Vincent M. Sugent
7768 Pleasant Lane
Ypsilanti, MI 48197
February 4, 2012

Karen Gorman
Deputy Chief, Disclosure Unit
U.S. Office of Special Counsel
1730 M Street, N.W., Suite 300
Washington, D. C. 20036-4505

Dear Karen,

Thanks again for your time, patience and effort in addressing safety issues and improprieties with Detroit Tower and the Agency. The following is offered as a response to the Secretary of Transportation, the Office of Inspector General and the Agency's findings and arguments.

Although the three allegations were substantiated, nothing has changed. The following is an excerpt from page 9 of the OIG report; *"According to the Air Traffic Manager, DTW managers have not changed the airport's simultaneous arrival and departure operations because no FAA official outside the facility has advised them that DTW is not operating in compliance with FAA Order 7110.65."* How is this possible? I was charged with an operational error for the miss application of a rule by an entity outside of the facility.

From December 2009 until late 2010, I was told that an interpretation request had been submitted and the facility was awaiting a response. In January 2011, I was told that one had not been sent. The facility knew exactly what was going on and what an interpretation request response would reveal, so the *"no FAA official outside the facility has advised them that DTW is not operating in compliance with FAA Order 7110.65."* absolutely holds no water.

This is the same position that the then Detroit Air Traffic Manager, Joseph Figliuolo, took during the play with words circulating around Detroit's Southwest Flow and AOV's use of non-compliance versus unsafe verbiage. Mr. Figliuolo did not know that non-compliance meant unsafe and now there is a difference between an operational error called against me by an outside entity and not being advised by an FAA official outside the facility that DTW is not operating in compliance with FAA Order 7110.65. On the contrary, that is exactly why Mr. Figliuolo never sent an interpretation request. As with the Southwest Flow play on words, Mr. Figliuolo knows or is being told exactly what the compliance issues are with the 7110.65 and my operation error.

In attachment 1, under the properties tab, the created date is 8/17/2010. In attachment 2, under the properties tab, the created date is 11/1/2010. In attachment 1, under the Facility Manager's Recommendations and Corrective Actions, Mr. Figliuolo states, *"This error*

will be briefed to tower control personnel to include a radar and voice replay and discussion of events." This has never taken place.

Via email, I received attachment 2 and to my surprise not only were there no comments under the Facility Manager's Recommendations and Corrective Actions page, but that page and every page thereafter was removed. This includes the signature pages of Mr. Figliuolo and then Director, Central Terminal Operations, Nancy Kort.

I noticed this discrepancy during my interview with Brian Uryga of the OIG. I sent Mr. Uryga the two separate files (Attachment 3) and nothing was ever mentioned in the report of the discrepancy. Given past conduct, this should have raised more concern and given greater scrutiny.

In early 2011, the facility offered an interpretation request from Support Manager, Ron Bazman. This is offered by the OIG as attachment 3. In the request Mr. Bazman states, *"However, application of these paragraphs in conjunction with the operational error prompted review of the application and intent of not only these paragraphs, but several others."*

At the core of Mr. Bazman's flawed logic is one simple fact; no one should ever have to ask the intent of a paragraph of the 7110.65. The intent is clearly stated in the 7110.65 and is as follows, *"This order prescribes air traffic control procedures and phraseology for use by personnel providing air traffic control services."* And providing air traffic control service is the separation of aircraft.

Mr. Bazman also states, *"I suspect we have been operating on the assumption that the 20 degrees satisfies the passing or diverging paragraph...."* Mr. Bazman is suspecting and assuming what the facility is doing is correct?

Mr. Bazman is also incorrect when he states, *"....30 degrees difference from the published missed approach procedure..."* That is not what the rule states. Paragraph 5-8-5 states "....from the missed approach course....", not published missed approach procedure.

Mr. Bazman cannot even offer a proper coherent interpretation request due to a lack of air traffic knowledge, experience and ability. Mr. Bazman is another reason for the facility to be in such disarray over this issue.

The email offered as attachment 7 in the OIG report shows the frustration of Susan Ruddy. Ms. Ruddy's statement, *"I'm not sure what happened in the interim, but the response today does not reflect our conversation."*, raises particular concern. I have respect for Ms. Ruddy so I am curious what took place for her to make such a statement.

Given Mr. Bazman's rambling incoherent request it is no wonder the response, and to use Ms. Ruddy's words, had contradictory and confusing statements.

On January 25, 2012, the Agency rescinded the response to the facilities interpretation request. (Attachment 4)

Page 8 of the OIG report states, *"This confusion and lack of understanding still exists despite the MBI mentioned above, which resulted from the recommendation of the Event Investigation Manager who reviewed the December 25, 2009, event. In the January 20, 2010, Event Review Report, the Event Investigation Manager recommended, among other things, that the "facility should conduct a Mandatory Briefing Item (MBI) on the requirements of paragraph 5-8-5." In response to the recommendation, an unsigned and unattributed piece of paper appeared in the "Read & Initial" binder in the DTW air traffic control tower sometime in late December 2009, stating: "The ATO Safety Team has recommended a review of paragraphs 5-8-4 and 5-8-5 in regards to a recent loss of separation between a departure and go-around. Please review the pertinent information included in the MBI"."*

This type of handling of MBI's is not uncommon here at DTW. No names, routing numbers and unclear direction. In the past this was done so the facility could put efficiency ahead of safety. Remember, the information was put into the read during the shift portion of the R & I binder and controllers were not briefed face to face. Again, given past conduct, this should have raised more concern and given greater scrutiny.

The actions required by Mr. Foushee's November 18, 2011 document were not transferred very well to the Secretary's letter to Ms. Lerner. Mr. Foushee's direction is better delineated and detailed than the first two pages of the document sent to Ms. Lerner.

The way I interpret Mr. Foushee's direction was that the Agency, regionally and/or nationally, was to address our issues, then we were to be briefed/trained and then observed to see if we were in compliance. This is not what is taking place.

Number 1 on page two of the document to Ms. Lerner must be fulfilled, the Agency must implement and provide a response to Allegation 1, a), b) from Mr. Foushee's document and the facility must receive any documents/notes/feedback concerning Agency response to Allegation 3, c), and d). This is needed to accomplish and fulfill number 2 on page two of the document to Ms. Lerner, Agency response to Allegation 1, c) and Allegation 2 a) and f).

As stated, the changes offered by Mr. Foushee were due to the findings of the OIG. So what has been done to correct the issues?

In attachment 5, the 1448z line is totally inaccurate. EGF4343 was not landing, and there is no way feasible could have been landing, on Runway 3 Left given the weather. Runway 3 Left can be utilized for landing during visual conditions, but does not have an instrument landing system required for landing in poor weather. N77RG was not a Runway 4 Right departure eastbound. N77RG was a Runway 3 Right departure westbound.

We have not changed any part of our operation. Yet Quality Assurance personnel observed controllers departing aircraft in poor weather conditions with landing aircraft on or inside of a 2 mile final. This violates paragraph 5-8-5 and to my knowledge have not reported any of the operational errors. Just because an aircraft did not execute a missed approach does not mean a rule was not violated.

So this is the quality and care that the facility and the OSC process receives. Quality Assurance personnel that are not nor even take the time to become familiar with the facility that they were tasked to observe.

The report states that we (controllers) are operating under conflicting rules, lack of clear guidance and training and committed unreported (unrecognized) operational errors. The report even shows a lack of understanding among the front line managers. Since the operational error, we have received only one attempt at clarification. The MBI mentioned earlier. This was also dismissed as inadequate guidance.

So, locally there has been a lack of clear guidance and training, unrecognized errors, lack of understanding, at least one poor briefing and Mr. Mello rescinded his interpretation.

Given all these noted issues at the facility, Mr. Figliuolo tasked the facility with addressing training/procedures and answering the interpretation request posed by Gary and me. Then the facility will submit what they come up with to the region/national offices for their blessing. While I believe that having the issues addressed and answered is a good thing, this is not our job. Facilities do not make, set or change policy. The Agency does. The interpretation request needs to be answered, and if necessary, the rules need to be changed nationally and then and only then will or should the facility make changes to our standard operating procedures.

It is funny that Mr. Figliuolo has tasked the facility with such an undertaking given the fact that he was the facility manager when this all first took place. Why did he not act in this manner when this first unfolded on December 25, 2009?

To make things even more convoluted, Mr. Peter Trapp, a contract employee of the Agency, makes statements (Attachment 6) like, *"I think the discussion you are referring to was primarily between AJT personnel"*, when ask to clarify the telcon statement of, *"....if I need to get you an interpretation that says you can't, I will...."*. Mr. Trapp also states", *"I review the collective work of all organizations as ultimately responsible for defining what operations are legal at DTW."* Again, that determination was made the moment I was charged with an operational error.

Utilizing bcc when replying to emails, not fully discussing all of the issues (national systemic issue), not addressing the Complainant's issue and unidentified comments during telcons are littered throughout Mr. Trapp's email and this is no way to solve a problem. No wonder they asked the facility to correct the issues.

Everyone outside of this facility is an air traffic rules genius and quick to pull the trigger and assign operational errors when things go wrong. But ask them to justify their position, correct a problem or actually help and they act as if you asked just stabbed them in the eye and asked if it hurts. They need to do their damn jobs and answer the interpretation request and properly address Mr. Foushee's changes in the order he laid out. If not and the facility continues to move forward in doing the jobs of others, I guarantee when an issue arises surrounding this topic the facility will be looking at themselves in a mirror.

Attachment seven covers two "Wake Turbulence and Missed Approach/Go-Around Operations" documents. One was signed and effective prior to my operational error and the other was signed and effective after.

The following are excerpts from both documents;

"Until new requirements are established, all terminal facilities should review their standard operating procedures and training programs to ensure that operational personnel are provided best practices for deconflicting missed approach/go-around operations that they are most likely to confront in their airport's configurations. Local operations should be modified to minimize such potential conflicts where it is determined to be practical and without undue operational impact.

It is incumbent upon controllers as a first priority of duty to establish departure separation as soon as possible after the transition of a missed approach/go-around.

The request for interpretation has highlighted the need for developing specific guidance for the separation of missed approach/go-around operations.

The ATO Safety Services office will immediately begin collecting separation data between missed approach/go-around traffic and other operations using passive collection tools such as the Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System (POARS) and Continuous Data Recording Player Plus (CDRPP).

Additionally, ATO Terminal Services is developing specific definitions and separation requirements that operational personnel will apply to missed approach/go-around operations.

While separation requirements are clearly defined for application between arriving and departing aircraft and between subsequent departures, they are not explicitly stated for application to missed approach/go-around traffic as it transitions from arrival to departure status."

Although wake turbulence is stated in the title, it is clear that the Agency knew and is concerned about the application beginning in February 27, 2009 in the first document and had continued concern, but allowed the second document to expire on June 15, 2011.

Both documents mention the missed approach transitioning from arrival to departure status, developing definitions and separation requirements and conflictions. Both documents also declare that new requirements will be established and are doing so via data collected by ATS Terminal Services. If new requirements will be established and specific definitions given, then why is the facility doing duplicate work? To date and to my knowledge, this has not been accomplished.

The documents signatory, Nancy Kalinowski, stated some of the same concerns we have and even had some of the same questions we asked in the interpretation request.

What happened to all the data collected? What is the progress on the specific definitions and separation requirements? Since the facility was tasked with answering our own interpretation request and establishing our own procedures, this information would be quite helpful would it not?

To my knowledge, the systemic issue is also not being properly or even addressed at all and that was made very clear by Mr. Trapp.

What is going on within the Agency? It appears the Agency is derelict in their duties and has once again put efficiency ahead of safety of the flying public. This entire situation is due to pitiful regional and national managerial performance and oversight and incompetent leadership due to a lack of air traffic understanding, knowledge, experience and ability.

