager, until someone would address these security violations is when the retaliation began against me.
- e. Many of these security violations I reported in 2012, were also outlined in the SECDEF Internal Review of the Washington Navy Yard Shooting, dated 20 NOV 2013.
- f. The Commander of SSP retaliated against me by alleging that I used my government computer for personal reasons even though my System Access Request Form was never given to me during in-processing (which discusses the uses and misuses of government equipment). SSP went so far as to request that sign my Systems Access Request Form and back date it to my date of hire, in the hopes of having their allegation of misuse of government equipment substantiated, when in fact they retaliated against me because of the security concerns I reported, where I should have been protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act.

I want to thank OSC for allowing my comments to be submitted for the record. As seen with Department of Veteran Affairs and retaliation for those employees coming forward for gross mismanagement and patient safety concerns, DoD employees should feel safe to disclose security violations that put the public in danger without fear of reprisal.


Vernon Eugene Londagin, Jr.