

4/12/2017

Subj: Comments on OSC DI-16-2721 and NAVINSGEN 201602892

Overall, the report seems to be conducted in a professional and competent manner. I would like to thank the Office of Special Counsel and the Secretary of the Navy's office for taking my allegations seriously.

I want to keep my comments brief and only comment on the independent nature of the investigation. It appears that the investigators did not obtain full access to the Navy ERP system? My expectation would be that an independent third party would obtain access to the system of record to verify the data associated with my complaints. Considering that the investigation took over 6 months and it has been nearly 13 months since my filing with OSC this seems reasonable. One section of the report in particular (*highlighted on the next page*) is so inaccurate that it makes me question the validity of the investigation in entirety.

Steps Required to Obtain Correct Information/Data:

1. **Gain access to Navy ERP** -- specifically the database for Port Hueneme's on base operating materials and supplies. This was identified as Warehouse "N63" in the Navy ERP system during my tenure with NAVSEA.
2. **Access the "Physical Inventory Module" for Warehouse "N63"**.
3. **Review the Physical Inventories conducted from January 2015 to March 2016 for Warehouse "N63"**. These are the inventories conducted under my watch. The inventory record #s should be roughly #15 through #100.
4. **Count the number of line items of material that had incorrect quantities or no quantities found.**

Anyone who follows these steps identified above will see that between 4,000-7,000 inventory errors were corrected in the first 3 months that we began to use the Physical Inventory Module of Navy ERP during my period of employment. I state these numbers with confidence, because one inventory record in particular corrected over 1,800 line items of material stored in the "ERROR" bin (these items were never assigned a physical bin location which is a basic step). It's easy to recall this with confidence even 13 or 14 months later, because I remembering having to type "0" into the system of record over a thousand times when posting the inventory results.

The chart below and the comments suggest that only 500 or less inventory line items were corrected during my employment at NAVSEA. That is an egregious misrepresentation of facts and it appears that the investigators simply took the data that NSLC and NSWC PHD employees provided to them at "face value". The investigators either did not have the expertise or access required to the Navy ERP system. Independent access to Navy ERP and expertise in the system would be a prerequisite for any independent investigation into these allegations.

99. The number of unaccounted for line items listed in Navy ERP for specific time periods are: **My best estimate at the actual numbers**

| | |
|--|---|
| 2012 | 753 line items |
| 2013 | 570 line items |
| 2014 | 1573 line items |
| 1 Jan 2015 – 30 Jun 2015 | 385 line items |
| 1 Jul 2015 – 22 Mar 2016 (Complainant's Tenure as NSLC Site Lead) | 596 line items <i>(1 Jul 15 – 31 Dec 15 - 518 line items)</i> <i>(1 Jan 15 – 22 Mar 16 - 78 line items)</i> |
| 23 Mar – 25 Jun 2016 (Acting NSLC Site Lead) | 25 line items |
| 26 Jun 16 to 22 Nov 2016 (Current NSLC Site Lead) | 5 line items |

1,200 line items
1,800 line items
6,000 line items
8,000 line items
1,000 line items
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100. The Navy ERP data establishes that during the Complainant's tenure the number of unaccounted for items decreased significantly over time. From 1 Jul to 31 Dec 2015, there were 518 unaccounted for line items. From 1 Jan to 22 Mar 2016, the number of unaccounted for line items was 78. The decline in unaccounted for line items is evidence that positive changes in warehouse management began during the Complainant's tenure and continue to date.

101. Nearly 85% of the unaccounted for line items, 3,281 line items, are for material that was received at PHD prior to 1 Jul 2015, the date that NSLC took over management of buildings 435 and 439.

This is extremely inaccurate. What is the data source? An NSLC employee or NSWC PHD employee providing data is not a data source.

*Please note that NSLC employees may have "wiped the data" as part of a cover-up following my departure. Read the transcript of my MSPB hearing for more details there. Specifically, read the testimony from the "acting Port Hueneme NSLC site lead" following my departure and what he was directed to do by the NSLC management team in late March 2016 or early April 2016.

Best Regards