Ms. Kort and Mr. Figliuolo were both in their posts of Director, Central Terminal Operations and Detroit Air Traffic Manager respectively at the time of the operation error. Both also held these posts during every Special Counsel charge that I have been involved in. The Agency clearly is aware of what roles Ms. Kort and Mr. Figliuolo played in each charge. I cannot believe this conduct is still allowed to continue.

Respectfully and Sincerely,

Vincent M. Sugent

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PART I. INVESTIGATIVE DATA

1. Date and time of incident:

MM/DD/YYYY: 12/25/2009

Time (Local): 0924

2. Responsible facility: DTW

Classification Level: 11

3. Severity Index: points

- [ ] A
- [ ] B
- [ ] C
- [ ] D

- [ ] Controlled
- [ ] Uncontrolled

- [ ] Converging, Opposite Flight Paths
- [ ] Converging, Crossing Flight Paths
- [ ] Same Flight Paths
- [ ] Diverging/Non-intersecting Flight Paths

4. Was weather a factor in the incident? [x] Yes [ ] No

(If yes, explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

5. Altitude/flight level of incident: 2000

6. Type of airspace:

- [ ] Class A
- [x] Class B
- [ ] Class C
- [ ] Class D
- [ ] Other

- [ ] Class E
- [ ] Class G
- [ ] Oceanic
- [ ] Airport Surface

7. Location of Incident :

Fix: DXO

Intersection:

Direction: 35

Runway:

Distance: 1

Taxiway:

Latitude:

Longitude:

Area/Sector or Position Designator: *See Appendix*

8. Closest Proximity:

Vertical Feet: 200

Lateral: 0.3

- [ ] Feet
- [x] Miles
- [ ] Minutes
- [ ] N/A

9. Number of aircraft for which the controller had control responsibility at the time of the incident: 5

10. Was training in progress?

- [ ] Yes
- [x] No

Complete blocks 11-36 for each employee

11. Enter P for primary or C for contributory:

12. Number of personnel involved: 1

13. Employee's facility:

Three-letter Identification **Level** **Type**

14. Reserved:

15. Date of birth: MM/DD/YYYY

16. Social Security Number: Last six digits only

17. Indicate the performance level of the employee:

- [ ] Developmental
- [ ] ATCS
- [ ] Supervisor
- [ ] Staff Specialist
- [ ] Other

If ATCS, how long since ATCS in current facility?

YY-MM

18. Last date of certification or recertification on position:

MM/DD/YYYY

- [ ] Initial Certification
- [ ] Recertification

19. Has training relevant to the incident been received within the last 12 months?

- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No

If yes, list the type and the date of that training in this block:

20. Is a medical certification issue related to the incident?

☐ Yes

☐ No

(If yes, explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

21. Identify and describe the type of work schedule being worked at the time of the incident:

22. Current and previous shift:

Previous shift:
Sign in Sign out

Current shift:
Sign in Sign out

23. Area of specialization:

TOWER

24. Sector or position:

LOCAL
NORTHWEST

Number and Name

25. Time on position:

Minutes

26. What sectors or positions were combined at the position being staffed at the time of the incident?

LSW

27. Which associated positions were staffed at the time of the incident?

NONE

28. Position function:

☐ Radar ☐ Radar Associate ☐ Hand-off ☐ Local Control ☐ Ground Control
☐ Flight Data ☐ Clearance Delivery ☐ Departure Position ☐ Arrival Position ☐ Supervisor
☐ Air Traffic Assistant ☐ Traffic Management Coordinator ☐ Tracker ☐ Other

29. Did any operational personnel request assistance prior to the incident?

☐ Yes ☒ No

(If yes, explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

30. Were any operational personnel aware that an Operational Error/Deviation was developing?

☒ Yes ☐ No

(Explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

31. Did the employee contemplate taking corrective action?

☐ Yes ☐ No

(Explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

32. Did any operational personnel attempt to take corrective action?

☒ Yes ☐ No

(Explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

33. Operational personnel were alerted to the incident by:

Equipment:	Personnel:	Non-facility Personnel:	Other:
☐ Conflict Alert	☒ Self-identified	☐ Pilot	
☐ MSAW/EMSAW	☐ Facility personnel	☐ Another facility	

34. Date and time operational personnel became aware of the incident:

MM/DD/YYYY **Time(local)**

35. Was the Distance Reference Indicator (i.e., J-Ring) being used?

☐ Yes

☒ No

36. Were there any distractions or environmental conditions that may have influenced the incident?

☐ Yes ☒ No (If yes, explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

37. Was an OSIC or CIC on duty at the time of the incident?

Enter A for OSIC
Enter C for CIC A

38. Was the assigned OSIC/CIC present in the operational area at the time of the incident?

☒ Yes ☐ No

39. Did the employee require OSIC/CIC assistance prior to the incident?

☐ Yes ☐ No

40. Did the assigned OSIC/CIC provide assistance?

☐ Yes ☐ No

(Explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

41. If sectors were combined, did the OSIC/CIC approve the combination?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not combined ☒ N/A

42. If the positions were combined, did the OSIC/CIC approve the combination?

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not combined

43. In what activity was the assigned OSIC/CIC engaged at the time of the incident?

☐ General Supervision
☒ Direct operational supervision
☐ Working a position of operation
☐ Administering training
☐ Receiving training
☐ Other

44. Was the OSIC/CIC certified in the area of specialization where the incident took place?

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A (If no, explain here)

45. Traffic complexity? 4

1	2	3	4	5
Low		Avg.		High

46. Indicate which factors were associated with traffic complexity.

☒ Weather
☐ Terrain
☐ Airspace configuration
☒ Number of aircraft
☐ Experience level
☐ Emergency situation
☐ Runway configuration
☐ Runway condition
☐ Flow control
☐ Special Event
☐ Other

47. Type of Control Provided

☐ Radar
☒ Tower
☐ Oceanic
☐ Non-radar
☐ AFSS/FSS
☐ TFM

48. Required separation was by:

☒ FAA Order
☐ Facility Letter of Agreement (LOA) or Directive

FAA Order: 7110.65 Facility LOA/Directive:

Paragraph: 5-8-5 B1 Paragraph:

49. Were any deficient procedures noted as a result of the incident?

☐ Yes ☒ No

(If yes, explain here)

50. Were any special procedures in effect at the time of the incident (e.g. Traffic Management Program)?

☐ Yes ☒ No

(If yes,explain here)

(Complete additional sections if more than two aircrafts are involved)

51. Number of aircraft/vehicles involved in the incident: 2

	Aircraft/Vehicle No. 1	Aircraft/Vehicle No. 2
52. Identification	NWA7332	FLG3845
53. Prefix/type/suffix	DC93/W	CRJ2/L
54. Flight/vehicle profile at time of time of incident	☐ Descending ☐ Making approach ☐ Touching down ☐ Radar vector ☐ Level flight ☐ Takeoff roll ☐ Taxiing-runway ☐ Landing roll ☐ Climbing ☐ Holding in position on runway ☒ Other GO AROUND	☐ Descending ☐ Making approach ☐ Touching down ☐ Radar vector ☐ Level flight ☐ Takeoff roll ☐ Taxiing-runway ☐ Landing roll ☒ Climbing ☐ Holding in position on runway ☐ Other
55. Aircraft ground speed	☒ N/A _____ Knots	☒ N/A _____ Knots
56. TCAS equipped	☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Unknown	☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Unknown
57. Evasive action	☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ TCAS ☐ Unknown	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ TCAS ☒ Unknown
58. Did the pilot file a Near Midair Collision Report	☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Unknown	☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Unknown

59. Aircraft and Obstruction/Obstacles

☐ Terrain ☐ Vehicle(s) ☐ Personnel ☐ Obstruction ☐ Equipment ☐ Protected Airspace
☐ Airport Movement Area (explain) ☒ Not applicable ☐ Other (explain)

60. Was equipment layout or design a factor in the incident?

☐ Yes ☒ No (If yes, explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

61. Was any pertinent equipment reported as functioning unsatisfactorily before the incident?

☐ Yes ☒ No (If yes, explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

62. System(s) in use:

☐ HOST	☐ CENRAP	☐ ARTS IIIE	☐ D-BRITE	☒ ASDE-X
☐ EBUS/HOST (FDP)	☒ ASR-9	☐ MEARTS	☐ BRITE IV	☐ Model 1
☐ EBUS	☐ ASR-11	☐ ACDs on ARTS	☐ AMASS	☐ OASIS
☐ URET	☐ ARTS IIE	☐ STARS on ARTS	☐ ASDE II	☐ Other:
☒ Mode S	☐ ARTS IIIA	☒ STARS	☐ ASDE III	

63. Was radar transition from one system to another in progress?

☐ Yes ☒ No (if yes, explain here)

64. What was the status of the Conflict Alert at the time of the incident?

☒ Activated ☐ Not available ☐ Not activated
☐ Not Installed ☐ Suppressed

ITEM 4. WEATHER WAS MARGINAL, WITH GUSTY WIND AND LOW LEVEL WINDSHEAR ADVISORIES.

ITEM 30. THE LOCAL NORTHWEST CONTROLLER WAS AWARE THAT A CONFLICT WAS DEVELOPING WHEN HE REALIZED THAT NWA7332 WAS GOING AROUND.

ITEM 32. THE LNW CONTROLLER TRIED TO STOP THE DEPARTURE AIRCRAFT'S TURN THEN TURNED THE DEPARTURE FURTHER RIGHT, BUT SEPARATION WAS LOST.

NWA7332 WAS CONDUCTING AN ILS RUNWAY 4L APPROACH. WHEN NWA7332 WAS JUST UNDER 2 MILES FROM THE RUNWAY
THRESHOLD, THE LOCAL NORTHWEST CONTROLLER CLEARED FLG3845 FOR TAKEOFF ON RUNWAY 4R WITH A HEADING OF 330 DEGREES. THE LOCAL NORTHWEST CONTROLLER OBSERVED NWA7332 GOING AROUND ON RUNWAY 4L AND INSTRUCTED FLG3845 (NOW AIRBORNE) TO CONTINUE RUNWAY HEADING AND NOT TURN. NWA7332 DECLARED THEY WERE GOING AROUND AND LNW ASSIGNED NWA7332 A 330 DEGREE HEADING. THE LNW CONTROLLER THEN INSTRUCTED FLG3845 TO MAKE A RIGHT TURN. LNW THEN TOLD FLG3845 TO MAKE A RIGHT TURN TO AT LEAST A 050 HEADING.

THE CONTROLLER FAILED TO ENSURE THE FLG3845 RUNWAY 4R DEPARTURE COURSE DIVERGED FROM NWA7332 4L MISSED APPROACH COURSE IMMEDIATELY BY AT LEAST 30 DEGREES.

