Sparky Edwards - OSC File No. DI-13-2348
Comments on the ROI
January 9, 2015

Appendix A:

1. **Para. 32**. Mr. Londagin and I tested security more than once. When we did so, it was dark and early in the morning. Mr. Londagin was a passenger in the car, but the Guards did not bend over enough to see and evaluate him. I handed them my passenger's (not my) ID upside down to show distress, but the Officer handed the ID back to me without looking at it. The guard did not notice it was not my ID.

2. **Paras. 35 and 36.** The Agency was not implementing the policy for eliminating decals. The Agency still required new employees to obtain a Washington Naval Yard Decal. On one occasion a Navy Master of Arms denied me entry because I did not have the proper decal.

3. **Paras. 54 and 55.** Ms. Bryant-Gordon certified the spaces improperly, whether purposefully or not. There were many problems that should have been fixed. The spaces should not have been certified as CAA. The former CSM Command Security Manager should be interviewed.

4. **Para. 62.** The Officer (CDR Clark) who did the inspection for Security provided me with information not reflected here. He stated that he had asked the Agency to give Mr. Londagin and me positive write-ups. He also stated that Security was praised for our knowledge, our working ability, and was recognized as doing exceptional work. The Agency overlooked the security problems we noted and the solutions we suggested. The Agency treated the inspection as a formality that was not meant to root out problems.

5. **Para. 64.** This summary is partially incorrect. Only 2-3 of the glass doors were covered with opaque covering, which mitigated the issue, but did not solve the problem at large. The Agency did not comply with my Plan of Actions to fix all of the problems with the glass doors, and cited NAVFAC and money as obstacles to solving the security issues. Additionally, Mr. Henry opposed my recommendations, and said the doors met standard. In 2013, he sent Phil Depeitro to a CYBER Inspection, who then reiterated the same security concerns with the doors I had been raising for 8 months. The doors needed to be fixed, and the astringels needed to be fixed. Also, the Common Access Cards are a CAT I finding.

6. **Para. 67.** The trim did not break, which would indicate it is strong; rather, the trim around the glass fell off. We found that the trim around the windows could be removed by fingertips and then put back in place. As a

result, any space in the CAAs could be infiltrated and exfiltrated with zero signs of force.

7. **Para. 68.** In and around June - July 2012, Mr. Londagin and I informed Ms. Ousterhout of the door deficiency, but she stated that the corrections did not need to occur for 6 months. The Cyber Inspection was 8 months away at that time. The deficiency correction finally occurred December 2012 - January 2013. The doors were installed with standard Phillips head screws, which can be removed with a common tool in a matter of seconds, whereas we requested the Agency use high security screws.

8. **Para. 69.** The Agency did not routinely check IDs prior to my arrival. The ID badges, which displayed escort requirements and clearance levels, were handed out to buddies of high ranking members, civilians, and big contract project managers with no clearances, so that they could circumvent Security and bypass the check-in process. I inventoried the number of ID badges missing or unaccounted for, which amounted to over 70%. I immediately changed the badging process, badges themselves, and the color system. Once I did this, the Head Office asked for stacks of cards to give VIPs so that they could easily enter. I informed them this was not authorized because they did not have the ability to access JPAS and check clearances. People did not like this change, but I was doing my job to protect Nuclear and Classified information.

9. **Para. 70.** The SSP HW leadership was highly aggressive in trying to get us to sign the documents.

10. **Para.74.** VADM Benedict testified he did not remember the packet I handed him on 19 March 2013, but I handed him this packet the day I left. It is the same packet Mr. Graf received in August 2013, and the ROI also states I provided this package on 19 March 2013. See para. 145; see also comments to para. 190.

11. **Para. 79.** The problem was that the Agency did not have a CAA, or a PDS. Once I discovered the Agency had neither, I immediately ordered that SIPR be shut down through the CIO, Edward Henry.

12. **Para. 84.** The SIPR was not reported during this time because the issue did not come to light until February. In and around December 2012-January 2013, we found the CAA signed checklist from the former Security Manager, and found it to be incorrect. I informed Command I needed to recertify the CAA and OSS. We used new checklist, evaluated all spaces, and the spaces failed.

13. **Para. 85.** Once the CCRI was delayed, the CIO wanted to turn SIPR back on, and I said no. We could not continue to violate laws and leave up unsecure and unprotected SIPR lines because the inspection was delayed.

14. **Para. 89.** I alerted the agency to this problem for 8 months and called the General and SES who eventually concurred with my findings.

15. **Para. 90.** Mr. Henry did not address the main problem, which is that we had no CAA or OSS, and so all of the SIPR line should have been pulled.

16. **Para. 93.** I decertified the spaces when they failed the security test. I decertified all SSP spaces that were OSS and CAA. As to this set of documents, the Agency wanted me to change my answers and certify the spaces. They also tried to get Vernon Londagin to sign the documents while I was out of the office. The only secure spaces were server rooms; however, the lines coming out of them needed to be in a PDS, and we did not have PDS.

17. **Para. 94.** The CIO told me he would not pull SIRNET from the Command suite, and the ADM also knew about the situation.

18. **Para. 95.** I decertified the space and lock boxes. There were no PDS and kill switches, which were required.

19. **Para. 96.** I informed SSP of these problems for 8 months.

20. **Para. 97.** I informed the Agency of this problem for over 10 months.

21. **Para. 98.** There were no secure areas because they did not pass my OSS inspection, and failed to meet the standards.