65. SUMMARY OF INCIDENT (continued from page 5)

66. INVESTIGATORS

Date	Typed/Printed Name	Signature
01202010 MM/DD/YYYY	EARL H GRAND First/MI/Last Name	Investigator-in-Charge
01202010 MM/DD/YYYY	LISA GREEN First/MI/Last Name	Team Member
MM/DD/YYYY	First/MI/Last Name	Team Member
MM/DD/YYYY	First/MI/Last Name	Team Member
MM/DD/YYYY	First/MI/Last Name	Team Member
MM/DD/YYYY	First/MI/Last Name	Team Member
MM/DD/YYYY	First/MI/Last Name	Team Member
MM/DD/YYYY	First/MI/Last Name	Team Member

65. SUMMARY OF INCIDENT (continued from page 6)

Part II. FACILITY MANAGER ACTION

67. Select the classification of the OE/OD. (More than one category may be selected.)

☒ Human ATCS ☐ Manager/Supervisor/Other Personnel ☐ Procedural ☐ Equipment ☐ Other (Explain in Block 69)

68. Causal Factors	No	Yes
		A
A. Data Posting	☒	
(1) Computer Entry	☐	
Incorrect input		☐
Incorrect update		☐
Premature termination of data		☐
Input/Update not made		☐
Other (explain):		☐
(2) Flight Progress Strip	☐	
Not updated		☐
Interpreted incorrectly		☐
Posted incorrectly		☐
Updated incorrectly		☐
Prematurely removed		☐
Other (explain):		☐
B. Radar Display	☐	
(1) Misidentification	☒	
Failure to re-identify aircraft when the accepted target identity becomes questionable		☐
Overlapping data blocks		☐
Acceptance of incomplete or difficult to correlate position information		☐
Other (explain):		☐
(2) Inappropriate Use of Displayed Data	☐	
MODE C		☐
BRITE		☐
Conflict alert		☐
Failure to detect displayed data		☐
Failure to comprehend displayed data		☐
Failure to project future status of displayed data		☒
Other (explain):		☐
C. Aircraft Observation (Towers Only)	☒	
(1) Actual Observation of Aircraft		☐
(2) Improper Use of Visual Data	☐	
Landing		☐
Taking Off		☐
Ground Operation	☐	
Taxiing across runway		☐

	No	Yes	
		A	
D. Communication Error	☒		
(1) Phraseology		☐	
(2) Transposition		☐	
(3) Misunderstanding		☐	
(4) Read back	☐		
Altitude		☐	
Clearance		☐	
Identification		☐	
Other (explain):		☐	
(5) Acknowledgement		☐	
(6) Other (explain):		☐	
E. Coordination	☒		
(1) Area of Incident	☐		
Intra-sector/position		☐	
Inter-sector/position		☐	
Inter-facility		☐	
Facility type: _____ Level: _____ and facility ID: _____			
(2) Failure to use/comply with precoordination information		☐	
(3) Improper use of information exchanged in coordination	☐		
Aircraft Identification		☐	
Altitude/Flight Level		☐	
Route of Flight		☐	
Speeds		☐	
APREQs		☐	
Special Instructions		☐	
Other (explain):		☐	
(4) Failure to coordinate between ground and local control	☐		
Crossing active runway		☐	
Vehicle, equipment, or personnel on active runway		☐	
Use of runway other than active runway for arrival and departures		☐	
Runway closure		☐	
Other (explain):		☐	
F. Position Relief Briefing	☒		
(1) Employee did not use position relief checklist		☐	
(2) Employee being relieved gave incomplete briefing		☐	
(3) Relieving employee did not make use of pertinent data exchanged at briefing		☐	

69. FACILITY MANAGER'S RECOMMENDATIONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A COMPLETE REVIEW OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS EVENT WAS CONDUCTED BY THIS FACILITY. THE REVIEW INCLUDED AN INVESTIGATION BY BOTH THE FRONT LINE MANAGER IN CHARGE AND THE QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT. THE OPERATIONS MANAGER, STAFF MANAGER AND THE AIR TRAFFIC MANAGER WERE BRIEFED ON THE INCIDENT.
THE QUALITY ASSURANCE INVESTIGATION INCLUDED A REVIEW OF THE VOICE TAPES, EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWS, AND RADAR DATA. THE INVESTIGATION CONCERNING THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE ON DECEMBER 25, 2009, REVEALED AN OPERATIONAL ERROR HAD OCCURRED.
THE EMPLOYEE WAS NOTIFIED OF THE OPERATIONAL ERROR AND GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO FILE AN ATSAP REPORT. THE EMPLOYEE WAS RETURNED TO DUTY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CURRENT NATIONAL QUALITY ASSURANCE ORDER AND AIR TRAFFIC SAFETY ACTION PROGRAM (ATSAP).

A MANDATORY BRIEFING ITEM ON 7110.65, PARAGRAPHS 5-8-4-AND 5-8-5 WAS PROVIDED TO ALL CONTROL PERSONNEL IN THE TOWER.

THIS ERROR WILL BE BRIEFED TO TOWER CONTROL PERSONNEL TO INCLUDE A RADAR AND VOICE REPLAY AND DISCUSSION OF EVENTS.

THE TOWER NATCA REPRESENTATIVE WAS FURNISHED A COPY OF THIS REPORT AND PROVIDED NO COMMENTS.

Date	Typed/Printed Name of Facility Manager	Signature
|0|2|0|4|2|0|1|0|	JOSEPH FIGLIUOLO III	/S

69. FACILITY MANAGER'S RECOMMENDATIONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (continued from page 10)

Part III. SERVICE AREA DIRECTOR

70. SERVICE AREA DIRECTOR'S CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This Block does not apply to OE/ODs attributed to contractor-operated Flight Servie Station.

☒ I concur with the recommendations and corrective actions of the facility manager.

Date	Typed/Printed Name of Service Area Director	Signature
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

70. SERVICE AREA DIRECTOR'S CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (continued from page12)

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Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Date: January 28, 2010

To: Vince Sugent, CPC
Matt Bird, NATCA Representative, DTW ATCT

From: Air Traffic Manager, DTW-1

Prepared by: Lisa Green, Support Specialist

Subject: ACTION: Final OE Report (DTW-T-10-E-001)

In accordance with FAA Order 7210.56C, please find attached a copy of FAA Form 7210-3, Final Operational Error/Deviation Report, Parts I and II, for the Operational Error that occurred on December 25, 2009.

In accordance with Order 7210.56C, paragraph 5-1-13 (b), employees may submit comments or recommendations in writing to the Air Traffic Manager within 5 calendar days of receipt. The comments shall include the employee's name, position function, and location of employment, signature, and date. Recommendations should concern corrective actions that can be undertaken to preclude a similar occurrence.

Please submit any comments to me by February 3, 2010. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to see me.

FAA FORM 7210-3, FINAL OPERATIONAL ERROR/DEVIATION REPORT (ATQA)

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report (ATQA)
PART I INVESTIGATIVE DATA

Report Number: D 7 W T C 9 E 0 C 4

1. Date and time of incident
MM/DD/YYYY: 1 2 2 5 2 0 0 9
Time (Local): 0 9 2 4

2. Responsible facility: DTW
Classification Level: 11

3. Severity Index: points
- [ ] A
- [ ] B
- [ ] C
- [ ] D
- [ ] Corrected
- [ ] Uncorrected
- [ ] Converging, Opposite Flight Paths
- [ ] Converging, Crossing Flight Paths
- [ ] Same Flight Paths
- [ ] Diverging/Non-intersecting Flight Paths

4. Was weather a factor in the incident? [x] Yes [ ] No
(If yes, explain in Block 68, Summary of Incident.)

5. Altitude/flight level of incident: 2000

6. Type of airspace:
- [ ] Class A
- [x] Class B
- [ ] Class C
- [ ] Class D
- [ ] Other
- [ ] Class E
- [ ] Class G
- [ ] Oceanic
- [ ] Airport Surface

7. Location of Incident:
Fix: DXO
Intersection:
Direction: 35
Runway:
Distance: 1
Taxiway:
Latitude:
Longitude:
Area/Sector or Position Designator: *See Appendix*

8. Closest Proximity:
Vertical Feet: 200
Lateral: 0.3
- [ ] Feet
- [x] Miles
- [ ] Minutes
- [ ] N/A

9. Number of aircraft for which the controller had control responsibility at the time of the incident: 5

10. Was training in progress?
- [ ] Yes
- [x] No

Complete blocks 11-39 for each employee

11. Enter P for primary or C for contributory:

12. Number of personnel involved: 1

13. Employee's facility:
Three-letter Identification | Level | Type

14. Reserved.

15. Date of birth: MM/DD/YYYY

16. Social Security Number: Last six digits only

17. Indicate the performance level of the employee:
- [ ] Developmental
- [ ] ATCS
- [ ] Supervisor
- [ ] Staff Specialist
- [ ] Other

If ATCS, how long since ATCS in current facility?
YY.MM

18. Last date of certification or recertification on position:
MM/DD/YYYY
- [ ] Initial Certification
- [ ] Recertification

19. Has training relevant to the incident been received within the last 12 months?
- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No

If yes, list the type & the date of that training in the box.

19A. During the 2 1/2 years prior to the incident, in how many Operational Errors has the employee been found to be the primary cause?

19B. During the 2 1/2 years prior to the incident, in how many Operational Errors has the employee been found to be contributory?

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report

Record Number: D T W T 0 9 B 0 0 4

20. Is a medical certification issue related to the incident?

☐ Yes

☐ No

(If yes, explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

21. Identify and describe the type of work schedule being worked at the time of the incident:

22. Current and previous shift:

Previous shift:
Sign in: Sign out:

Current shift:
Sign in: Sign out:

23. Area of specialization: TOWER

24. Sector or position: LOCAL NORTHWEST

Number and Name

25. Time on position: Minutes

26. What sectors or positions were combined at the position being staffed at the time of the incident? LSW

27. Which associated positions were staffed at the time of the incident? NONE

28. Position function:

☐ Radar ☐ Radar Associate ☐ Hand-off ☐ Local Control ☐ Ground Control
☐ Flight Data ☐ Clearance Delivery ☐ Departure Position ☐ Arrival Position ☐ Supervisor
☐ Air Traffic Assistant ☐ Traffic Management Coordinator ☐ Trainee ☐ Other

29. Did any operational personnel request assistance prior to the incident?

☐ Yes ☒ No

(If yes, explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

30. Were any operational personnel aware that an Operational Error/Deviation was developing?

☒ Yes ☐ No

(Explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

31. Did the employee contemplate taking corrective action?

☐ Yes ☐ No

(Explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

32. Did any operational personnel attempt to take corrective action?

☒ Yes ☐ No

(Explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

33. Operational personnel were alerted to the incident by:

Automatic	Personnel	Non-Facility Personnel	Other
☐ Conflict Alert	☒ Self-identified	☐ Pilot	
☐ MSAW/EMSAW	☐ Facility personnel	☐ Another facility	

34. Date and time operational personnel became aware of the incident:

MM/DD/YYYY Time(local)

35. Was the Distance Reference Indicator (i.e., J-Ring) being used?

☐ Yes

☒ No

36. Were there any distractions or environmental conditions that may have influenced the incident?

☐ Yes ☒ No (If yes, explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

Distractions: Radio/phone/other activity, presence of visitors, loud or boisterous conversations, equipment malfunction, and relationships with co-workers. Environmental conditions: noise, ambient air, work area layout, temperature, noise, and lighting.

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report

Report Number: D T W T 0 9 E 0 0 4

37. Was an OSIC or CIC on duty at the time of the incident?

Enter A for OSIC
Enter C for CIC: A

38. Was the assigned OSIC/CIC present in the operational area at the time of the incident?

☒ Yes ☐ No

39. Did the employee require OSIC/CIC assistance prior to the incident?

☐ Yes ☐ No

40. Did the assigned OSIC/CIC provide assistance?

☐ Yes ☐ No

(Explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

41. If sectors were combined, did the OSIC/CIC approve the combination?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not combined ☒ N/A

42. If the positions were combined, did the OSIC/CIC approve the combination?

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not combined

43. In what activity was the assigned OSIC/CIC engaged at the time of the incident?

☐ General Supervision
☒ Direct operational supervision
☐ Working a position of operation
☐ Administering training
☐ Receiving training
☐ Other

44. Was the OSIC/CIC certified in the area of specialization where the incident took place?

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A (If no, explain here.)

45. Traffic complexity? 4

1 2 3 4 5
Low Avg. High

46. Indicate which factors were associated with traffic complexity.

☒ Weather
☐ Terrain
☐ Airspace configuration
☒ Number of aircraft
☐ Experience level
☐ Emergency situation
☐ Runway configuration
☐ Runway condition
☐ Flow control
☐ Special Event
☐ Other

47. Type of Control Provided

☐ Radar
☒ Tower
☐ Observer
☐ Non-radar
☐ AFSS/FSS
☐ TFM

48. Required separation was by

☒ FAA Order
☐ Facility Letter of Agreement (LOA) or Directive

FAA Order: 7110.65 Facility LOA/Directive:

Paragraph: 5-5-5 (b) Paragraph:

49. Were any deficient procedures noted as a result of the incident?

☐ Yes ☒ No

(If yes, explain here.)

50. Were any special procedures in effect at the time of the incident (e.g. Traffic Management Program)?

☐ Yes ☒ No

(If yes, explain here.)

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report

Report Number: D T N T 0 9 E 0 3 4

(Complete each applicable section. Check mark the appropriate box.)

51. Number of aircraft/vehicles involved in the incident: 2

	Aircraft/Vehicle No. 1	Aircraft/Vehicle No. 2
52. Identification	NWA7332	FLG3845
53. Prefix/postfix	DC93/W	CRJ2/L
54. Flight/vehicle profile at time of loss of incident	☐ Descending ☐ Making approach ☐ Touching down ☐ Radar vector ☐ Level flight ☐ Takeoff roll ☐ Taxiing-runway ☐ Landing roll ☐ Climbing ☐ Holding in position on runway ☒ Other GO AROUND	☐ Descending ☐ Making approach ☐ Touching down ☐ Radar vector ☐ Level flight ☐ Takeoff roll ☐ Taxiing-runway ☐ Landing roll ☒ Climbing ☐ Holding in position on runway ☐ Other
55. Aircraft ground speed	☒ N/A _____ Knots	☒ N/A _____ Knots
56. TCAS equipped	☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Unknown	☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Unknown
57. Evasive action	☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ TCAS ☐ Unknown	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ TCAS ☒ Unknown
58. Did the pilot file a Near Midair Collision Report	☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Unknown	☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Unknown

59. Aircraft and Obstruction/Obstacles

☐ Terrain ☐ Vehicle(s) ☐ Personnel ☐ Obstruction ☐ Equipment ☐ Protected Airspace
☐ Airport Movement Area (explain) ☒ Not applicable ☐ Other (explain)

60. Was equipment/ayout/design a factor in the incident?

☐ Yes ☒ No (If yes, explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

61. Was any pertinent equipment reported as functioning unsatisfactorily before the incident?

☐ Yes ☒ No (If yes, explain in Block 65, Summary of Incident.)

62. Systems in use

☐ HOST	☐ CENRAP	☐ ARTS IIIE	☐ D-BRITE	☒ ASDE-X
☐ EBUS/HOST (FDP)	☒ ASR-9	☐ MEARTS	☐ BRITE-IV	☐ Model 1
☐ LDAS	☐ AB-411	☐ ADS on ARTS	☐ AMASS	☐ CASIS
☐ URET	☐ ARTS IIE	☐ STARS on AH-12	☐ ASDE II	☐ Other
☒ Mode S	☐ ARTS IIIA	☒ STARS	☐ ASDE III	

63. Was back-up data from one system lost or offline in progress?

☐ Yes ☒ No (If yes, explain below.)

64. What was the status of the Conflict Alert at the time of the incident?

☒ Activated ☐ Not available ☐ Not activated
☐ Not installed ☐ Suppressed

64a. What was the status of the AMASS or ASDE at the time of the incident?

☒ Active ☐ Inactive/Noise ☐ Off/STB/NA

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report

Report Number D T W T C 9 E C C 4

25. SUMMARY OF INCIDENT

ITEM 4. WEATHER WAS MARGINAL, WITH GUSTY WIND AND LOW LEVEL WINDSHEAR ADVISORIES.

ITEM 30. THE LOCAL NORTHWEST CONTROLLER WAS AWARE THAT A CONFLICT WAS DEVELOPING WHEN HE REALIZED THAT NWA7332 WAS GOING AROUND.

ITEM 32. THE LNW CONTROLLER TRIED TO STOP THE DEPARTURE AIRCRAFT'S TURN THEN TURNED THE DEPARTURE FURTHER RIGHT, BUT SEPARATION WAS LOST.

NWA7332 WAS CONDUCTING AN ILS RUNWAY 4L APPROACH. WHEN NWA7332 WAS JUST UNDER 2 MILES FROM THE RUNWAY
THRESHOLD, THE LOCAL NORTHWEST CONTROLLER CLEARED FLG3845 FOR TAKEOFF ON RUNWAY 4R WITH A HEADING OF 330 DEGREES. THE LOCAL NORTHWEST CONTROLLER OBSERVED NWA7332 GOING AROUND ON RUNWAY 4L AND INSTRUCTED FLG3845 (NOW AIRBORNE) TO CONTINUE RUNWAY HEADING AND NOT TURN. NWA7332 DECLARED THEY WERE GOING AROUND AND LNW ASSIGNED NWA7332 A 330 DEGREE HEADING. THE LNW CONTROLLER THEN INSTRUCTED FLG3845 TO MAKE A RIGHT TURN. LNW THEN TOLD FLG3845 TO MAKE A RIGHT TURN TO AT LEAST A 050 HEADING.

THE CONTROLLER FAILED TO ENSURE THE FLG3845 RUNWAY 4R DEPARTURE COURSE DIVERGED FROM NWA7332 4L MISSED APPROACH COURSE IMMEDIATELY BY AT LEAST 30 DEGREES.

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number D T W T A 9 R 0 0 4

55. SUMMARY OF INCIDENT (continued from page 5)

66. INVESTIGATORS

Date	Typed/Printed Name	Signature
0 1 2 0 2 0 1 0 MM/DD/YYYY	EARL H GRAND First/MI/Last Name	Investigator-in-Charge
0 1 2 0 2 0 1 0 MM/DD/YYYY	LISA GREEN First/MI/Last Name	Team Member
MM/DD/YYYY	First/MI/Last Name	Team Member
MM/DD/YYYY	First/MI/Last Name	Team Member
MM/DD/YYYY	First/MI/Last Name	Team Member
MM/DD/YYYY	First/MI/Last Name	Team Member
MM/DD/YYYY	First/MI/Last Name	Team Member
MM/DD/YYYY	First/MI/Last Name	Team Member
MM/DD/YYYY	First/MI/Last Name	Team Member

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number D T W T C 9 E C 0 4

55. SUMMARY OF INCIDENT (continued from page 6)

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report	Report Number	D	T	N	T	C	9	E	0	0	4

Part II. FACILITY MANAGER ACTION

67. Select the classification of the OE/DD. (More than one category may be selected.)

☒ Human ATCS ☐ Manager/Supervisor/Other Personnel ☐ Procedure ☐ Equipment ☐ Other (Explain in Block 69)

68. Causal Factors	No	Yes
		A
A. Data Posting	☒	
(1) Computer Entry	☐	
Incorrect input		☐
Incorrect update		☐
Premature termination of data		☐
Input/update not made		☐
Other (explain)		☐
(2) Flight Progress Strip	☐	
Not located		☐
Interpreted incorrectly		☐
Posted incorrectly		☐
Updated incorrectly		☐
Prematurely removed		☐
Other (explain)		☐
B. Radar Display	☐	
(1) Misidentification	☐	
Failure to re-identify aircraft when the assigned beacon identity becomes questionable		☐
Overlapping data blocks		☐
Acceptance of inaccurate or difficult to correlate position information		☐
Other (explain)		☐
(2) Inappropriate Use of Displayed Data	☐	
MODE C		☐
BRITE		☐
Conflict alert		☐
Failure to detect displayed data		☐
Failure to use displayed displaying data		☐
Failure to anticipate future status of displayed data		☒
Other (explain)		☐
C. Airport Observation (Tower Only)	☒	
(1) Actual Observation of Aircraft		☐
(2) Inappropriate Use of Visual Data	☐	
Landing		☐
Taking Off		☐
Ground Operation	☐	
Taxiing across runway		☐
Failure to position aircraft properly		☐
Other (explain)		☐

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report

Report Number: D T N T C S E 0 0 4

	No	Yes A
D. Communication Error	☒	
(1) Phraseology		☐
(2) Transposition		☐
(3) Misunderstanding		☐
(4) Read back	☐	
Altitude		☐
Clearance		☐
Identification		☐
Other (explain)		☐
(5) Acknowledgement		☐
(6) Other (explain)		☐
E. Coordination	☒	
(1) Area of Incident	☐	
Intra-section/position		☐
Inter-section/position		☐
Inter-facility		☐
Facility type _____ Level _____ and Sector ID _____		
(2) Failure to use/comply with precoordination information		☐
(3) Improper use of information exchanged in coordination	☐	
Aircraft identification		☐
Altitude/Flight Level		☐
Route of Flight		☐
Speeds		☐
ARRIVE		☐
Special Instructions		☐
Other (explain)		☐
(4) Failure to coordinate between ground and local control	☐	
Crossing active runway		☐
Vehicle, equipment, or personnel on active runway		☐
Use of runway other than active runway for arrival and departures		☐
Runway closure		☐
Other (explain)		☐
F. Position Relief Briefing	☒	
(1) Employee did not use position relief checklist		☐
(2) Employee being relieved gave incomplete briefing		☐
(3) Relieving employee did not make use of Backup Data exchanged at briefing		☐
Other (explain)		☐

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Vincent Sugent

From: "Vincent Sugent" <vinjamie@comcast.net>
To: "Uryga, Brian" <brian.uryga@oig.dot.gov>
Sent: Friday, August 12, 2011 5:39 PM
Attach: DTW-T-09-E-004.pdf; DTW-T-09-E-005.pdf; A1-A2 - DTW OE 12-25-09 Report.pdf
Subject: Fw: OE's from 12-25-09

Brian,

Here is the email that I received the reports from.

If I would have noticed Joe's recommendations I would included them initially, but I was basing my comments on A1-A2. (attached). I cannot find or remember how I received it.

After reviewing both reports, A1-A2 created 11-1-2010 and DTW-T-09-E-004 created 8-17-2010, I am looking into why the report with a later date does not have Joe's recommendations.

Vin

----- Original Message -----
From: Earl.Grand@faa.gov
To: vinjamie@comcast.net
Cc: John.Whitehurst@faa.gov
Sent: Tuesday, August 17, 2010 4:53 PM
Subject: OE's from 12-25-09

Vinnie,

It was brought to my attention that you never received the two OE Reports from December 25, 2009. Please find attached the reports, and I apologize for not providing the reports to you in a timely manner.

Earl H. Grand
Support Manager, Training & Quality Assurance
Detroit Metro Tower (DTW) & TRACON (D21)
734-955-5005

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Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Date: JAN 25 2012

To: Paul J. Sheridan, Director, Central Terminal Operations, AJT-C

From: Tony Mello, Acting Director, Terminal Safety and Operations Support, AJT-2

Subject: Rescind Terminal Safety and Operations Support Response to Request for Interpretation dated July 15, 2011

Terminal Safety and Operations Support (TSOS), AJT-2, is rescinding the interpretation response to your Request for Interpretation to FAA Order 7110.65T, Paragraphs 3-8-2, 5-5-7, 5-8-3, 5-8-4, and 5-8-5, dated February 16, 2011, from the Detroit Airport Traffic Control Tower, pertaining to Detroit Metro Wayne County Airport, Runway 04L and 04R operations.

If you have any questions or need further information, please contact Jeff Camara, Terminal Operations and Procedures, AJT-2A3, at (425) 917-6788.