22. **Paras. 110 and 111.** I told the Agency about problems with the CAA.

23. **Para. 122.** I informed the Agency that the SIPR needed to be pulled back.

24. **Para. 123.** Mr. Henry stated they were going to modify blue prints to fool inspectors. When I protested, the Agency began having meetings without me. The Agency informed me that all SIPR was shut off, but that was not so because the main offices were still on. I confronted Mr. Henry about this, who did nothing about it, and said the ADR did not care. I immediately reported this to Glenda Arrington and Kevin Zumbar.

25. **Para. 135.** In addition to personal cell phones, personnel had private contractor wifi-air cards, personal air cards, PDAs, private laptops, and other USB items.

26. **Para. 137.** Policy states that no personal electronic devices (PEDS) are allowed in any area where Classified information may be Stored, Viewed or Processed. In all of these CAAs, information was constantly being Stored, Viewed, or Processed.

27. **Para. 145.** I have been truthful about everything I have stated.

28. **Paras. 148 and 149.** The Agency was not checking the majority of safes. Mr. Londagin and I found safes that had been sitting for 6-8 years with the same combinations, and that did not have a single daily check-in. Checking safes are a daily requirement. We also encountered heavy resistance to make changes. We implemented mandatory training for people with repeated violations, but people often continued to ignore policy because leadership did not reprimand them. My SECVIO log shows problems with the safes.

29. **Para. 151.** These statements are not accurate. Mr. Londagin and I reported we had difficulty making combination changes. We had a whole section go through a mandatory class because they were refusing to comply with the safe policies. SSP SOP stated that the Security Officers for each section were delegated as the people to change the combination. There were over 180 safes in SSP, so we could not change them all without help. We had safes with missing SF700s, safes that had been moved, safes with no combination changes for 6-8 years, and safes with no known combinations. We had to call in locksmiths, and enact training to solicit help in changing the combinations. One of the CAPT's Secretaries, Grace Galombo, could testify to this.

30. **Para. 155.** We had a list of GS 14s and 15s who told their people to ignore Security and not to lower the blinds.

31. **Para. 158.** Mr. Londagin and I informed the Agency about problems with the ADM's computer. The ADM and CAPT Brenton both left their SIPRs logged in and on when unattended. We had a meeting with Mr. Hyre and another in CAPT Brenton's office and saw that his SIPR computer was logged in and on display. During our first authorized after-hours inspection, we informed the Agency that the ADM did not have his burn bag marked or secured, and windows open to SIPR. CAPT Wolfe and Mr. Ketchum told Mr. Londagin and I that if we wanted to keep our jobs we needed to tread lightly in the command offices. We found over 176 violations found that night in a matter of 4 hours.

32. **Para. 162.** I sent an email to Mr. Ketchum and Mr. Hyre informing them that an unattended CAC is a CAT 1 STiG finding. I sent them an email stating that I easily found 76 unsecured CACs in a 5 day period. After my report, we were told not to touch a single CAC and to cease addressing this issue.

33. **Para. 178.** These statements are not accurate. I informed Mr. Hyre that the United Kingdom (UK) needed guards, and could help pay through their funds.

I was the factor behind getting the guards, not my predecessor. The UK has an office inside of Agency space, and some of their security requirements exceed Agency requirements, and by treaty, we had to address their requirements.

34. **Para. 182.** To elaborate on the core hours and access issue, I discovered that SSP employees and contractors went to baseball games at the stadium, and then returned to SSP space in the middle of the night intoxicated to sleep. On camera, I also saw SSP employees sleeping for days at a time in the spaces.

35. **Para. 184.** The Agency had not fully updated SSP Security SOP since 2004, and partially updated it in 2007. The SOP should be updated annually.

36. **Para. 189.** I brought Mr. Ketchum documentation of the problems, and also gave him plans of action to fix the problems, which he failed to address. Our Security in Depth did not exist, our building was not capable of being locked, and employees were expressing concerns for safety. We found vandalism in some areas of the building, and intoxicated people sleeping in the spaces. Also, I found over 160 cans of beer being stored in a cubical in the open storage secret space of SSP.

37. **Para. 190.** I handed the package of information to VADM Benedict. See comments to para. 74; see also para. 145. I sent emails expressing concerns that I was denied access to the ADM because I was told I had to go through Mr. Hyre, Mr. Graf, Mr. Ketchum, and the BOD. The appointment letter and regulations for the CSM states that I have direct and unrestricted access to the ADM. I was concerned that staff was not informing VADM Benedict about my security concerns, and set up a meeting to give him the packet. Mr. Ketchum arranged a meeting several hours before my meeting to place me on Administrative Leave. I still brought the packet with me, and when I walked out of the suite, I handed it to VADM Benedict.

38. **Para. 191.** The packet I handed VADM Benedict contained the security deficiencies, the security violation list, my Plan of Action Management (POAM), name list, and other documents regarding staff members. I also sent a huge list of Vios and POAMS to Mr. Ketchum and Mr. Hyre. It appears the SSP Board of Directors (BOD) received these POAMS, because they would not know how to correct the violations without these documents. A major problem was that Mr. Ketchum, BOD, Mr. Hyre, Mr. Graf, and Capt. Wolfe were circumventing the access line to the Admiral.

39. **Para. 193.** Using the BOD to cut off the CSM from the ADM is not proper nor allowed. I was not allowed to properly address these issues with the ADM.