Attachment

Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Date: JUL 15 2011

To: Paul J. Sheridan
Director, Central Terminal Operations

From: Thomas S. Bowman Jr
for Tony Mello
Acting Director, Terminal Safety and Operations Support

Subject: Request for Interpretation to FAA Order 7110.65T, Paragraphs 3-8-2, 5-5-7, 5-8-3, 5-8-4, and 5-8-5; Your Memo dated February 16, 2011

We have reviewed your request for an interpretation to FAA Order JO 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, Paragraphs 3-8-2, 5-5-7, 5-8-3, 5-8-4, and 5-8-5 and offer the following:

With regard to Item 1 in which you assert that a missed approach aircraft is considered a departure aircraft after crossing or perpendicular with the arrival runway threshold, your assertion is correct with one exception. A missed approach aircraft (like an aircraft cleared for a low approach) is considered a departing aircraft once it crosses that landing threshold. There is no requirement for an aircraft to be perpendicular with the arrival runway threshold.

Regarding Item 2 and your assertion that 30-degree separation may be reduced to 15 degrees for the missed approach aircraft crossing the arrival runway or being perpendicular to it is incorrect. One form of separation must exist at all times and may be discontinued only after a different form of approved separation is attained.

Regarding Item 3 in which you assert that the 30-degree requirement is "determined by the calculated course from the approach end of the runway" is incorrect. The 30-degree requirement is calculated from the missed approach point or the point of arrival at decision height and/or the missed approach fix at a prescribed altitude.

Regarding Item 4 in which you ask, "Verify the climb requirement in the DTW published missed approach procedure for the RWY 04L Z approaches do not influence the point at which the estimated missed approach course is calculated." This assertion is incorrect. The DH on RWY 4L is published as 845 and the approach course is 035. The requirement to climb an additional 455 feet prior to turning certainly influences the missed approach course by insuring additional altitude separation (ROC) and subsequently, additional separation.

Finally, regarding Item 5, we agree with your assertion of "Verify Paragraph 5-5-7 does not apply to departure/departure or departure/arrival operations" with one exception. There is no requirement that an aircraft be a departure/departure or departure/arrival operation to apply this paragraph. However, Paragraph 5-5-7, Passing or Diverging, is an approved form of separation and may be applied to replace a different form of separation until such time as another approved for separation exists.

If you have any questions or desire further information, please contact Robert Law, Terminal Operations and Procedures, at (202) 385-8793.

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Office DEPOT. green

LNW # 210 LNE # 200

0900 060/3 3/4 BR VV002
SIMMEL 1350-1400

1448Z EGF4343 RWY NOT IN SIGHT 3L
N77RG, RWY 4R DEPT EASTBOUND
EGF4343 TL30-DIVERT

1000L 050/4 1/4 FG VV002
1011L 040/4 1/16 FG VV002 TURNS 1/4
(SL CLSD ALL DEPTS 4/R SMGS PRK)

1100L 060/3 Ø FG VV001

1609Z DAL1640 RWY NOT IN SIGHT 2 NOT FINAL 3R 090°
COM 2885 4R 060 RTN for LANDING

1629Z ASQ5312 RWY NOT IN SIGHT 4R NO DEPTS
RTN for LANDING

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Vincent Sugent

From: "Vincent Sugent" <vinjamie@comcast.net>
To: "Gorman, Karen" <kgorman@osc.gov>; "Bird, Lewis"
Sent: Wednesday, January 11, 2012 8:52 PM
Subject: Fw: DTW Corrective Action Plan -- Next Telcon

Matt,

What venue was it stated that Jake's go-around was being re-reviewed?

Vin

----- Original Message -----
From: The Birds
To: VINJAMIE@COMCAST.net
Sent: Wednesday, January 11, 2012 8:05 PM
Subject: Fwd: DTW Corrective Action Plan -- Next Telcon

-----Original Message-----
From: Peter.CTR.Trapp <Peter.CTR.Trapp@faa.gov>
To: The Birds <___
Cc: daniel.e.ricks <daniel.e.ricks@faa.gov>; John.Whitehurst <John.Whitehurst@faa.gov>
Sent: Thu, Dec 22, 2011 9:57 am
Subject: Re: DTW Corrective Action Plan -- Next Telcon

Matt –

Thanks again for your response. Again, I will respond to your points/issue in-order:

The telcon should happen today at 1400 EST as we discussed on the last telcon. My second message was a "temperature-check" since a couple of participants had voiced they favored Friday over today. Several participants to the telcon are calling in on leave status, so I felt it appropriate to consider their requests.

I am not trying to conduct review/comment of the meeting minutes in secret, but I recognize that everyone has a differing reason for participating on these telcons, and that I am not a perfect listener. My email to everyone listed on page 1 of the minutes included: *"Please send me any discrepancies or corrections you find in the minutes that are focused on yourself. If you have comments, changes, or corrections that affect an organization and/or DTW, please bring it up on the telcon so everyone is aware of your suggestion."* If I did not hear something you said on the telcon, or I used "plugged in" instead of "over-the-shoulder" to represent what FLM/CICs do in the tower-cab, a note from you to me is probably efficient and the most direct way to repair the minutes. If someone says that "DTW is looking for all missed approaches off Runway 4L to make an immediate left-turn to 320 degrees" and I put "DTW is looking for all missed approaches off Runway 4L to make an immediate left-turn" in the minutes, I would like that to be corrected on the next telcon so that everyone hears the correction – both corrections are important, but in the latter case, everyone receiving my minutes may be carrying around incorrect information that could seriously affect the corrective action plan.

Using "bcc" is something I learned a long time ago to save everyone in a large group the embarrassment that can occur when someone does a "reply to all." My emails are going to the list of personnel listed in

the meeting minutes (top of page 1); no more or less than that. If your participation on the telcons prevents your commenting during the telcon, or if you are more comfortable commenting via email, I can accept either approach. I am not trying to control the dialogue or comments on these important matters. If everyone uses the email method of commenting, it complicates my editing and subsequent release of the minutes, and it does not allow for active group dialogue to your own comments; (i.e., it might take a two days for someone to comment on the draft minutes, another person takes two days to review and comment on your edit). Based on your concerns, I suggest that we discuss the following as a group today:

- Scope of the flight procedures review(s); DTW versus other airports
- Missed approach headings versus intercepting and tracking a radial
- Best date/time for next telcon
- Other comments you may have for the group

Regarding your statement connecting the complainant's event and this corrective action, I very much understand your concern. The Terminal Procedures office is actively working with Flight Procedures to look for clarity and definitive boundaries that will help everyone. Please raise your concerns about headings and radials today.

I do not recall the discussion about "not discussing the complainant's issue" on the telcon, but the corrective action plan is not focused on one (investigated) event. It was mentioned on the telcon that the offer to debrief the complainant should be scheduled to permit any new clarity and understanding plus training materials regarding the three air traffic paragraphs be available so that the complainant has the advantage to see what has (will) change as a result of his allegations.

Regarding your comment that someone mentioned "dismissing the Mello Q&A," I know that Jeff Camara from Terminal Procedures stated that his office was considering rescinding the Jul. 15, 2011 interpretation that is part of the OIG Report of Investigation; (see Discussion, first bullet, in the meeting minutes). If you need a copy of the Jul. 15, 2011 memorandum, I can provide that to you.

I was not trying to confuse you in my reply to your question regarding what makes DTW different . . . I hope my Wednesday response clarified things. As for what do I mean by "your operating limits" I simply meant that any missed approach at DTW will be designed around obstacles, airspace, and navigation aids that are unique to DTW; (i.e., a climb restriction at one airport may not be appropriate at another airport; headings may be more appropriate for some missed approaches, while radials are better at other airports). The national policy is clearly the national solution, but that does not imply that any airport can utilize all national policies on all runways, during all weather conditions, without meeting all the required prerequisite equipment and training requirements, etc. It was discussed a couple of times on the telcons that DTW may need to tailor the national policy to their geography, airport layout, and operational configurations. I was referring to the DTW adaptation of national policies when I used "your operating limits." When I used "our existing policy(s)" in my response I was referring to the published policy in-place at the time of the OIG investigation and the commencement of this corrective action plan. It occurs to me that a national policy that is quite vague and broad might be strengthened locally by a SOP that is more restrictive. If another national policy is quite specific and narrow, it might not survive the test of time because it is too restrictive. Since SOPs cannot deviate from national policy(s), the waiver approach is often used to permit one airport relief from national policy. I think "our policy" refers to the published FAA policy - for both of us.

The determination of what is legal at DTW occurs at several levels. National policy is determined through changes that affect what is now in-place. Recommended changes result in document change proposals (DCP) and those get vetted and approved/denied. DTW determines how they will implement the national policy and/or they may use their SOP and waivers to further restrict or seek relief from the national policy. DTW has your local quality control processes that constantly are at work using the tools and reports available. The Terminal Service organization, the QCG, and Safety (AJS) also see reports that highlight operational measures for all facilities. Exception reports are generated when events meet certain criteria and additional reviews are conducted. Local reviews and other reviews by Terminal Service organization, the QCG, and Safety are all used to validate events, trends, and hazardous patterns. I view the collective work of all organizations as ultimately responsible for defining what operations are legal at DTW.

I am a contractor supporting ATO Safety & Technical Training. My direct supervision is from David M. Boone.

Respectfully,

Peter Trapp
(202) 493-5000 - office
(703) 965-9791 - cell

From: The Birds

To: Peter CTR Trapp/AWA/CNTR/FAA@FAA, bzilonis@natca.net, John Whitehurst/AGL/FAA@FAA, Daniel E Ricks/AGL/FAA@FAA

Date: 12/22/2011 05:03 AM

Subject: Re: DTW Corrective Action Plan -- Next Telcon

Peter,

I have three issues.

Let's start with the meetings ever changing schedule. I am not a professional go to meeting person, I do shift work and work weekends. This constantly changing schedule is new to me and very frustrating. Can we not just plan a meeting and attend it? You think your people are working hard, you should see what's going on at DTW.

Second, I am perplexed at your methods of communication. You apparently asked the group questions about minutes from the last tel-con, I say assume because I have no way of knowing who was asked the questions I was, since you kept it secret, via bcc. It makes me wonder if anyone else actually got the email I did, or who might be on these emails. The divide and conquer method might be effective when solving conflict, as it keeps the parties from bickering while the lone authority deems necessary what each party hears about the other, my thoughts are that this process is not that process. I am hesitant to have my thoughts and comments and concerns heard solely by you. I believe these emails need to be seen, read and distributed by the whole group, or not at all. What good does it do me to have you edit, or pass along your version of my expertise?

Third, your insistence that we are different than other airports is a stretch at best. The ridiculous ruling on "The Complaintant's" OE resulted in us being told we could not separate headings from anything but headings. The information you provided shows other airports that separate headings from radials. You only strengthen my argument that this is a nation wide problem, brought on by the people that decided "The Complaintant's" situation resulted in an OE. We were told headings and radials can't be diverged, if this new news is in fact true, that makes the application of 5-8-5 simple, although it won't solve "The Complaintant's" scenario.

Someone in the telcon said we should not discuss "The Complaintant's" issue, but isn't that what we're here to solve?

Someone in the telcon said we would be "dismissing" the Mello Q&A answers, is that true and if so, who do we go to to get them?

I am also confused by this statement you made, "my original thoughts on this whole correction action plan was actually intended to challenge this group to better define your operating limits based on our existing policy(s)". If the whole group is supposed to be challenged, wouldn't it be easier if the whole group knew what the whole group was doing and not just you? And further, why is it "your operating limits" and "our policy?" isn't this one FAA? I hope this doesn't mean a different standard will be set for DTW because of "The Complaintant".

I do have more comments about your response to me, but I'd rather save them for the group.

One last thing who do you work for, and who will be ultimately determining what's legal at DTW?

Thanks,
Matt Bird
DTW NATCA

-----Original Message-----
From: Peter.CTR.Trapp <Peter.CTR.Trapp@faa.gov>
Sent: Wed, Dec 21, 2011 6:39 pm
Subject: DTW Corrective Action Plan -- Next Telcon

With some people traveling tomorrow (Thursday), and others working diligently on their assignments, **will moving the telcon to Friday morning prevent anyone from participating?**

I will work with Brett to send out a formal invite to the telcon, as early as possible on Thursday.

Respectfully,

Peter Trapp
(202) 493-5000 - office
(703) 965-9791 - cell

Matt -

Thanks for your email response, and let me respond to each of your major points, one at a time:

[#1] - I think I agree with you; DTW is only using the Northflow for 32% of all traffic this time of year; the other 68% of traffic is using one of the Southflow runways; I believe the majority of IMC days are when they are using the Northflow, but I do not have that data readily available; we intend to look at the Southflow runways (outboards, 21L and 22R) once finished with the Northflow review; not to over-simplify the issue, your pair of runways on the west-side (22L & 22R) are further apart than the east-side (21L & 21R) runways, but the thresholds on the west-side have twice the stagger; DTW needs to have a sense of what is changing (both North and Southflows) so they can plan their training, SOP changes, etc. for everyone to come away satisfied;

[#2] - my first set of minutes included this phrase, "DTW is much different than other large airports" (now reads "DTW lacks headings for the missed approaches"); you were not the only person that found my first set of minutes objectionable; I was hasty and sloppy in choosing what words to put in the minutes; I did a survey of six major airports to arrive at my conclusion (see Excel file attached) so I feel qualified to make such a statement; don't ask me to explain the difference because I am not a TERPS expert, and for all I know DTW is using fifth-generation missed approach procedures and all the other airports are on third-generation missed approaches; DTW does have a fairly unique geographic layout because the departure runway thresholds are staggered (forward or behind) the primary arrival runway threshold under certain configurations - this takes careful application of paragraph 5-8-5; DFW and LAX basically have negligible threshold staggers; CLT, CVG, and IAH have much greater distance & IAH "eliminated" the need for paragraph 5-8-5b2 on Runways 15/33 (parallels) because there are no IAPs to the runway having a threshold forward of the other parallel; I could not find a major airport running simultaneous (high-volume) operations with "closing-spaced, staggered-threshold" runways like DTW (I will look some more); my original thoughts on this whole correction action plan was actually intended to challenge this group to better define your operating limits based on our existing policy(s);

[#3] - "plug-in" is not part of the minutes, but I assume the choice of words implies that FLMs/CICs are "plugged-in;" I meant to convey the "over-the-shoulder" awareness that FLMs/CICs regularly use in the tower-cab and I apologize for my choice of words to describe this activity;

[#4] - I did not mean to imply that having a FLM overseeing the simultaneous operations was better (or worse) than having a CIC overseeing the other half (East vs. West) of the operation; this was discussed superficially on the first telcon, and quite honestly I expected more discussion in the following telcons; this part of the corrective action is not about what is a legal operation, but more about the responsibilities outlined in 7210.3; you will notice that the tower-cab observers are required to provide feedback on their observations each morning - this report is to facility management, (never anticipated to be something for CICs and/or the CPCs because of the disruption); I understand that your facility is operating consistently, and it is up to our team to develop/propose anything different; creating a new solution will probably be judged unsatisfactory if we cannot train it and everyone is unable to use it repeatedly under IMC traffic conditions.

I was pleased you were able to join the telcon, and I hope the collective energy and knowledge of the group will help everyone better understand one another and identify the hazards we cannot (choose to not) see. If my response is off target, or demonstrates my lack of understanding, I apologize and request a *"do-over"* opportunity!

Respectfully,

Peter Trapp
(202) 493-5000 - office
(703) 965-9791 - cell

%%%%%%%%% Your Message %%%%%%%%%%

[**numbers** added for reference only]

Peter,

Thank you for sending me this, I don't recall ever recieving previous meeting notes.
I don't know why the agenda is to only deal with **[#1]** one runway set, when the same ruling would apply to every runway set at DTW, like many other airports around the country.
I believe it was stated somewhere that DTW **[#2]** is unique, and as delighted as I might be to think that's a good thing, my understanding is that we're only unique because someone decided the way we operate, and have operated for at least the last 12 years is not legal. I think if someone decided to do this very same thing in ORD, ATL, LAX or HOU to name a few, they would get to be just as unique as DTW.

As far as recommendations or corrections, **[#3]** there is absolutely no reason to think a "CIC" would plug in with a CPC, as described in the meeting notes.
If you need several reasons that would not work, let me know.

The fault to most of the logic listed as "preventative measures" beyond changing the complaintants ruling, or moving the missed approach points is that controllers at DTW do what the FLMs have told them to do. So having a FLM plugged **[#4]** in won't change a thing, there is no difference of opinion between FLMs at DTW and CPCs at DTW as to what's legal.

Thanks again, please keep me on the list for future minutes.

Matt Bird
DTW NATCA

Vincent Sugent

From: "The Birds" <
To: <VINJAMIE@COMCAST.net>
Sent: Monday, January 23, 2012 6:57 PM
Subject: Fwd: question

-----Original Message-----
From: Peter.CTR.Trapp <Peter.CTR.Trapp@faa.gov>
To: The Birds <
Cc: John.Whitehurst <John.Whitehurst@faa.gov>; daniel.e.ricks <daniel.e.ricks@faa.gov>
Sent: Fri, Jan 20, 2012 1:05 pm
Subject: Re: question

Matt -

I think the discussion you are referring to was primarily between AJT personnel. I have not seen any interpretations other than the one in the OIG's package of evidence following their investigation. Since interpretations originate at the local level, I would think that DTW would have all of the interpretation files you are requesting.

I am going to distribute my meeting minutes shortly, and the minutes will focus on progress associated with 5-8-3, 5-8-4, and 5-8-5 since that was our assigned charter.

Respectfully,

Peter Trapp
(202) 493-5000 - office
(703) 965-9791 - cell

From: The Birds <
To: Peter CTR Trapp/AWA/CNTR/FAA@FAA, John Whitehurst/AGL/FAA@FAA, Daniel E Ricks/AGL/FAA@FAA
Date: 01/19/2012 01:24 AM
Subject: question

Peter,

After our last telcon (where there was more talk of emails I was not allowed to see) someone spoke up and said that we could not apply 7110.65 paragraph 5-5-7 as I described.

Since a lot of what we do is based on this rule, I was wondering if you or anyone had heard from this person. I specifically remember him saying, "if I need to get you an interpretation that says you can't, I will".

If we're not going to be applying this rule in this case or any other fashion, I'd be interested in having a copy of this interpretation, and I'd like to know what the plan will be to change all the other things we do based on this rule.

I'd also be interested in knowing who said it, and based on what.

Thanks,

Matt Bird
DTW NATCA

Vincent Sugent

From: "The Birds"
To: <VINJAMIE@COMCAST.net>
Sent: Monday, January 23, 2012 6:57 PM
Attach: DTW-OIG-Response_Draft-Mtg-Minutes_011312g.doc
Subject: Fwd: DTW Corrective Action Plan Meeting Minutes -- Jan. 27 (next telcon)

-----Original Message-----
From: Peter.CTR.Trapp <Peter.CTR.Trapp@faa.gov>
Sent: Mon, Jan 23, 2012 9:11 am
Subject: DTW Corrective Action Plan Meeting Minutes -- Jan. 27 (next telcon)

Minutes from the last meeting are attached, and I hope you find the revisions and additions satisfactory. If you have comments, changes, or corrections that affect an organization and/or DTW, please bring it up on the telcon so everyone is aware of your suggestion. Corrections/edits you send privately to me will be shared with the entire group.

Brett will be inviting everyone to the **next scheduled telcon on Jan. 27, 2012,** beginning at 0900 EST shortly.

Respectfully,

Peter Trapp
(202) 493-5000 - office
(703) 965-9791 - cell

Minutes from the DTW Corrective Action Meeting

Dec. 8-9, 16, 22 (2011); Jan. 4, 13, 2012; attended via telcon

NAME	PHONE	E-MAIL	ORGANIZATION
Paul Sheridan	817-222-5500	paul.sheridan@faa.gov	AJT-C Dir. of Terminal Ops
Jeff Stewart	817-222-4234	jeff.stewart@faa.gov	AJT-C Senior Advisor
Todd Lowry	817-222-5565	todd.lowry@faa.gov	AJT-C Senior Advisor
Joseph Figliuolo	734-487-7316	joseph.figliuolo@faa.gov	AJT-CL District Mgr.
Gary Ancinec	734-955-5004	gary.f.ancinec@faa.gov	D21 Acting ATM
John Whitehurst	734-955-5014	john.whitehurst@faa.gov	DTW Acting ATM
Ron Bazman	734-784-2167	ronald.d.bazman@faa.gov	DTW Support Mgr.
Earl Grand	734-955-5005	earl.grand@faa.gov	DTW Trng. & QA Mgr.
Matt Bird			DTW FacRep
Dan Ricks	734-955-5000	daniel.e.ricks@faa.gov	DTW FLM
Tony Roetzel	817-222-5472	tony.roetzel@faa.gov	AJV-C1 Mgr. of CSA QCG
Susan Ruddy	817-321-7717	susan.ruddy@faa.gov	AJV-C21 OSG Specialist
Robert Lewallen	817-838-1922	robert.L.lewallen@faa.gov	AJV-C24 OSG Specialist
Dorothy Davis	817-222-5500	dorothy.davis@faa.gov	AJV-C13 Mgr. of CSA QCG (North)
Jeff Camara	425-917-6788	jeff.camara@faa.gov	AJT-24 Procedures
Brett Faulkner	202-385-8689	brett.faulkner@faa.gov	AJT-23 Mgr. of QC
Michael Beckles	202-385-4302	michael.r.beckles@faa.gov	AJS-3 QA Specialist
Gary Birdwell	817-222-4742	gary.birdwell@faa.gov	AJV-C13 QSG Specialist
Robert Owens	817-222-4638	robert.a.owens@faa.gov	AJV-C13 QSG Specialist
Dan Schmidt	817-222-4596	dan.schmidt@faa.gov	AJV-C13 QSG Specialist
Phil Adams	817-222-4764	philip.w.adams@faa.gov	AJV-C13 QSG Specialist
Peter Trapp	202-493-5000	peter.ctr.trapp@faa.gov	AJS (contractor)

Introductions

Brett Faulkner welcomed everyone, thanked them for attending, and summarized the purpose of the telcon – to ensure understanding of the OIG's findings and the FAA's corrective actions. Brett pointed out that one unexpected outcome of the investigation report that was transmitted to the OSC by the DOT Secretary was the increased time required for the CSA QCG to observe tower operations at DTW. Attendance on the telcons is recorded above.

Scope

Peter Trapp summarized the OIG's findings and FAA's planned corrective actions for the group. Allegations & findings from the OIG investigation include:

- Complex, overlapping national policies pertaining to the use of simultaneous operations on parallel runways and defined airspace at DTW may not allow controllers to fully

_____ *highlighted sections are from most recent meeting, and corrections/changes to minutes*

comply with all air traffic policies under some specific configurations using parallel runways in IMC;

- Lack of understanding among some air traffic controllers with regard to policies intended to ensure the safe conduct of simultaneous operations to/from multiple runways indicates training deficiencies/shortfalls; and
- Misunderstandings and inconsistent application of national air traffic policies at DTW have contributed to undiscovered and unreported losses of separation when DTW is conducting simultaneous operations on parallel runways in IMC.

Corrective actions the DOT included in their submission to the OSC are:

- review the published arrival and missed approach procedures at DTW;
- review the application of national air traffic policies in FAA Order 7110.65, paragraphs 5-8-3, 5-8-4, and 5-8-5; specifically at DTW as it relates to the complainant's complaints to see that our policies are understandable, do not conflict with other policies necessary for safe operations at DTW;
- review associated training materials related to simultaneous operations at DTW to ensure controller training materials are concise and understandable;
- develop training scenarios using their tower simulation tools to demonstrate and allow controllers to see how evolving simultaneous operations using two or more parallel runways can result in unsafe situations requiring local controller (LC) intervention;
- commence development of training of LC qualified personnel no later than ten working days following receipt of this memo at DTW;
- DTW will retrain LC responsible for simultaneous operations on the proper application of FAAO 7110.65 paragraphs 5-8-3, 5-8-4, and 5-8-5;
- ATO Safety and Technical Training will ensure the training for all FAA facilities that conduct simultaneous operations is consistent and reflects the latest policy changes;
- DTW will offer to complete an in-depth briefing to the complainant regarding the event on Dec. 25, 2009;
- DTW will ensure one front line manager (FLM) be assigned to oversee and visually supervise both arrivals and departures on *both* banks of runways (East & West) during all peak-hour periods when simultaneous operations are conducted in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC);
- DTW will ensure the FLM(s) assigned to oversee and visually supervise arrivals and departures provide timely feedback to all controllers (local controllers (LC) and on-the-job-trainee (OJT) controllers) working during peak-hour IMC periods throughout the 60-day period;
- CSA QCG will assign tower observers to monitor all of DTW's simultaneous operations periods for a minimum of 60-days following release of this memorandum;
- CSA QCG tower observers will ensure the DTW management team receives daily feedback for every period of observed simultaneous operations under IMC;
- CSA QCG will commence audits of DTW's simultaneous operations to include selected IMC periods for a minimum of 60-days;

- CSA QCG will ensure the DTW management team receives weekly feedback following all audits of simultaneous operations;
- CSA QCG will prepare a written report and then brief the Central Service Area Director of Operations and the Director of Terminal Safety & Operations Support on DTW's training and compliance progress after the 60-day period;
- Central Service Area Director of Operations and the Director of Terminal Safety & Operations Support will jointly agree when the CSA QCG audits may be suspended, and/or if additional retraining is required to improve simultaneous operations at DTW; Directors will notify AJS in writing of their decision(s); and
- FAA will provide OIG an update to our initial response no-later-than Jan. 31, 2012; quarterly updates will become necessary if the retraining and audits extend beyond our initial update.

Review of Available Data

Peter Trapp confirmed that all parties had received the investigation package the DOT sent to the OSC on Nov. 30, 2011. This package includes the OIG report of investigation (ROI), the FAA's response to the investigation sent by AAE on Nov. 18, 2011, and several attachments to the investigation; 50 pages total; sensitive contents and restricted distribution. A comparison of six major airport's IAP published missed approaches was shared with DTW and AJT-2 Procedures.

Discussion

The following items were discussed, and clarification (***bold-italics***) was provided on some items:

- DTW asked for assistance on the proper meaning (and operational limits) of FAAO 7110.65 paragraphs 5-8-3 and 5-8-5; AJT-2 Procedures (Jeff Camara) will assist; there will be no interpretation for these paragraphs at the present time, and AJT-2 is even looking to potentially rescind the Jul. 15, 2011 interpretation; more discussion about protecting for the MA, and when one paragraph applies (or not); AJT-2 Procedures committed to work through the policies once the published MAs are reviewed and tentative changes are known; AJT-2 Procedures reiterated the importance a published MA provides the CPCs – designs ensure separation until another form of separation is achieved; DTW reiterated the importance of a common understanding of paragraph 5-8-5 so that any IMC operations are fully compliant; ***DTW raised a question about possibly using paragraph 5-5-7 separation in a situation when the arrival aircraft commenced MA while another aircraft was departing on a parallel runway; discussion did not result in alteration of the corrective action plan***
- DTW described the operational limits of assigning two FLMs in the tower cab so that one could focus on each bank (East & West) of parallel runways; CIC will often be available to cover one bank of runways if a second FLM is not available; CIC can handle the on-the-spot corrections; FLM will handle all performance evaluations of controllers working either (both) banks of runways; DTW is reviewing best course of action and will advise the group

- Variations in the published DTW missed approaches were discussed; unclear as to when the aircraft executing a missed approach will begin their turn away from DTW; most do not have headings, one has no altitude, DTW lacks headings for the missed approaches necessary when conducting simultaneous operations on parallel runways; support from Flight Procedures (AJV-3) is active, with tentative changes and operating limits reviewed on telcons; table-top review are planned for week of Dec. 27, to include the proposed NOTAMs and flight-check requirements; flight-check scheduling can take up to 30-days to complete; OSG will coordinate review of the tentative changes and scheduled implementation with DTW-D21; table-top reviews are underway, and expected to complete in one week; once the two outboard runways for Northflow operations are reviewed, the OSG will request they complete a similar review of the two outboard runways for Southflow operations; OSG requested that DTW deliver a list of all operational runway configurations most often used so that they do not overlook any configurations; ***table-top reviews are complete, the 1100 foot restriction prior to commencing the MA turn-out is simply the result of adding 400 feet AGL to the field elevation; Flight Procedures will amend all MAs to contain the 1100 foot MSL restriction required for approval of the four new MAs (North outboards, South outboards); because the procedures are initially revised and published via NOTAM to permit flight trials, DTW will need to establish a reasonable start date for the trial period once their training completion is known***
- Someone asked if the DTW SOP could provide the controller with headings to use when conducting simultaneous operations in IMC; no, because of the possibility of lost-communications with one (both) aircraft, and local procedures can only supplement national policy; DTW clarified on Dec. 22 telcon that most every aircraft executing a missed approach has/will receive a heading and altitude clearance (canceling the published MA) prior to shipping the aircraft back to D21; this method tends to speed the divergence, allowing DTW to avoid large departure slowdowns
- DTW expressed concern about using the tower simulation tools to demonstrate the evolution of unsafe conditions; simulation was recommended because it is a repeatable method of training; training team will provide their plans once they have reviewed materials and methods available at DTW; since there is presently no Tower Simulation System (TSS) available to DTW, other methods of providing training are being looked at; AJT is reviewing the longer-term availability of TSS at DTW; District Manager explained that options for accelerating the TSS were scrubbed and that new space for the TSS was determined as the favored(approved) option; space is expected to be ready in July 2012, and Frederick Johnson (AJT-13) has the background; ***District Manager provided an update that construction of the new space required for the TSS has been further delayed, and will not begin until Sep. 2012, so operations of TSS at DTW will not occur until 2013***
- DTW asked about the timing of debriefing the complainant on the Dec. 25, 2009 event; delay until after the review of training, and any corrective measures to improve the appropriate training would be best

_____ *highlighted sections are from most recent meeting, and corrections/changes to minutes*

- QCG asked what date to use for determining the ten-days limit; Nov. 30, 2011 (date of DOT letter to OSC)
- QCG recommended the tower observations be limited to the scope of this corrective action plan; agreed - the purpose of the QCG observations should be spelled out as a result of the policy (paragraphs 5-8-3, 5-8-4, & 5-8-5) reviews, published instrument approach reviews, and training reviews/changes; (this is not open-ended oversight); first phase of the on-site observations are included in an email from Dorothy Davis dated Dec. 16, 2011
- QCG asked for the operational scope of their audits; AJS and AJT will develop the criteria with the QCG; until such time as the approved training is delivered to the workforce, QCG will only be collecting data on what rules controllers actually apply during IMC operations when paragraphs 5-8-3, 5-8-4, & 5-8-5 apply; radar/audio reviews done to complement tower observations are not "audits"
- Several participants asked if there were more than one 60-day period; Yes, one 60-day period was anticipated, and this is a minimum duration; since audits cannot begin until the re-training is completed, the 60-day period of tower observations and the 60-day period for audits will be considered as separate periods; a longer duration may be required if the two Directors feel it is warranted; based on the first on-site observer arriving at DTW on Dec. 20, that will commence the beginning of the (minimum) 60-day period; observations and audits beyond 60-days will be a joint decision of the Central Service Area Director of Operations and the Director of Terminal Safety & Operations Support
- QCG asked if the on-site observations had to be 60 consecutive days; no, small breaks for travel and holidays are reasonable; prolonged absences could add to the overall period(60-days) to complete the corrective action; on-site observations and audits are to take place concurrently during the (minimum) 60-day period
- DTW asked why the on-site observations should begin prior to the clarification on the paragraphs and once controllers are retrained; on-site observations were desired to begin as soon as possible because of the third allegation, and to allow the QCG observations that would form the starting point for the 60-day report
- DTW raised the environmental limits currently in-place for Northflow operations limit the departures to airspace defined between 350 degrees and 060 degrees; OSG is checking the environmental agreement that applies, and what options (if any) are available; by specifying the MA headings for Runways 4L and 3R, subtracting 30 degrees from each side (para. 5-8-5) of the remaining airspace limits the available airspace used for departures from the inboard Runways 4R and 3L; limiting the airspace available necessarily increases the noise-footprint over communities that have successfully filed/won their case(s) in court(s)
- DTW asked about the proper response to a MA that is not "flown correctly" (flown differently than published); DTW confirmed that <u>most</u> every aircraft executing a missed approach has/will receive a heading and altitude clearance (canceling the published MA) prior to shipping the aircraft back to D21

- DTW asked when they can apply 15 degree divergence (versus 30 degree); AJT-2 Procedures stated they would complete their 5-8-5 (30 deg) tasking, then re-visit 5-8-3 (15 deg)
- DTW asked about the distribution of meeting minutes, and suggested that everyone openly share their ideas and concerns regarding this CAP; Peter Trapp will distribute any comments/edits to the meeting minutes to each group members
- DTW asked who would be reviewing the training materials required for re-training on paragraphs 5-8-3, 5-8-4, & 5-8-5; the group will be reviewing and approving training changes that DTW feels are necessary and prudent
- AJT-2 Procedures invited Flight Procedures specialists Johnnie Baker, AJV-353 (405-954-5148) and Steven Barnett, AJV-353 (405-954-9568) to join the Dec. 22nd telcon to clarify the changes planned for DTW's published IAP missed approach procedures; progress and planned next steps were confirmed by AJV
- ***Central OSG Group Team Manager, Walter Tweedy attended the Jan. 13th telcon because of the extensive support his team has provided since December***

Next steps

Actions discussed:

a) Team composed of the CSA QCG, OSG, AJT-2 Procedures, and AJS-3 will review available definitions, interpretations, and training materials regarding simultaneous operations; this work began on Dec. 14, 2011 (within the ten-days prescribed) and a progress report was provided on the Dec. 16th telcon

b) AJT-2 Procedures, OSG, AJT-2, and CTSA DO, and DTW will collaborate on necessary changes to training materials regarding simultaneous operations; DTW will take the lead in developing training; Earl Grand is the POC, and he may request support from the other organizations supporting this CAP; AJT-2 Procedures will feed the latest changes from Flight Procedures and anticipated NOTAMs required to implement missed approach changes between IAP publication cycles; District Manager reiterated the responsibility for training development is at DTW and that this action will receive utmost attention over the next couple weeks; training development will include the new MA procedures that Flight Procedures is able to approve; ***District Manager reported that training development has commenced at DTW***

c) AJT-2 Procedures will review DTW appropriate SOP segments regarding simultaneous operations; this work began on Dec. 14, 2011 (within the ten-days prescribed) and a progress report was provided on the Dec. 16th and Dec. 22nd telcons; Flight Procedures (AJV) is working to complete changes to the published missed approaches to Runway 4L (340 HDG) and Runway 3R (090 HDG) based on work they initiated several weeks ago; once Northflow runways are completed, Flight Procedures will review Southflow runways; OSG is checking the environmental agreement that applies, and what options (if any) are available

d) AJT-2 Procedures, CSA QSG, and AJS will collaborate on the scope of the tower observers can use while conducting their on-site observations; AJT-2, AJS, and QCG

worked together to define the scope for the QCG observers (see discussion above); QCG sent a message to all parties on Dec. 17; observations commenced on Dec. 20

e) AJT-2 Procedures & Central OSG will review the published missed approaches to both Runways 4L and 3R, and report on necessary changes to the missed approaches when DTW is using Runways 4R and 3L for simultaneous operations under IMC; this work began on Dec. 14, 2011 (within the ten-days prescribed) and a progress report was provided on the Dec. 16th/22nd and ***Jan.*** 4th***/13th*** telcons

f) CSA QCG started the on-site observations at DTW on Dec. 20; QCG reported one of three days being IMC, and three MAs observed during the period leading to Dec. 22; QCG reported one of two days being IMC, and no MAs were observed during the period leading to Jan. 4; QCG is auditing 7230-4 logs, radar and voice records on days they are not on-site; ***QCG reported only one IMC day, and no MAs were observed during the period leading to Jan. 13;***

g) AJS and AJT will develop the audit criteria with the QCG; audit description was included in an email from Dorothy Davis dated Dec. 16, 2011; starting audits after training is completed will necessarily extend the corrective action plan end-date, but this complies with DOT letter to OSC; QCG and AJS will develop the audit process necessary to satisfy AAE, AOV, OIG, and OSC

h) CSA QCG will look at their on-site resources and request supplemental personnel from AJT-2; QCG feels that Dec. 2011 is covered; AJT-2 suggested they could provide some on-site coverage during Jan-Feb. 2012 for two 5-day periods, and will coordinate with the QCG; QCG has committed to conduct radar/audio reviews for IMC periods when tower observers are not available

i) QCG will provide their on-site observers with guidance on the scope of their observations - COMPLETE

j) OSG is seeking support from Flight Procedures (AJV-3) to the published instrument approach procedure (IAP) missed approach procedures – on-going support has been timely and efficient to this effort

k) AJT is reviewing the alternatives to using simulators for training at DTW; appears that real estate for the TSS is primary cause of delayed arrival at DTW - COMPLETE

l) DTW will conduct radar/audio reviews for IMC periods when tower observers are not available; AJS will assist with a report of suspected MAs derived from PDARS and/or other tools

m) OSG will coordinate review of the tentative MA changes and scheduled implementation with DTW-D21; ***DTW will select a commencement date for new MAs, and that start-date will be used to trigger the NOTAMs covering the trial period***

n) DTW will deliver a list of all operational runway configurations most often used to the OSG and AJT Procedures so that they do not overlook any runway configurations; ***DTW stated that their most often used configurations (Northflow or Southflow) is arrivals on the outboards and departures on the inboards; next most often configuration during the winter season is with one of the runways closed (30-60 minutes) for snow-removal - COMPLETE***

o) ***AJT-2 Procedures will draft an email message to DTW containing the expected actions regarding the NOTAMs to be issued for the four new MAs***
p) Follow-on telcon with this group is planned for ***Jan. 27, 2012*** commencing at ***0900 EST***

Closing

Brett Faulkner thanked everyone for attending, and asked Peter Trapp to provide meeting minutes to everyone as soon as possible. Everyone agreed to another follow-on telcon before close-of-business (COB) Jan. 27, 2012.

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NOTICE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Air Traffic Organization Policy

N JO 7110.501

Effective Date:
March 30, 2009

Cancellation Date:
March 29, 2010

SUBJ: Wake Turbulence and Missed Approach/Go-Around Operations

1. **Purpose of This Notice.** This notice provides information pertaining to wake turbulence and missed approach/go-around operations.

2. **Audience.** This notice applies to all airport traffic control tower personnel.

3. **Where Can I Find This Notice?** The notice is available on the MYFAA employee Web site at https://employees.faa.gov/tools_resources/orders_notices/ and on the air traffic publications Web site at http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/air_traffic/publications.

4. **Action.** The content in this notice is presented as informational only. No air traffic procedures have changed; therefore, no training is required for air traffic operational personnel. Air traffic managers must ensure that all terminal air traffic control personnel are briefed on this notice. Until new requirements are established, all terminal facilities should review their standard operating procedures and training programs to ensure that operational personnel are provided best practices for deconflicting missed approach/go-around operations that they are most likely to confront in their airport's configurations. Local operations should be modified to minimize such potential conflicts where it is determined to be practical and without undue operational impact.

5. **Distribution.** This notice is distributed to the following Air Traffic Organization (ATO) service units: Terminal, Safety, and System Operations Services; service center offices; and the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service.

6. **Background.** In researching a request for interpretation to Federal Aviation Administration Order (FAAO) 7110.65R, Air Traffic Control, Paragraph 7-2-1a2, Visual Separation, it was determined that:

FAAO 7110.65 does not explicitly prescribe the wake-turbulence separation responsibilities for controllers controlling missed approaches and go-arounds. While separation requirements are clearly defined for application between arrivals and departures, subsequent departures, they are not explicitly stated for application to missed approach/go-around traffic as it transitions from arrival to departure status.

FAAO 7110.65, paragraph 1-1-1, states, in part, "Controllers are required to be familiar with the provisions of this order that pertain to their operational responsibilities and to exercise their best judgment if they encounter situations that are not covered by it." For example: a missed approach occurs after a heavy departure, or two missed approaches occur with the smaller aircraft behind the larger aircraft, and turns for one or both aircraft are not possible. The missed approaches/go-arounds should be handled as situations not specifically covered by FAAO 7110.65. Controller actions must be

in accordance with FAAO 7110.65, Paragraph 2-1-2 NOTE, Duty Priority, which states, "Because there are many variables involved, it is virtually impossible to develop a standard list of duty priorities that would apply uniformly to every conceivable situation. Each set of circumstances must be evaluated on its own merit, and when more than one action is required, controllers shall exercise their best judgment based on facts and circumstances known to them. That action which is most critical from a safety standpoint is performed first." It is incumbent upon controllers as a first priority of duty to establish departure separation as soon as possible after the transition of a missed approach/go-around. When an aircraft executes a missed approach/go-around, controllers must exercise their best judgment, considering the effect of wake turbulence and issuing control instructions to minimize its impact. In addition, a wake turbulence cautionary advisory must be issued in accordance with FAAO 7110.65, Paragraph 2-1-20b, Wake Turbulence Cautionary Advisories, which states, "Issue cautionary information to any aircraft if in your opinion, wake turbulence may have an adverse effect on it. When traffic is known to be a heavy aircraft, include the word "heavy" in the description." Controllers must issue traffic advisories in accordance with FAAO 7110.65, Paragraph 2-1-21, Traffic Advisories, which states, in part, "Issue traffic advisories to all aircraft (IFR or VFR) on your frequency when, in your judgment, their proximity may diminish to less than the applicable separation minima." Issuing advisories will alert the pilots to traffic which may warrant their attention and assist in avoiding wake turbulence.

The request for interpretation has highlighted the need for developing specific guidance for the separation of missed approach/go-around operations.

The ATO Safety Services office will immediately begin collecting separation data between missed approach/go-around traffic and other operations using passive collection tools such as the Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System (PDARS) and Continuous Data Recording Player Plus (CDRPP). Any detected wake remnant encounters will be documented as a nonconformance procedural operational error attributed to the system, not the individual facility or employee. ATO Terminal Services will lead development of specific definitions and separation requirements that operational personnel will apply to missed approach/go-around operations.

for Nancy B. Kalinowski
Vice President, System Operations Services
Air Traffic Organization

2-27-09
Date Signed

NOTICE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Air Traffic Organization Policy

N JO 7110.531

Effective Date:
June 16, 2010

Cancellation Date:
June 15, 2011

SUBJ: Wake Turbulence and Missed Approach/Go-Around Operations

1. Purpose of This Notice. This notice provides information pertaining to wake turbulence and missed approach/go-around operations. This notice reissues N JO 7110.501, Wake Turbulence and Missed Approach/Go-Around Operations, effective March 30, 2009.

2. Audience. This notice applies to all airport traffic control tower personnel.

3. Where Can I Find This Notice? This notice is available on the MyFAA employee Web site at https://employees.faa.gov/tools_resources/orders_notices/ and on the air traffic publications Web site at http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications.

4. Action. The Air Traffic Organization (ATO) Office of Safety continues to collect separation data between missed approach/go-around traffic and other operations using passive collection tools such as the Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System (PDARS) and Continuous Data Recording Player Plus (CDRPP). Detected wake remnant encounters are being documented as a nonconformance procedural operational error attributed to the system and not to the individual facility or employee. Additionally, ATO Terminal Services is developing specific definitions and separation requirements that operational personnel will apply to missed approach/go-around operations.

The content in this notice is informational only. No air traffic procedures have changed; therefore, no training is required. Air traffic managers must ensure that all terminal air traffic control personnel are briefed on this notice. Until new requirements are established, all terminal facilities should review their standard operating procedures and training programs to ensure that operational personnel are provided best practices for deconflicting missed approach/go-around operations that they are most likely to confront in their airport's configurations. Local operations should be modified to minimize such potential conflicts where it is determined to be practical and without undue operational impact.

5. Distribution. This notice is distributed to the following ATO service units: Terminal and System Operations Services; the ATO Office of Safety; Office of the Service Center; and the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service.

6. Background. Research involving an interpretation request to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Order JO 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, Paragraph 7-2-1, Visual Separation, revealed that:

FAA Order JO 7110.65 does not explicitly prescribe the wake-turbulence separation responsibilities for controlling missed approaches and/or go-arounds. While separation requirements are clearly defined for application between arriving and departing aircraft and between subsequent departures, they are not explicitly stated for application to missed approach/go-around traffic as it transitions from arrival to departure status.

FAA Order JO 7110.65, paragraph 1-1-1 states, in part, "*Controllers are required to be familiar with the provisions of this order that pertain to their operational responsibilities and to exercise their best judgment if they encounter situations that are not covered by it.*" For example, a missed approach occurs following a heavy/B757 aircraft departure or two missed approaches occur simultaneously with the smaller aircraft behind the larger aircraft, and turns for one or both aircraft are not possible. The missed approach/go-around should be handled as a situation not specifically covered by FAA Order JO 7110.65.

Additionally, controller actions must be in accordance with FAA Order JO 7110.65, Paragraph 2-1-2, Duty Priority, which states, "*Because there are many variables involved, it is virtually impossible to develop a standard list of duty priorities that would apply uniformly to every conceivable situation. Each set of circumstances must be evaluated on its own merit, and when more than one action is required, controllers shall exercise their best judgment based on facts and circumstances known to them. That action which is most critical from a safety standpoint is performed first.*" It is incumbent upon controllers as a first priority of duty to establish departure separation as soon as possible after the transition of a missed approach/go-around. When an aircraft executes a missed approach/go-around, controllers must exercise their best judgment, considering the effect of wake turbulence and issuing control instructions to minimize its impact. Also, a wake turbulence cautionary advisory must be issued in accordance with FAA Order JO 7110.65, Paragraph 2-1-20, Wake Turbulence Cautionary Advisories, which states, "*Issue cautionary information to any aircraft if in your opinion, wake turbulence may have an adverse effect on it. When traffic is known to be a heavy aircraft, include the word "heavy" in the description.*"

Lastly, controllers must issue traffic advisories in accordance with FAA Order JO 7110.65, Paragraph 2-1-21, Traffic Advisories, which states, in part, "*Issue traffic advisories to all aircraft (IFR or VFR) on your frequency when, in your judgment, their proximity may diminish to less than the applicable separation minima.*" Issuing these advisories alerts pilots to traffic which may warrant their attention and assist in avoiding wake turbulence.

Nancy B Kalinowski

Nancy B. Kalinowski
Vice President, System Operations Services
Air Traffic Organization

6-14-10
Date Signed